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I. *Aim:* The aim of this quarterly shall be to provide a forum (1) for the discussion of Christian faith and life on the basis of the Lutheran confession, (2) for the application of the principles of the Lutheran Church to the changing problems of religion and society, (3) for the fostering of world Lutheranism, and (4) for the promotion of understanding between Lutherans and other Christians.

II. *Policy:* The editors will welcome contributions that are likely to be helpful in the furtherance of the aims set forth above. It will be required of such contributions that they be frank and fair in their discussion of moot questions; that they be free from controversial animus; and that their contents be of real scholarly and practical value to the readers. Difference of opinion between contributors, or between a contributor and the editors, does not of itself exclude articles from publication since the editors do not hold themselves responsible for the opinions of contributors.

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The Confessional Problem

By Ernest Werner

WHILE it is more usual to speak of the confessional principle, it has become necessary to recognize a confessional problem. More than anything else right now, it is the movement in America to secure Lutheran unity which makes this necessary, since Lutherans differ so remarkably in their appreciation of the problem which comes to light if we ask, What is our contemporary relationship to these documents which belong unmistakably to a past age?

Probably it is futile to argue whether most Lutherans would find a problem in this question, nor is this the point. Yet a surprising variety of answers could be gathered from American Lutheranism today, from the conservative Lutheran who considers himself unconditionally bound to the Confessions to the liberal Lutheran who arrives at different doctrinal conclusions when it seems necessary to do so. Our American Lutheran disunity emerges at this point as something far more than a disunity of organization. The understanding of the confessional principle differs from church to church and is not the least of our differences to be overcome.

The relevance of the Confessions as either confessions or norms becomes more and more problematic as the doctrinal situation of the twentieth century continues to move beyond the doctrinal situation in which Luther's revolutionary discovery was made. Lutheran bodies are continually elaborating fresh doctrinal and confessional statements, and when the Lutheran World Federation met in Minneapolis, it really did the same thing in issuing its "theses." Plainly, it would not have done for them to point dumbly to the Lutheran symbols because they no longer apply directly to us or our world or speak directly for us. Yet we recognize a deep historical relationship between them and ourselves. Exactly what is this relationship? We cannot, of course, dislodge the Confessions from their place in Lutheran history. Neither can we ignore the gap between them and our present age.

My suggestion is that the Lutheran symbols are no longer *our* confessions, the unqualified confessions of contemporary Lutheranism,

but that they are for us the classic documents of our Lutheran identity. Treating them that way, as documents of our identity, offers the possibility of doctrinal freedom together with a grasp of the entire doctrinal organism. These are just the requirements we must meet in dealing with Lutheranism in history, which is the familiar story of persistence through change. The Lutheran identity has persisted in history, but it has not been unmodified by changes and changing influences met on the way. The suggestion made here is an attempt to accommodate this historical fact.

I. The Problem of the Confessions as Norms

An important part of the confessional problem can be exposed by reflecting on the problems that arise in the attempt to apply these Confessions as norms. There are at least four relevant questions we can ask here. First, does the use of these symbols as norms change their character as confessions? Second, what kind of norm are these Confessions thought to be? Third, how does a normative use of the Confessions relate to the fact of doctrinal development and change? Fourth, granting that the different species of Lutheranism and denominational Christianity today are of the Christian church and speak with its authentic voice, can we use the Confessions as norms without making ourselves guilty of an uncatholic arbitrariness?

The first of these questions deserves at least our notice. We must see that the use of these writings as norms and confessions involves two distinct things. A norm, as such, is not a confession, and a confession is not a norm. This is true even if actually some great Christian confessions have arisen from a normative as well as a confessional motive, e.g., the Apostles' Creed. A norm is an authoritative standard for evaluating beliefs, and it remains outside the believer. But a confession in its earliest moment is subjective and spontaneous; any authority it has is in its persuasiveness and appeal. So despite the many practical difficulties which a church faces when it must make and maintain a confession, it is worthwhile asking whether the use of any confession as a norm does not change, or perhaps threaten, its confessional character.

A second consideration is the *kind* of norm which the Confessions are supposed to be. Are the Confessions to be placed above the Bible

itself in an explicit ecclesiastical demand, similar to that of Roman Catholicism, or implicitly, as they are when they are used to determine our approach to the Scriptures which we are then bound to interpret in the way of the Confessions, if not in particular passages at least in the exegesis of Scripture as a whole and in the distinctive Lutheran grasp of the Gospel? For if the Confessions authoritatively regulate our approach to the Bible, then the Bible is not free to be the supreme norm, and we have at best the church's version of the Bible, not the whole literature.

The Confessions themselves understand this perfectly and emphatically place themselves beneath the biblical norm (introduction to the Formula of Concord). These documents offer themselves as witnesses and guides, and of course many Lutherans receive them as that. But this only makes the question of the norm more acute. If the Confessions are not authoritative norms for our interpretation of the Bible, how are they norms at all? Is there such a thing as a subordinate, or secondary, or regulated norm, or does the idea of a subordinate norm disclose an inner contradiction?

Let us quote from a conservative Lutheran theologian his explanation of the secondary norm:

> While Holy Scripture is the absolute norm of faith . . . , the Lutheran Church recognizes its officially received Confessions, or Symbols, as secondary norms . . . , or as true declarations of the doctrines of Holy Scripture, which all Lutheran theologians must confess and teach. For this reason the confessional Lutheran Church demands of all its public teachers and ministers a bona fide subscription to all its Confessions as the pure and unadulterated declarations of God's Word (*quia,* not *quatenus*). . . .
>
> However, while Holy Scripture as the deciding norm . . . is absolutely necessary, the Confessions as the distinguishing norm of the Church . . . are only relatively necessary. The former decides which doctrines are true or false; the latter, whether a person has clearly understood the true doctrines of Scripture.[1]

Plainly, the person here has no chance of regulating the Confessions; it is they which regulate him. On this view, what would happen if a person should dissent from a confessional doctrine in the name of the Bible? He would be told that he is misunderstanding the Bible since it is the Confessions which decide whether a person has clearly

1 J. T. Mueller, *Christian Dogmatics* (St. Louis, 1951), p. 129.

understood its doctrines. Here the person has lost direct access to the Bible, which he may approach only through the confessional medium. It is obvious that this means setting up not a *secondary* but a *second* norm which claims absolute authority over the person. If such a norm really were secondary, it would have to be and remain secondary to the Bible. But the Bible, as one reads it, cannot correct the Confessions, as one reads them, since it is they which determine "whether a person has clearly understood the true doctrines of Scripture." Here an alleged secondary norm has blocked off the so-called primary norm. That the Bible is still considered to be the primary norm is only an illusion, for we can be sure that if Luther speaks the last word for Paul, Paul no longer speaks for himself. A secondary or regulated norm would have to be regulated *by* someone—by the believer on the basis of the Bible. But then it would cease to be a norm! What all this means in the end is that we cannot attribute any real meaning to the idea of a secondary norm.

A third consideration has to do with the relation between a static norm and the fact of doctrinal development and change. We certainly *have* a changed doctrinal situation in the churches of the twentieth century, compared with the situation of the Reformation. This is so for two reasons: there has been a continual activity in theology since then, and the mental background of doctrine has undergone continual and radical change.

The cosmological revolution begun by Copernicus has been a source of change up to the present, and its full effects upon our thought and morale have not been felt until its amplification in twentieth century astronomy. Luther and his friends could not have anticipated this effect, nor could they have guessed how the changed cosmology would alter man's mood and his beliefs, or how this would throw the antiquity of the biblical cosmology into a glaring light.

Our understanding of man has been greatly modified, too. Studies in history and anthropology, including studies in comparative religion, have affected the Christian understanding no less than the secular. The biological discovery announced by Wallace and Darwin a hundred years ago, while not really the first anticipation of organic evolution, opened rifts between science and traditional religion that have not yet been satisfactorily closed, as the press showed clearly in Darwin's centennial (1958).

Perhaps the most important new fact in the doctrinal situation has been the loss of religious infallibility. The Reformation may justly be said to have initiated this movement by smashing the church's infallibility. More recently, through the acceptance of historical knowledge and methods in the study of its Scriptures, the belief in biblical infallibility has had to be given up, and with that has gone belief in religious infallibility of any kind, reminding us that "the truth . . . in Jesus" (Eph. 4, 21) is something quite different from infallible information.

Needless to say, all this has transformed our doctrinal situation as these revolutionary themes have entered the field of doctrinal work, often with disrupting effects. All creative theology today has been transformed in the process, including creative Lutheran theology. The change in the doctrinal situation is too enormous to be ignored, and it challenges the idea of a static doctrinal norm.

Both this challenge and our contemporary appreciation of the church lead to the fourth consideration: Is a particular denominational norm used arbitrarily if it is imposed as the whole doctrinal truth or the only valid version of true doctrine?

The ecumenical movement has inspired the denominations with a recognition that they are all together the church, and it has created a recognition that churches which seem quite strange and remote to us may have, bound up with their strangeness, valuable contributions to the church as a whole. The voice of catholicity has begun to be heard within the denominations, and with it has come the feeling that other Christian churches speak with a validity that is not inferior to our own because it is, in the end, not different from our own. Against this background the individual Creeds and Confessions have lost for many people in all denominations the exclusive authority they once were felt to have. Of course, many religious orthodoxies ignore this situation and remain unsympathetic to the claims of other churches. This is only what we might expect, knowing the tendency toward provincialism that we find in human nature. This condition, fortunately, has not prevented the spread of a more catholic understanding of the church.

It happens to be that Luther, among the Reformers, has influenced our lives and faith and practice as Lutherans more than Zwingli, Calvin, or Knox. So it would seem to be wise to devote proportionately more time to a study of Luther than to the other Reformers, just as

Americans devote more time to a study of English or American history than to other languages and nations. But as the comparison already suggests, a neglect of the others would be intolerably narrow, and only a low grade of patriotism would defend English as in all ways the best language or American history as always the preferred field of historical study. We should feel unduly cramped if we were not permitted to honor our feelings that there are values in other times and places which have surpassed our own. Similarly, we recognize the fortuitousness of being obligated to be on the Lutheran side in all questions or of insisting that wherever Lutherans differ from other Christians, it must always be they rather than we who are "wrong"—indeed, the growing recognition of different doctrinal families makes us wonder whether "right and wrong" ought to be the invariable standard for evaluating every difference that we find. These thoughts, too, render questionable the attempt to use our Confessions as authoritative doctrinal norms.

II. The Problem of the Confessions as Confessions

Passing to a consideration of these documents as confessions, we first have to ask, Whose confessions? We cannot ignore the fact that they are first the confessions of sixteenth century Lutheranism and only after that our Confessions, through accepting our tradition. And however great our loyalty to them, however thorough our assimilation, we recognize that they are not the documents we would compose today if we had to express from the start our faith and doctrine. The problem enters as we measure the difference between our relationship to these documents and the relationship in which their authors stood to them. So conspicuous has this difference become that it is safe to say that there can be no understanding of confessional subscription which does not take it into consideration. The two most prevalent types of confessional subscription in America are preoccupied with it.

One of the major attempts of American Lutheranism to appropriate the Confessions has been the way of "unconditional" doctrinal subscription. Yet qualifications are allowed even here! A person making such a subscription does not bind himself to the exegesis of any particular passage—but only to the exegesis of Scripture as a whole. He does not obligate himself to the philosophical framework of the Con-

fessions—unless this should happen to be involved in the essence of a doctrine. Scientific and historical mistakes are allowed for. Even the *form* of the doctrine is not considered unconditionally binding. Only the pure doctrine remains, and to this, *because* it is the true interpretation of Scripture, a person binds himself with an unconditional pledge.

All these conditions attached to an allegedly unconditional subscription are efforts to compensate for our changed and changing relationship to these documents. There is a valid motive here, namely, the insight that only an unchanged, direct, unqualified relation to the Confessions can pass for a genuine confessional subscription. This unqualified relation is sought by attempting to escape the changes wrought by history in allowing for historical qualifications, on the theory that these can be granted without touching the substance of doctrine. But an examination will show that this attempt is finally futile.

Among the defenses given for the unconditional (doctrinal) subscription is the argument that doctrine is an organic mass, with each part in vital union with every other part, so that a violation of a single element will disturb the whole organism. This argument is strong in its rejection of arbitrary or atomistic doctrinal methods, but it is quite impossible to confine the principle to the realm of doctrine alone, conceived as a substance which transcends any limitations through involvement in history and its relativities. The idea is that historical relativity cannot affect doctrine and that certain elements which plainly do belong to historical relativity—such as one's philosophy or exegesis—do not enter into the doctrinal substance.

This is where the argument breaks down. It is unthinkable to separate one's exegesis from the doctrinal conclusions drawn from it, or to suppose that one's philosophical concepts may enter into the formation of doctrine (as they certainly do) without modifying the doctrine accordingly. For instance, the same principle which connects Luther's christology with his doctrine of the Lord's Supper connects his partly scholastic, pre-scientific ontology with both. Luther's interpretation of the Real Presence, which for him included a "spiritual" presence of Christ's body and blood, was no doubt connected in some measure with his view of the *unio personalis* according to which the two natures of Christ, though distinct, are inseparably and eternally united. But his whole line of thinking is equally bound up with the view that a *physical* body can be present in a *spiritual* mode (Formula of Concord, Article

VII), something that makes no sense to the atomic physics of our century, that is, to our way of conceiving the physical body which Jesus shared with us in a common humanity. Our scientists have arrived at a far more profound insight into the physical world than Luther had, even if their descriptions are imperfect and metaphorical. Short of taking refuge in a mental haze, we cannot understand the notion of a physical being existing in a non-physical way, yet still somehow remaining a physical being. This is but a small item in the changed doctrinal situation of today, but it reminds us that doctrinal formulations cannot escape entanglements with the whole mentality of an age, its style, its limitations. Therefore, doctrines cannot attain to forms which are forever beyond the need of revision.

Our perception of the organic union between historically relative elements and the form-and-substance of doctrine leads us to ask where, if anywhere, historical qualifications end. Doctrines surely do not have a kind of ideal, platonic reality apart from and above their historical forms! The concepts and words in which doctrines are cast *are* the doctrine, and they are anchored in the relativities of history. If one grants historical qualifications, does that not actually *release* us from the doctrinal situation? Any revision in concepts, words, facts means nothing less than a *change in doctrine*. Doctrines are simply ways of stating Christian truth in terms of our ideas, which are imperfect and which are apprehended by our imperfect minds. If we are sometimes in a position to correct former mistakes, this means inevitably a doctrinal change. The only way to avoid such changes is to refuse to allow qualifications of any kind.

The many qualifications allowed to the unconditional subscription reveal a complicated apparatus for dealing with a situation which has lost its former simplicity. This is a tacit admission that even the most whole-hearted confessionalist of today cannot make a pure and simple confessional subscription.

The other major attempt in America to formulate our confessional subscription is to describe it as a subscription "in so far as" the Confessions agree with Scripture. This attempt is admirable in that it does not beg the question whether there may not be something in the Confessions that needs to be corrected by the Bible. There can be no doubt that if we subscribe to the Confessions in so far as they agree with Scripture, the supremacy of the Bible has been secured. Further-

more, there is no reason in principle why such a subscription may not go along with an entire acceptance of the doctrinal corpus. On the other hand, there is no reason why such a subscription may not go along with a 99 per cent rejection of the confessional doctrines! In American Lutheran practice, this subscription has generally worked out in a substantial, a more or less complete, acceptance of the Confessions.

The question we must ask of this type of subscription is whether it is a genuine confessional subscription. Can we have a genuine confessional subscription that is not unqualified? And the answer is No. As soon as any dissent occurs, the confessional edge is blurred. The precise nature of one's confession is unknown. That is why a merely approximate acceptance of the Confessions is unsuitable *if it is really a confession we are after.* We should want to know exactly what differences have occurred, and why, and how they affect the whole doctrinal organism.

In reality, this situation may be unavoidable—I quite believe it is —but since this method considers itself a *confessional subscription,* it has to be pointed out that as such it fails by allowing the confessional edge to be blurred. Hence, while this type of subscription admirably safeguards biblical supremacy, it finally fails in its intention.

The confessional problem, therefore, is that these Confessions cannot be *our* confessions of faith unless they are really unqualified, unreserved. But the striking fact is that there is no unqualified approach to them in American Lutheranism today. This fact deserves profound consideration. Both historical and doctrinal qualifications disturb the original relation of the confessor to his faith. That is, any qualification is an admission that the expression of faith is somehow unsatisfactory. And it must be obvious that eventually the historical no less than the openly doctrinal qualifications blur the confessional edge by throwing a shadow of questions across the form and content of any belief.

None of these observations is meant to cast doubt upon the fundamental fact that the Lutheran Confessions are historically irreplaceable and valuable to us today. The question is rather, How shall we best describe their historical role and their present usefulness and importance? The course of this essay leads to the conclusion that our categories of interpretation, namely, "confession" and "norm," are obsolete

or, strictly speaking, impossible, and that some other category must be found to describe that historical role and interpret their present and abiding significance. We can no longer express, and still less exhaust, our relationship to these documents by approaching them as *our* doctrinal norms or *our* confessions of faith. The great question is, How shall we think of our relationship to them today? *What are they for us?*

III. The Confessions as Documents of Our Identity

My suggestion in the introduction was to recognize the significance of the Lutheran Confessions in that they are the classic documents of our Lutheran identity. This, certainly, is what we want to preserve. When it comes to making a confession of faith, that is something which we must offer ourselves, and it is bound to be a dynamic thing, fluid and growing if we are growing ourselves. According to this hypothesis, the Confessions are *not* norms which predetermine our contemporary doctrinal work or fence it off into certain fields, and they are *not* confessions which providentially anticipate exactly the faith and doctrine we intended to confess, but they are, for us, the documents by which we identify the original Lutheranism and in which, consequently, we find a primary origin of our own spiritual being. Regardless of what they may have been for their authors, *this is what they are for us!*

Identity is the same thing as a particular being. Our identity is our being what we happen to be. The Lutheran identity means the distinctive character of Lutheranism, and we insert the adjective "classic" to show that it is Reformation Lutheranism that we have in mind.

We shall not suppose that the exact identity of Reformation Lutheranism can be duplicated today. Lutheran scholars have pointed out that already in the seventeenth century Lutheranism passed into a phase of Orthodoxism which threatened its dynamic character and made it into something different from what it was in Luther and his friends. We may be sure that Lutheranism has changed continually and that the Lutheranism of different times and lands is more different than we at first think. It is mainly through ignorance that we forget this. As with an individual life, but on a larger, complex scale, the identity of Lutheranism has persisted in history but, as it has absorbed

from its environment or struggled against it, it has undergone a process of continual change. The historical principle involved is that of persistence through change, the survival of an identity even while it is being modified. And we can scarcely escape these dynamics of history! To try to do so, perhaps by imposing on ourselves a rigid "orthodoxy," would prove to be moribund, as the most rigid orthodoxies often are. This is why we cannot be Lutherans as Luther was, or Melanchthon, or anyone else of that age of the Reformation. In this sense the slogan "Forward to Luther" suggests a false goal.

The identity of the Lutheran Church will continue to alter subtly and gradually as long as it is really *in* history. Also, each believer, in an infinitesimal way, alters the situation through participation. Each individual, we know, is a physically, mentally, and spiritually distinct person. And his Christianity, his Lutheranism, will conform to his distinctiveness—he will have his "own" Christianity, his "own" Lutheranism. The unique factor of his identity will color the whole organism of his faith.

This, of course, has always been the case in Christianity. No one who has become familiar with the New Testament can fail to have noticed the great distinctiveness of Paul and John. What different personalities these were! What different orientations they had! What striking variations in their theological approach! Most personalities will not possess the high distinctiveness of these two great men, but each person, to his own degree of distinctiveness, alters Christianity (and Lutheranism) through his participation. The church, in which Paul could see a place for many different members in the one body, should not penalize the development of individuals, and it might remember that any society which does so is stifling its vitality and its creative alternatives. We must boldly accept the fact that each new generation, each new member will modify the persisting identity of Lutheranism.

How can a religious identity change if it is based on an eternal revelation: a revelation of eternal truth? This happens because revelation is received *in* history by people subject to historical laws, it becomes incarnated in churches and men and in their thoughts and beliefs. The Christian identity has varied amazingly through the ages of the church. The sixteenth century German and the twentieth century American, the fifth century Latin and the first century Jew are all different types of

men, yet Christians have been drawn from all of them. The perfect symbol for this fusion of eternity and history is a medieval stained glass window of Christ. It is medieval through and through and Christian through and through, and the two are inseparable. So it is with us and our type of Christianity. Christianity never existed in the abstract. There have been Christians with their Christianity. Identity here stands for the special character of the fusion which occurs between a personality and the revelation it receives.

Now, if the Confessions are the classic documents of our identity, this means that we ought to assimilate them in order to know ourselves and possess ourselves with deeper consciousness and freedom. Our very being is bound up with what these Confessions transmit. Deeper consciousness and freedom require that we assimilate our past, learning how we began, what we are, and why we are that way. Assimilating the Confessions is not a matter of accepting this and rejecting that. It cannot become a question of subjecting ourselves to an alien dominion. Our task is to learn and listen to what these documents have to say, for they bear witness to a reality out of which we have come and to which we belong—although not entirely!

Assimilating the theology of our origin is the way, I should think, in which the course of doctrinal development is properly directed. The dynamics of history demand that there shall be a continual development, adaptation, and fresh appropriation. Even the preservation of our identity demands this, for every living organism must respond to its environment to keep alive. But developments are not the same as aberrations or arbitrary changes. In the Lutheran Church as such there has to be reference to the whole of Lutheran doctrine, past and present, before genuine development can occur.

Assimilation implies a type of acceptance, but it is not that of a doctrinal submissiveness afraid to think its own thoughts. It is the acceptance implied in an acknowledgment of the powers that made us for good or ill. And, of course, an acceptance of this type solves the confusion about the limits of doctrinal freedom. We would eliminate the blurred confessional edge entirely if, instead of offering these documents as our confessions with various unspecified qualifications, we would show them to others and look upon them ourselves as the classic documents of our identity. The task being one of assimilation, we no longer need to draw lines. *All* the content of these documents has to be

understood as hanging together and interdependent. The attempt will be then to grasp the Confessions in their original distinctiveness, their full identity. We accept these Confessions, as they are, as showing the origin of what we are, although they are not the only sources of our identity. At the same time, we possess complete critical freedom over these documents, for we recognize that biblical supremacy cannot be preserved, and doctrinal fortuitousness cannot be avoided, unless this is so. Therefore, our recognition of these writings as classic documents of our identity gives us full doctrinal freedom toward them in conjunction with an entire grasp of the doctrinal organism. Freedom here does not mean release or severance from them; after all, they "are" Lutheranism and we are Lutherans! But it means freedom to participate creatively in historical change, with a creativity that will be directed through the assimilation of these documents.

What we want to avoid in our reverence for the past is becoming arrested in the stage of Reformation Lutheranism and so being unable to speak to new questions, new situations not known to the Reformers. *They* were subject to the relativities of history no less than *we*. And the real, deep, almost instinctive motive we all have in this matter, namely, *to preserve our identity and so our very being,* is frustrated no less by a principle that smashes the distinctiveness of our *present* identity than by a principle that fails to do justice to all the sources of our identity. Therefore, it is assimilation that these documents require, based on our acceptance of them as the documents of our identity. We thus accept them in their entirety for what they are to deepen our knowledge of ourselves and to deepen ourselves, while preserving freedom of conscience in the survey of the whole or the consideration of any doctrinal particular.

The Tension Between Love and Truth

By Martin J. Heinecken

KIERKEGAARD tells of the two men who went up to the temple to pray. The one had the true conception of God objectively, but his inward state was not genuinely humble and worshipful. Therefore he was not in the truth and did in fact worship an idol. The other had an objectively wrong conception of God, and the object of his worship was not the true God, but inwardly he was truly worshipful and grateful in his heart. He was therefore in the truth and worshiped the true God. Here we see it put most boldly. On the face of it, it sounds like the old cliché: it does not matter what you believe, just so you are sincere.

H. Richard Niebuhr recently suggested that the church's purpose is to increase love of God and men upon the earth. Certainly, the end result of the church's existence upon the earth is the increase of love. But this increase of love is not under man's direct control; it is the result of the faithful proclamation of the Gospel. The disciples did not simply go out and preach that men should love one another. This is the preaching of the law that can never save but only accuse. This is precisely what men the world around found it impossible to do. The first disciples went out to preach the good news of what God had done in Christ, that this Christ had died for their sins and been raised again for their justification, that in him there was victory over sin and death and a new life of trust and love, and that this Lord would come again for the fulfillment of God's plan. So this was the first thing incumbent upon the church, the faithful proclamation of the news upon which their redemption depended, so that in the proclamation itself, in the living Word, the Lord of the church himself might be present in their midst. "I am the vine, ye are the branches. Without me ye can do nothing," Jesus had said, and of his presence they were assured only as the Gospel was rightly proclaimed. Only through the faithful proclamation of the Gospel could love among men increase. They must faithfully sow the seed; God alone would give the increase. They must

even let the tares grow along with the wheat until God's own harvest time.

This, then, is the other side of the issue. On the one hand, it seems so obvious that only love matters. On the other hand, the presence of this love depends upon fidelity to the truth, the truth of the Gospel. *Kerygma* and *didache* were thus from the beginning intertwined. The Gospel and all its implications had to be distinguished from other views, it had to be taught to converts and to children, and so there was from the beginning a passionate concern for the truth.

So far I have discussed the tension between truth and love as the tension between fidelity to the Gospel which the church is commissioned to proclaim and the life of love it is under contraint to live.

Now I want to turn for a moment to the tension between love and truth simply in the moral realm. Here, too, some say that love is primary, and for the sake of love even the lie becomes white. On the other hand, there are the rigorous moralists who insist upon the categorical imperative, never under any circumstances whatsoever to tell an untruth. Fichte drew the ultimate consequences when he said, "If my wife must die of the truth, let her die," to which an obvious retort is, "Let's first have a look at Fichte's wife."

In the moral realm all our human relations depend upon our being able to depend upon one another, to take one another at our word. As Kant pointed out, you cannot make into a law universal the maxim that you may on occasion, if it suits, tell a lie, because if everyone did this no one would ever believe anybody, and the efficacy of the lie depends upon its being believed.

What an absolutely devastating thing it is when for the first time a child discovers that it has been deceived. His whole world collapses; he no longer knows upon whom he can depend. The human relationship of trust and love is turned to suspicion and hatred. I know what happened to me as a child when the farmer boys promised to take me to the circus and when the time came they said it was only a joke. No wonder the Catholic moral theologians had trouble with the so-called jocular lie.

When a person has been deceived, not only is his former world of security shattered, but a new world of possibilities is opened up before him in which he is not the deceived but the deceiver. He does not have to say what is so and land in the soup. If he is clever, he can lie his

way out. He can make a pretense; he can be a hypocrite; he can by dissimulation get much further than by strict honesty. Yet once more he may discover, "What a tangled web we weave when first we practice to deceive."

This opens up the problem to us, and we can see its many implications. They appear first of all in theology, both in the concern for the truth of the facts of the historical revelation to which the Bible witnesses and also in a concern for the truth of the doctrines which are connected with these facts and the actual living of the Christian life of love.

Secondly, we can see how the predominance of one interest over the other may determine the characteristics of a church, fundamentalist versus liberal, high and carefully structured versus low and loose in organization, doctrinally strict and not very enthusiastic or socially concerned versus Spirit-filled and more or less indifferent to doctrine. I remember the student interseminary meeting when one boy got up and said, "I have never had a religious experience and I hope never to have one," and several other boys went right through the roof. In ecumenical discussions, those with a concern about right doctrine often appear as unloving obstructionists. They will wreck the place before they will budge one inch on the three genera of the *communicatio idiomatum*. We may ask ourselves in this connection also what temperament has to do with the church a man joins. What about disguised feelings of insecurity and of hostility?

Thirdly, we can see the problems this raises for teachers in the classroom. What does speaking the truth in love mean in the way we teach? Is there such a thing as quite objectively and dispassionately setting forth what is so? What difference does it make that the teacher is within the Christian fellowship, himself one of the witnessing community? How does this affect his perspective, what he sees in the Bible, what is important to him and what is not? If he approaches the Bible with the preconception that all that matters is love and that fidelity to the truth does not really matter, how does this affect his integrity as a scholar? As men of the twentieth century there are many things we cannot hold to be true, and we cannot, out of concern for dear old grandma who firmly believes them, refuse to say so. Yet there are many things we will refuse just to blurt out. At the mission house in Hermannsburg, Germany, I saw the model of the little sailing ship in which

the first missionaries sailed to Africa. Many years before, while I was still in seminary, my teacher told us of the old peasant woman who marveled at the power of God, who had made it possible for such a company of missionaries to get into that ship less than three feet long. Should any man have disillusioned her?

This leads us to the fourth area in which the problem arises, the realm of everyday living, where all the familiar casuistry arises as a result of strict adherence to the truth, when telling the truth is defined as saying what is so, i.e., formal correspondence between the words that are spoken and what is actually so.

Now I want to begin at the end and try to work backwards. Perhaps by discussing the so-called ethical problem of telling the truth we will be able to gain a perspective in the light of which the other problems may be illuminated. I shall lean heavily on what Dietrich Bonnhoefer writes in a brief chapter at the end of his *Ethics*. I shall not try to distinguish between my own words and his. If you think it is good, give Bonnhoefer the credit. If it is not good, I shall take the blame.

Telling the truth is not just a matter, under any and all circumstances, of saying what you believe to be so. No word is ever a word in isolation, but it is always in a very specific context which gives it its meaning. The same word may mean different things depending on who says it, to whom it is said, and in what context it is said. "When the king says, 'Go' and the commoner says 'go,' the words are the same; the difference lies in the authority" (S. K.). So a word of command by a captain on the battlefield or by a policeman directing traffic has its place, achieves a purpose, does not destroy but furthers life together, while the same word in an intimate personal relation may "sever the bonds of mutual confidence."

So a human word is never just a *flatus vocis*, a breath of more or less foul air. The human word reflects the Word of God as it comes to us through the biblical witness. The Word of God is the creative Word through which all things were made. "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made. He spake and it was done. He commanded and it stood fast." It is this Word which became flesh and dwelt among us. When this Word spoke, the lame walked, the blind saw, the lepers were cleansed, the loaves were multiplied, the stormy seas were stilled, the dead were raised up, sins were forgiven, a new life was given for the

old, the demons were driven out, and the kingdom of God was indeed come.

Here is the life-giving Word of God which is itself the Truth, in which speech and action are one. This word is itself action, actually judges and condemns, actually saves and imparts eternal life. Here there is no discrepancy between truth and love. He *is* the Way, the Truth, and the Life, and all three of these are love, for God is love, and here God is manifest in the flesh.

What is true of God's word is, to a lesser degree, also true of the human word, which also is always an action. The human word, too, though it is not absolutely creative like the Word of God which creates *ex nihilo,* also brings into being that which it says. The word of command brings order out of chaos. The word of hate creates hatred and division. The word of love heals, reconciles, unifies. But then it all depends on who is speaking, by what authority he speaks, to whom he is speaking, and the total context of the relationships.

Bonnhoefer, quite true to his own view, cannot be understood except in the context of his own theological orientation. His constant emphasis is on the real, i.e., the actual, world in which we are living, and this is a world disrupted by sin and fallen into contradiction with its origin. It is, however, also the world in which God became incarnate and in which the new age has begun, in which there is the new life in Christ. God is the living God and not a metaphysical idol. This God always asks only very specific things of us in a very specific context. What God asks is love. Love is the fulfillment of the law. It is only, therefore, where there is a new mind and heart of love that what God wants becomes a reality. The divine imperative becomes the divine indicative in the new life in Christ. Out of the right God-relation flows the right relation to the neighbor. "We love because God first loved us" (I John 4:19).

Then this love must manifest itself very concretely in a specific situation, according to time and place and station within the given orders of life, the family, the school, the economic order, etc., and never in abstraction from these.

Being a Christian is not just a matter of a moral character, i.e., of rigidly congealed behavior patterns as the derivation of the word "character" would indicate. Telling the truth and all other moral actions are not a matter of once and for all having come into possession

of a virtue or a moral quality, or having dedicated oneself irrevocably to a universal moral principle. This makes one inflexible and unyielding to the situation. The Christian, however, must be free to do what the moment demands. In this sense the Christian, of all people, has no character, no predictable behavior pattern. His behavior seems arbitrary and contradictory and even unethical. Telling the truth and all other Christian behavior, therefore, are something that must always be learned. This means an ever increasing appreciation of the total reality of life, not only the immediate context, but the total context in which a man lives, horizontally and vertically in both the God- and man-relation, in terms of the fallen as well as the redeemed humanity.

So this is the context: A good act is in love doing God's will in a particular place and time, so that love always takes the form demanded by that situation. Let us apply this to telling the truth. Ordinarily a child first learns from his parents in the home, in a specific relation which is not reversible, that he should tell the truth. The child is to tell his parents the truth and the parent has the right to ask it, but the child cannot make quite the same demand upon the parent, nor does the parent owe the truth to his children in quite the same way. If he were to tell the child exactly what is so, it might become an untruth under the circumstances.

This means that telling the truth means something quite different under different circumstances. The question must always be asked whether and in what way a man is entitled to demand truthful speech of others. Speech is different between parents and children, man and wife, friend and friend, teacher and pupil, ruler and subject, friend and foe. The more intimate the relation, the greater the possibility of openness; hence the complete openness of a man before God, "unto whom all hearts are open and from whom no secrets are hid."

If it is objected that truthfulness is owed to God and conclude that therefore a man must simply at all times say what he believes to be so, then this is to forget that God is the living God who demands concrete obedience in a specific situation. "We must be truthful not in principle, but concretely," in the relations in which we stand. The more complex the situation, the more difficult the telling of the truth becomes. A child related only to his parents has a relatively easy time of it, but a man who has many vocations, as father, husband, breadwinner,

judge, statesman, or detective, or whatever he is, has a much more difficult time of it.

Therefore, telling the truth is something that must be learned anew, so that one may find the right word on each occasion. The "how" of the words becomes important, not only the *what* of what is said and whether or not the words correspond exactly to what is so in an abstract way. Without uttering a word of formal falsehood a man can nevertheless speak flatteringly, presumptuously, or hypocritically. The tone of the voice, the raising of an eyebrow, an accompanying gesture, the circumstances under which something is said, the fact of whether the person is authorized to say what he is saying or not will all make a difference.

If an utterance is to be truthful it must therefore in each case be different. The person who fanatically insists on saying what is so at all times makes no allowance for human weakness, and so he destroys the proper relation between men. He thinks he is serving God, but in reality he is serving Satan who is the father of the lie. In Bonnhoefer's words, "he wounds shame, desecrates mystery, breaks confidence, betrays the community." Whether a man may speak in judgment of another depends again on the circumstances and the given orders of life. The parent may judge the child's conduct. The preacher in the pulpit, in his pastoral care, must proclaim the law of God in judgment and condemnation. He must tell the truth, but he must do so in love. "God's truth," Bonnhoefer says, "judges . . . out of love." Satan and the old Adam in us judge out of envy and hatred.

Of course, this view has its dangers because it sounds as though one can now play fast and loose with the truth, adapt it to one's convenience, and so obliterate the line between truth and falsehood. Or one can adopt what Bonnhoefer calls a calculating or schoolmasterly attitude, so that from your lofty perch you compute just what percentage of the truth you think you can let a man have—like shots of penicillin.

But this is a misunderstanding and fails to see how the total situation is to be determinative. The word in the home is different from the word in public. The word of command has its place, as well as the judging word and the forgiving word. "Each word must have its own place and keep it." It must be rooted and have a home. But because of the omnipresence of words through our methods of mass communica-

tion, words lose their place; they become homeless and rootless, and so life becomes a texture of lies. Here the sanctity of the orders of life comes in, and when "these . . . orders no longer respect one another, words become untrue."

Bonnhoefer tells the story of the boy who was asked by a teacher in school if it were true that his father had come home drunk. The boy said, "No." Though formally untrue, the boy gave the proper answer when he protested against this intrusion into the privacy of the family. If the boy had been more mature he might have avoided the formal untruth with some kind of explanation, but under the circumstances he rose to the situation in the only way of which he was capable. The teacher had no right to humiliate him in this way before the other boys. The boy displayed a sense of honor on a higher level than the brutal telling of the truth by its fanatical devotee.

So you cannot define a lie as a statement which is formally untrue, even if you qualify it by saying that it must be done consciously and deliberately and not in ignorance. Here the common feeling that *all* lying is wrong is right and should be upheld. Since all formal untruths, however, are not held to be wrong but may under certain circumstances be considered good, they should not be called lies or even white lies.

The definition of a lie as a *conscious discrepancy between thought and speech* is also inadequate because this would, e.g., include the most harmless April Fool joke; it would make impossible being an actor or a detective or even a polite person.

Nor can one say that a lie is "a deliberate deception of a man to his own detriment" because then one becomes involved in all the casuistry of the so-called white lie. If a deceptive word that is told to an insane person is called a lie, then lying gets a false sanction. It would be better to call this word the true word under the circumstances.

The concept of the lie must therefore be sought on a deeper level. A lie is primarily the denial of God as he has evidenced himself to the world. Satan is the father of the lie (John 8:44), and (according to I John 2:22) "he is a liar who denies that Jesus is the Christ." Therefore, Bonnhoefer says, "The lie is a contradiction of the Word of God which God has spoken in Christ and upon which creation is founded." The lie, whether it be by speech or silence, is "conscious and deliberate destruction of the reality which is created by God and consists in God." Our words, therefore, "must be in harmony with the Word of God,

to express the real as it exists in God," and when we are silent this is "to signify the limit which is imposed upon our words by the real as it exists in God."

But since the world in which we live is a fallen world, a world of disruption and inner contradiction, this, too, must be taken into account. The world is in need of reconciliation and healing. We always stand within the different orders of the real and their claim upon us in a sinful context. So while we strive toward reconciliation we are drawn into the prevalent disunion and conflict. Neither the Fall nor God's Word of creation nor the word of reconciliation in which all disunion is overcome are to be denied.

Perhaps this will explain how Bonnhoefer, who was so devoted to life-together-in-love, to reconciliation and peace, to being truthful at all times, to acting always in love, could take part in the plot against Hitler. He could not extricate himself from this situation and let others attempt what the moment called for so that he might share in the benefits without sharing in the risk. This was the will of God for him in that situation. This was the truth for that hour.

So Bonnhoefer comes to a simple conclusion. He speaks the truth who considers three things: (1) Who causes me to speak and what entitles me to speak? (2) What is the place at which I am standing? (3) How do I relate to this context the object about which I am making some assertion?

Here the fragment ends, but it is enough, I think, to give us real direction.

Between love and the telling of a formal truth there is tension. Between the demands of love and the ethical universal there is tension, but this tension is resolved when it is seen that the loving action is the true action under the circumstances. This may help us now, working backward, to solve the other problems we have raised.

Our concern is for the proclamation of the truth as over against the increase of love. But what we have said would seem to indicate that this is a false disjunction. The concern for the truth of God is as inseparable from the concern for love as is the love of God from the truth of God, for the truth is that God is love, and not in some abstract sense. "God is love" means something very specific. This is not an abstract truth at which man's reason can arrive by contemplation. This is not a definition. What this sentence means is clear only through the

self-revelation of God in acts never unaccompanied by interpreting words that make clear the action.

It all hinges on whether or not we think that the right God-and-man relation is a human possibility that men can discover for themselves anywhere and at any time. Is love in the specifically Christian sense a possibility anywhere or is it tied up with the proclamation of the events to which the Bible witnesses? It all depends on whether we think that the human predicament can be solved just by so-called loving actions, giving bread to the hungry, etc., or whether something else is called for.

There is a legitimate concern involved when the Quakers divorce their help entirely from any missionary appeal. They want the recipients to feel that their gifts have no strings attached but are intended solely to help them in their need. The price of a cup of coffee and a brief shelter from the blast is not to be having your soul harangued. The Good Samaritan did not propagandize his captive audience strapped fast to his ass. Jesus made no prior stipulations but helped all who came to him in accordance with their need.

But we know very well that this was not all Jesus did. He came teaching as well as healing. He made very definite claims and demands. All his actions are meaningless apart from their interpretation. This interpretation is, however, a post-Pentecost interpretation. Only after the promised Spirit was sent did people understand, did the church and its mission begin. Before the day of Pentecost they only sat and waited. Only in the enlightenment and power of the Holy Spirit were they a *koinonia* with a message and a mission, viz., the proclamation in word and deed of the truth of God, of what he had done in Jesus, the promised Christ. This means that an actual transformation of life was absolutely inseparable from entering into this new fellowship.

Now we can go back to what we said about telling the truth which is other than merely a formal verbal correspondence with what is so. To possess the truth of God is something other than a formal correspondence between words or thoughts in the head and something objective and outside of the mind to which these ideas correspond or with which they are identical. This is not what the Bible means by knowing God. God is not a reality corresponding to my idea of him in my mind, any more than my wife or any person is. We just have to rid ourselves of such Platonic notions. To know God is to be known

of him, and this is a matter of right relationship, as has so often been pointed out after the analogy of the sexual relation. The God of the Bible does not correspond to any single idea in man's mind. He is not the archetype of an idea. He is the living God who confronts man, stands over against him, addresses him, face to face, eye to eye, even though this is in a medium or mask.

Therefore we have no simple God-idea in the Bible but a complex picture of God in his actions, which, of course, are always inseparable from interpretive words. Even when we reduce all of what God is into one word and say that God is love, this does not give us a simple idea in our minds to which God corresponds. For one thing this love of God, we also say, is holy love. God's love is on the background of his holiness, and this holiness is not just moral perfection; it is God's otherness. God in his love cannot be defined by giving the genus and the differentia. There is no higher genus, such as "being," under which we can subsume God. He is rather the ground of all being.

What the sentence, "God is love," means in the Christian sense only he knows who has, in either faith or offense, experienced this God as he reveals and imparts himself. The referend of the word "God" is not in itself clear. We fox around with this word "God" as though it had a commonly recognized meaning. We ask, Do you believe in God? We say we can prove God exists, or that there is no God, and we act as if these were meaningful sentences, when they are not at all. Does God mean a supreme being (whatever that means)? Or a perfect being (whatever that is)? Or a first cause? Or an architect of the universe? Or an unmoved mover? Or a highest good? Or a what?

Or does it mean simply that unknown Other who confronts us in our existence, of whose presence we are inescapably aware, whose claim upon us we feel, whose power over us overwhelms us, whose inescapable judgment we dread, but whose heart and will, whose disposition toward us, we do not know until he himself makes it known in personal encounter. Is it the God of the philosophers or is it the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, i.e., the God who in Jesus, in the power of the Holy Spirit, is made known? The sentence, "God is love," can therefore mean a thousand things, and what it means in the Christian sense only he will say who has been touched and transformed by that God in his self-manifestation either in faith or in offense, and this self-manifestation takes place only where this God is truly proclaimed.

Thus there have to be affirmations of faith in the form of sentences, but these are the assertion neither of self-evident truths nor of universal truths of the reason which beam their certainty to us because we are reasonable creatures. "God is love" is not a self-evident truth of the reason. Neither do the affirmations of faith concern ordinary matters of fact which can be established with greater or less degree of probability, depending on the evidence, etc. No matter of fact is ever absolutely certain or indubitable. It has only a degree of probability and could always be otherwise. With respect to all matters of fact we are in the realm of probability. Therefore the *certainty of faith* is a different kind of certainty. It exists in the relationship which is in need of constant renewal. Hence a man must always hear the Word of God again and again. It is this which stands fast.

The affirmations of faith, therefore, while they certainly involve historical events which took place at a time and place, cannot simply be established as other events are. The revelatory events in which God is active are not directly discernible by contemporaries nor establishable in retrospect by a later historical investigator. They are discernible only in God-given faith or offense and are so witnessed to. The man on the cross, apart from the interpretation put upon this event by chosen witnesses whom God enlightened, can be discerned to be only the death of a good man or a deluded man, or it can be mistakenly interpreted as the death of a half-god or something equally fantastic. This establishes the inseparability of event and interpretation.

The separation of *kerygma, didache,* and moral exhortation thus becomes quite impossible. From the beginning they are tied together. All the first witnesses were concerned that their witness should be true. St. Paul called down a curse upon the perverter of the Gospel (Gal. 1:8). Peter is sure that the apostles have not followed cunningly devised fables (II Peter 1:16). St. John witnesses to what they have seen with their eyes and their hands have handled of the word of life (I John 1:1-3). But to which of them did it ever occur to separate this witness to the truth from the love manifested in that truth and from the transformation to a new life of love which that witness occasioned? "Herein is love, not that we love God, but that he loved us and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins. Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another" (I John 4:10).

So where the Gospel was rightly proclaimed, there the love of

God was magnified, and nowhere else. The concern for truth was precisely the concern for love. There can be no question about this. To say that it made no difference whether or not what the apostles said was true, just so people loved one another, is a plain contradiction of the record. Everywhere the witnesses went they found people loveless, fearful, biting and devouring one another, without hope in the world, and they came to them with what they believed to be the only true answer to their need. They found people worshiping false gods and they proclaimed the true God; they found them with false estimates of themselves, wrong self-understandings, and they set out to correct them, precisely in order to make known to them the love of God and to bring them into the fellowship of love.

But now we must remember a few things. How quickly and easily these two concerns became divorced! This was the problem from the start, as we see not only from James, but also from Paul, for whom this business of faith without works was no less a problem. Therefore the constant concern should be to make clear that the truth was at all times the kind of truth one can never accept just with the top of the head, but always only through inner participation and transformation. It always sets you before a decision. It always means either faith or offense. And when men forget this, they let their concern for a formally correct truth take precedence over their concern for the spread of love. For then it is no longer God's truth for which they are concerned but their own truth. Then they are confusing man-made theological propositions with the living Word of God.

Here what we said before about the meaning of a word in different circumstances should come back to us. A word is always a different word under different circumstances. Even words which are carefully defined by the dictionary and have a generally accepted meaning take on a different meaning depending on the circumstances. So the word "swine" is a perfectly harmless word, but said in a certain context with a certain intonation it can be dynamite.

It is hopeless, therefore, to suppose that in certain words or in certain fixed doctrinal formulations we can capture the truth for all times. To speak the truth we must speak the word that is true in a particular time and place. A repeated formula may become utterly untrue and distorted and say something quite different once it is removed from the context in which it was first spoken. All theology is addressed

to a situation, and to understand it we must understand it in its context. It is not a matter, therefore, of a simple establishment of a correspondence between the words spoken and that to which these words correspond. The words must be true to the situation and must say in that situation what is in harmony with the faith once and for all delivered. This means that theology is in constant flux and that, in order to say the same thing, it must in a different context be said differently. The Chalcedonian Christology, e.g., which arose in a certain historical situation must be understood in the light of that situation, what it was intended to refute and what to safeguard. The mere repetition of this formula is no safeguard of the truth. If the acceptance of this formula, divorced from its context, is made a matter of a man's eternal salvation, then precisely that divorce between truth and love takes place. As soon as it becomes an intellectual formulation to which I can give assent, so to speak with the top of the head only, the damage is done. Then it is his own truth about which a man is concerned, not God's. Then loveless fanaticism takes the place of loving concern for the truth. There is a difference between the passionate concern which moved St. Paul and the great Reformers of the church and that of people with a one-sided concern for fixated, doctrinal affirmations.

All of them, without exception, were concerned about doctrinal reform, about a restatement of the truth that had become distorted, precisely because they thought that thereby God's great, unbounded love had become distorted and compromised. Whenever men say they have no interest in doctrine but only in loving deeds, it can not possibly be for any other reason than that they substitute another set of doctrines. It is never true that men do not care what others hold to be true, just so their actions are right, for they know right well that what men do is inseparable from what they hold to be true. The natural scientist comes into conflict with the church precisely because of what he holds to be true as over against what he thinks the church holds to be true. Therefore, both need to examine the claim to truth which they make. The church's claim to truth must never be to a truth of the reason or to an investigable historical phenomenon with which men can deal and which they can establish in accordance with their own criteria of true or false. The church proclaims the personal Truth, with whom we must enter into a personal relation of trust, confidence, and obedience. It proclaims the truth in matters of ultimate concern

which can never be established in a so-called objective way. That is why it is affirmed only through inner participation in either faith or offense.

Perhaps, if this is so, we can see what prompts men into a certain kind of church where they have an externally guaranteed authority, an infallible hierarchy, an infallible book, or a once and for all fixated system of dogmas. These are under our control, they are at our disposal, they are manipulable—but not so the Word of God which it must be our constant concern to hear and to proclaim. If it is *our own* truth that is our concern, we grow loveless and fanatic. If it is *God's* truth that is our concern, we cannot help but be passionate about it, because it is only in passionate inwardness that we can hold this truth that has shed abroad in our hearts the love of God that both judges and redeems us. It is always when we have not yet let go completely of all human security that is at our own disposal that we become loveless. This is the subtle power of *hybris*. This is so at all the points of our impotence, the turns of fate that end in death, the accusations of guilt that end in condemnation, and the search for truth and meaning that ends in meaninglessness. Out of the state of anxiety that always precedes the leap into sin, we grasp at our own truth, our own formulation of it, and then we cling to it heartlessly and fanatically. We do the judging instead of submitting ourselves and others to the judgment of God.

The Theology of Pastoral Care

By David Belgum

WHY is *doing* error taken less seriously than *thinking* or *speaking* error? If a preacher were publicly to deny the doctrine of grace, he would be summarily tried and defrocked. Yet if he obstructs the free flow of grace by hasty reassurance and premature absolution before the parishioner has had a chance to confess fully the nature of his sin or, on the other hand, rejects the penitent with disgust and shock, sending the person away despairing of the love and mercy of God, the church does not discipline the pastor.

Pastoral care provides the parish minister with a tangible check on his theology, for he often discovers embarrassing discrepancies between what he preaches from the pulpit or teaches to his catechetical class and those beliefs he is really ready and willing to act upon—in short, his *real* beliefs. The Communion sermon might go something like this: "God forgives the penitent freely out of his boundless love and unmerited grace. 'Though your sins be as scarlet, they shall be white as snow.' 'There is more joy in heaven over one sinner who repents than over ninety and nine who need no repentance.' " After the service an excited and eager informer from the Ladies' Aid inquires solicitously of the preacher if he feels that what has been going on between Mr. X. and young Alice J., one of the older catechumens, is quite right, especially since Mr. X. is a married man and Mrs. X. is expecting a baby any day now. The pastor severely chastises Mrs. Big Mouth for bearing such unthinkable false witness against one of the most dedicated men on the church council. Of course, the acid test comes Monday morning when Mr. X. walks into the pastor's study instead of going to work and says, "Pastor, is it really true what you said in your sermon yesterday, that God can forgive anything?" The preacher-theologian tries to remember whether he used the phrase *simul iustus et peccator* yesterday or the Sunday before. Theology is suddenly going to be vitally important for Mr. X. and his wife and the expected baby who will be baptized in the church a couple months from now, and equally significant for Miss Alice J., and perhaps her parents. How the grace

of God is translated and applied to this ticklish and complex human situation by means of pastoral care can make a far more crucial impression on these souls than many an intellectual statement about the doctrine of grace.

Somehow it has become easier to classify actions as adiaphora than thoughts and words. Perhaps the admonition of St. James is pertinent here: "But be doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving yourselves" (James 1:22).

Theology Demands Expression

Great and moving beliefs cannot be contained in a vacuum or ignored. They must find an outlet, motivate one to some specific service or response.

Prophecy against a proud and self-satisfied people and against social injustice dates back to the early beginning of the people of God as a natural outgrowth of their faith in God. A closely allied expression was an intensive effort to preserve the true faith against all error, idolatry, or dilution.

Witnessing about the good news of the kigdom is highlighted in the early church as the inevitable response to the great theological fact of the resurrection.

Sacramental action in the specific form of Baptism and the Lord's Supper had its Old Testament counterpart in sacrifice and ceremony.

Instruction in order that believers might know ever more fully the God who had revealed himself through Christ is a self-evident demand of theology itself and was early appreciated as a necessity in the experience of the church.

Pastoral care is, among many others, a natural expression of theology. It is the love of God translated into specific help for people under special stress or with particular needs. One quickly senses the interrelatedness of such loving concern with the above sample expressions which theology demands. The greatest prophets were not preaching just for its own sake but because of a love and concern for their people; they were caring for their spiritual welfare. And is not the care of the individual the whole reason for administering the sacraments and the work of evangelism. Whatever is unique about pastoral

care, we must also agree that there is an aspect of it in all the work and activity of the church.

Definition and Terminology

Webster defines care as "charge, oversight, or management, implying responsibility for safety; as under a doctor's *care*. 'The *care* of all the churches,' II Cor. 11:28." (The RSV translates it "anxiety.") Interestingly the Latin term for care is *cura,* meaning medical attendance. Yet one sees that the second definition of cure in the dictionary is "spiritual charge, care of souls; the office of a parish priest or of a curate. . . ." It is understandable that current emphases should stress the cure aspect of pastoral care, but it will be pointed out later that there is a need for a broader definition.

In the Old Testament the term *hesed* is frequently found to describe the kindness, favor, good deeds, mercy, and pity involved in what we would consider pastoral care or concern. It is usually translated as lovingkindness or mercy.

Three New Testament words have a bearing on our understanding this concept. The word *merimna* means care or concern, but it has too much of the aspect of anxiety in it in some verses to be a completely adequate term. Nevertheless, it is used in I Corinthians in comparing believers with members of the Body of Christ: ". . . that the members of the body may have the same care for one another; if one member suffers, all suffer together; if one member is honored, all rejoice together." The word describing how the Good Samaritan cared for the victim by the roadside is *epimeleomai,* yet it is not used very often. The term for shepherding (*poimaino*), literally to tend a flock or herd or lead them to pasture, figuratively to protect, rule, govern, foster, is frequently used of Christ and the ministry.

It is difficult and perhaps impossible to find in the Scriptures any one term or phrase that would be equivalent to our current usage of pastoral care. Seward Hiltner has proposed the concept of "perspectives"[1] to replace the more rigid categories of pastoral "offices" according to which the work of the ministry was divided into separate and

1 Seward Hiltner, *Preface to Pastoral Theology* (New York, 1958), Chapter IV, "Perspectives."

rather isolated compartments. "The term 'perspective' suggests that there is a certain point of view in the subject who is performing the viewing or feeling or helping. But it implies also that this subject is not completely described by this slant or point of view."[2]

Pastoral care as a general approach or orientation in theory and practice permeates and is interrelated with other branches of theology as well as other ministerial functions. It would be possible to use pastoral care in the sense of loving pastoral concern for people, in which case it ought not to be absent from any activity of the church. As a motive it should permeate preaching, church administration, the instruction of the young, work with fellowship groups, and all the rest. To paraphrase a passage of Scripture we could say, "We care for others because God first cared for us."

Paul Johnson contrasts pastoral care with public leadership. This is true in a sense because we hesitate to share our most painful hurts or grievous sins in public. When pastoral care has been performed in public, there have sometimes been serious consequences, as in the case of a young couple who had to get married as a result of indiscreet intimacies at a Sunday School picnic. The pastor and father agreed that before they could be married or re-accepted into the fellowship of the congregation, they must confess their sin publicly before the congregation. A series of later pastors, a mental hospital staff, and a private psychoanalyst all agreed that this traumatic experience of public shame was crucial in fixating this woman in her psychoneurotic and hypochondriacal pattern for life. Johnson offers the following definition of pastoral care: "Pastoral care may be defined as a religious ministry to individual persons in dynamic relationships, arising from insight into essential needs and mutual discovery of potentialities for spiritual growth."[3] Those who desire a more explicitly Christian definition will prefer Willibald Demal's definition: "It is the main task of pastoral care to transmit to the human soul the grace of God, to keep and sustain the human soul in this state of grace, and thus to educate the human being 'unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ' (Eph. 4-13). It is obvious that the degree of success attending this task will be in proportion to the pastor's knowl-

2 Seward Hiltner, *op. cit.*, p. 18.
3 Paul Johnson, *Psychology of Pastoral Care* (New York, 1953), p. 24.

edge of the natural characteristics and particular conditions of the soul entrusted to his care."[4]

Pastoral care is special, added, and individualized help offered to an overwhelmed person in a stressful situation or undergoing a crisis in his life. Needed therefore is a specific and individualized adaptation and application of the Word and will and grace of God over and above that offered through the standard and regular ministries of the church, such as preaching and the administration of the sacraments.

Semantics and the Search for Cognates

Unclear definition of terms has made a host of unnecessary enemies between various disciplines, not least of which has been the shadow boxing between the behavioral sciences and theology. Demal's attitude, quoted above, which shows an appreciation for "knowledge of the natural characteristics and particular conditions of the soul," goes a long way toward furthering co-operation between these two fields.

Often psychotherapists and pastors have discovered how similar their aims were when both had dealt with the same patient. Both have been working toward such goals as reconciliation, "acceptance of the unacceptable" (which, I believe, is Tillich's phrase), freedom from egocentric bondage unto an "abundant life," more adequate interpersonal relationships, etc. On the other hand, many over-zealous and not too profound bridge builders have glibly equated terms that are not truly equivalent. *Redemption* is not identical with therapy, which might or might not be an aspect of redemption in a given case. *Sin* is not necessarily synonymous with neurosis or maladjustment; the better question might be, when is it cause and when is it effect? Catharsis is not always *confession,* which has as a necessary implication repentance and contrition and all that these terms imply, such as responsibility and accountability. *Forgiveness* is more demanding than acceptance, as evidenced by the fact that the psychotherapist has no real equivalent to the church's forms of absolution.

Pastoral care has been able to utilize many of the terms and concepts developed by psychology, sociology, psychiatry, and anthropology in understanding the role of the pastor in connection with Holy Com-

4 Willibald Demal, *Pastoral Psychology in Practice,* translated by Joachim Werner Conway (New York, 1955), p. 6.

munion (particularly when administered to the sick) and the great crises and events of confirmation, marriage, and the funeral. In many ways this has not been a fair dialogue, for the church has not offered its insights specifically and effectively to the workers in the behavioral sciences.

Questions and Answers Involved in Pastoral Care

Questions asked of theology frequently arise from the pastoral care situation. The Church of England hospital chaplains have compiled a provocative little book suggesting some of these questions.[5] There is the problem of suffering and evil; whence its source and power? The crisis of death raises inevitably the question of man's ultimate destiny and personal eschatology. "What is the relation between healing and faith?" asked a group of pastors in a summer clinical pastoral training course.

What shall be a Christian anthropology capable of undergirding pastoral care? Should it be optimistic or pessimistic? The minister in the situation of pastoral care wants to know the practical implications of such theological terms as "total depravity," "predestination," "freedom of the will," and "the new man in Christ."[6] What does Scripture say of man's self-concept, and how much and what kind of self-love is allowed in the passage about loving the Lord with our whole heart and our neighbor as ourself? And is it true that the biblical concept of man places him in community—the people of Israel in the Old Testament dispensation and the fellowship of the New Testament church.

These basic questions should be directed toward theology for metaphysically and logically stated answers that hang together in a coherent whole. They are not the kind of questions that should be directed toward the social and physical sciences.

Questions directed toward the behavioral or social sciences are constantly arising from the practice of pastoral care. An excellent Roman Catholic work in this field sympathetically points out why the church must take cognizance of the contributions of the social sciences.

5 *A Priest's Work in Hospital,* edited by J. Gordon Cox (London, 1955).

6 See an article by Paul W. Pruyser, "Toward a Doctrine of Man in Psychiatry and Theology," *Pastoral Psychology,* Vol. IX, No. 82 (March, 1958), pp. 9-13. Also, David E. Roberts, *Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man* (New York, 1950).

"As faithful Catholics, we do not doubt for a moment that grace can accomplish anything and everything. But the priest, as an instrument of God upon earth, must do his best to remove anything that could make the operation of grace more difficult."[7] It is interesting to note that the man who wrote the introduction to this book holds the title of professor of Pastoral Medicine in the University of Vienna. Yes, for an understanding of those many impedimenta that "make the operation of grace more difficult," be they brain tumor, alcoholism, schizophrenia, environmental or genetic factors, emotional, social, or physical influences and pressures, we turn gratefully to the vast researches of cultural anthropology, sociology, social and personal psychology, psychiatry, and other fields of medicine. These are the resources when such questions as the following are asked by the pastor: "What physical and mental endowments does this parishioner have with which to meet his life situation that seems at present too difficult for him?" "What are the latent and obvious causes for this man's behavior (not to be confused with questions about first cause)?" "What are the present stresses against which this man is wrestling—disease, physical handicap, social pressures, fears, both concrete and imagined?"

Why have some churchmen feared these so-called secular sciences in understanding man when they have not hesitated to use archeology, philology, history, comparative literature, and even physics and chemistry to study the Word of God, date old manuscripts, and get a clearer understanding of the meaning of certain passages of Scripture. Think of the scientific fields utilized to prepare a lexicon for the help of exegetical theologians. Yes, it is legitimate to direct many questions from the practice of pastoral care toward the social and behavioral sciences.

Answers come from the other branches of theology, not only citing examples but giving the rationale behind this ministry.

Exegetical Theology is a good place to begin to look for answers because for the Christian ministry it is a basic foundation. Professor Sitler has given a dramatic example of how pastoral care cannot be derived easily or glibly or obviously from an accurate reading of

7 Erwin Ringel and Wenzel Van Lun, *The Priest and the Unconscious*, translated by Meyrick Booth (Westminster, Maryland, 1954), p. 10.

Scripture.[8] He told about a group of professors of Christian Ethics who had adjourned from a discussion meeting for lunch in central Manhattan when suddenly they came upon a man who had just been struck by a taxi. One of their number was quick to lean forward and act on his Christian impulse to follow the example of the Good Samaritan when a native New Yorker restrained him and said it was against the law to move a stricken man, that an ambulance had already been dispatched from Bellevue Hospital with a trained emergency intern to assist the man. Sure enough, while they were still speaking, the sound of the siren drew nearer. In this case it was necessary to translate Scripture from one historical and cultural setting to another, as well as from the Greek to the English language. In fact, this is a principle accepted by all except extreme literalists.

In listing dependent and needy people, Holy Scripture includes the stranger and his need of hospitality and care (Gen. 18:2-5 and Jer. 9:2). The lost wanderer of the desert sands was helpless without the concern of some man fortunate enough to have a tent, food, and water. His need of these basic elements was so similar to that of sheep that it was quite natural for the figure of the shepherd to be applied to those caring for the people of God. All travel was hazardous, and no shepherd knew when he might need just such help to save his own life. Care and guidance of children was as obvious as the special care needed for the little lambs in the flock. We see this in many references to the fatherless.

Although religious leaders were to be concerned for the welfare of the people of Israel, a great deal of what we would today call pastoral care was not done by professional people but was rather taken care of within the family and tribal structure. Prophets spoke out mainly to correct economic and social oppression. Let us consider, as just one example, the care of the aged, which is becoming acute in our own generation. In Ps. 71 we read a rather pathetic plea: "Do not cast me off in the time of old age; forsake me not when my strength is spent." This prayer is addressed to God, but perhaps also to the children who are now in their strength of maturity, no longer dependent on the aged and weakening parents. Perhaps there is some lurking

8 An illustration used by Joseph Sitler in a sermon in Central Lutheran Church, Minneapolis, May 5, 1958, on the occasion of the dedication of the headquarters of the Lutheran Welfare Society of Minnesota.

fear that children will not remember the Fourth Commandment or fail to practice it in this crucial time. In Prov. 20 we read: "The glory of young men is their strength, but the beauty of old men is their gray hairs." Joseph, long before the commandment about parent-child relations was formally stated, was deeply concerned for his old father and provided for his latter years. Pastoral care must translate these answers from Scripture into the mid-twentieth century situation of scattered families, broken families, rapid mobility and migratory laboring groups, urban efficiency apartments, periods of recession or unemployment, technological and cultural changes.

Jesus made his pastoral care of people as the Good Shepherd very specific and direct. He instituted the laying of hands on the sick (Mark 16:18), and in sending out the seventy he instructed them, "Heal the sick that are therein, and say to them, 'The kingdom of God is come nigh unto you'" (Luke 10:9). The care of Peter for those in need was so effective that "the people also gathered from the towns around Jerusalem, bringing the sick and those afflicted with unclean spirits, and they were all healed" (Acts 5:16). There is much we can learn from Scripture, not only about what pastoral care is and how it should be carried out, but also what the rightful responsibility of other than religious professionals (such as parents, children, fellow believers, etc.) should be.

Historical Theology provides yet another kind of answer for the questions of pastoral care as it unfolds and makes available the experiences and traditions of the church for two thousand years. If church history teaches us anything, it should be to be leary of fads and extremes which have unbalanced the total mission of the church. Thus this discipline will guard us from over-exaggerating pastoral care in this day of enthusiastic acceptance of healing, counseling, and psychotherapy. Those who have lived through the Religious Education fervor of the 1920's will recognize the danger of such panaceas and narrow-mindedness.

During the Middle Ages numerous monastic orders and lay brotherhoods rendered pastoral care to the sick and needy, the distressed and troubled. In that cultural setting there was not so much competition for the privilege of doing welfare and health work, counseling, and guidance as there is today, when special associations have been formed to serve each category of need, whether it be cerebral

palsy and tuberculosis or the mentally ill and mentally retarded. We must remember that in the Middle Ages the church was the chief source of care.

Many changes came with the Reformation, since it accompanied as well as caused a general upheaval in the structure of society. New ideas about the relationship between church and state and about the obligation of the church to society made radical changes in the welfare and health work of the church as well as in the understanding and practice of pastoral care.

Historical perspective is needed by those performing pastoral care. The missionary movements, the coming and going of various theological emphases and ecclesiastical practices, as well as the background of the local parish and its synod must all be understood and kept in mind by the pastor in his work with individuals as well as in the rest of his ministry.

Systematic Theology provides pastoral care with the necessary over-all framework within which to function. Without the guide lines and correctives of such a comprehensive framework, pastoral care can become merely another group of techniques and expediencies to achieve the "good adjustment" of man to himself—in short, anthropocentric.

William Whyte gives us a devastating picture of the church of suburbia to which his "organization man" belongs. He quotes Pastor Leinberger's view that the goal of the church is human relations pure and simple.

> I think this is the basic need—the need to belong to a group. You find this fellowship in a church better than anywhere else. And it is contagious. In a community like Park Forest, when young people see how many other people are going to church regularly, they feel they ought to. Another need is that of counseling. Young people want a place to take their problems and someone to talk to about them. Put all these things together and you get what we're after—a sense of community. We pick out the more useful parts of the doctrine to that end.[9]

How desperately this pastor and church need some of the doctrines of the church which stress the eternal perspective. I cannot vouch for the musical or literary merit of the hymn in question, but it is doubtful

9 William H. Whyte, Jr., *The Organization Man* (New York, 1956), pp. 406, 407.

if this church ever sings the one that begins, "I'm but a pilgrim here; heaven is my home."

The late Professor David E. Roberts wrestled with the relationship between doctrine and care. His approach is to be preferred far above the one held by the pastor of suburbia.

> Since every one faces theological questions in one way or another, how he decides them will have a profound bearing upon his interpretation of the meaning of the psychological facts. Our normative criteria concerning what is good and bad for man, both psychologically and ethically, cannot be divorced from our world-views concerning "man's place in the cosmos."[10]

So we see that pastoral care cannot operate apart from the other branches of theology any more than can homiletics or catechetics or their tangible expressions in preaching and Christian education.

Answers are also provided by the behavioral and social sciences. The Roman Catholic study already mentioned presents a wholesome attitude toward the contributions of psychotherapy to the practice of pastoral care. The authors say, "In the care of souls, we can employ not only the means provided by faith, but also those offered us by nature."[11] And David Roberts wrote: "The task of formulating a theological interpretation of man must be tackled afresh in each generation, and what one attempts to say from a Christian perspective can hardly be related effectively to the thought of this generation if it ignores or fails to comprehend the recent contributions which have been made to a 'science of man.' "[12] Thus to many present-day church members the insights into personality gained from psychoanalysis have made the doctrine of original sin much easier to understand. Also the case studies and researches of psychology have shown the usefulness of the church's practice of confession.

Hiltner cites an example from A. A. which shows how the nature of grace can become more meaningful once it has been demonstrated in a personal relationship. "Condemnation the alcoholic had had in plenty; and perhaps from his wife and friends, love. But he had never experienced the two together in this form. One who understands the process thoroughly and from the inside, so that one literally can not

10 *Op. cit.*, p. 146.
11 *Op. cit.*, p. 23.
12 *Op. cit.*, p. 148.

be fooled by any rationalization whatever, nevertheless will get up at two A.M., drag the alcoholic out of a bar, render the physical care necessary to start the dehydrating process, at the expense of any other obligation whatever. Here is inexorable judgment along with almost unlimited concern. . . ."[13] A theological student once said that he had been helped to experience and believe in forgiveness and in the doctrine of grace through pastoral counseling which he underwent and through the experience of providing pastoral care for hospital patients in a clinical pastoral training program. This in no way is meant to assert that this experience (either giving or receiving pastoral care) validated the doctrine of grace; but it helped him to see its relevance in a unique and personal way which had not been possible for him through intellectual channels alone.

The foregoing has been intended to show the questions and answers involved in pastoral care and how a continuous dialogue goes on between theology in its various branches and the behavioral and social sciences, and, further, how they meet in the theory and practice of pastoral care.

Pastoral Care as Expediter Stands in the Middle

Since theology has often been called the queen of the sciences, perhaps we might draw an analogy from the physical sciences to illustrate the relationship between theology and pastoral care. In the General Electric Company there is quite a distance functionally between the theoretical physicist doing his research in the laboratory and the end of the assembly line where the finished product is ready for the use and enjoyment of the customer. Somewhere in between is the production engineer who facilitates the process of turning the abstract idea into a concrete product. He is a multi-discipline specialist (if that is not too gruesome a contradiction in terms), a co-ordinator, synthesizer, and expediter.

Naturally this expediter knows some physics and chemistry, though often surely not so much as the researcher in the laboratory. He is somewhat acquainted with mechanical engineering, architecture, and design in order to lay out a workable assembly line. He will con-

13 Seward Hiltner, "What We Get and Give in Pastoral Care. What We Get: II. Theological Understanding," *Pastoral Psychology*, Vol. V (March, 1954), pp. 23, 24.

sult with time study and efficiency experts and draw on the broad experience of heating and lighting engineers. He has done his job well if the radio comes off the assembly line according to specifications and in keeping with the original theory, and also attractively packaged in a crush-proof corrugated box.

He will not be praised by his boss for having made ingenious innovations without at least checking with the laboratory and original blueprints or the administration. He will certainly be deposed from the stewardship of his position if he manages to produce can openers, or even electric shavers, on the radio assembly line, no matter how superior those can openers or electric shavers might be.

Just as faulty electronic equipment in a television camera can make of no effect a part of the enormous effort of the church's evangelism program, so psychotic, neurotic, or psychosomatic bottlenecks might make less effective the channels whereby grace is intended to be bestowed upon a needy soul. Thus when Holy Communion seems not to be working its proper and gracious blessing in some person, it becomes the task of pastoral care to deal with the impediment, whether by personal confession and absolution, pastoral counseling, group methods, or by calling in some specialist to aid, be he family physician, social worker, or psychotherapist.

Just as the repair of the equipment in the case of the faulty camera is not an end in itself but a means to the larger goal of communicating the Gospel to millions of people over television, just so the therapy of the handicapped person mentioned above has the ultimate end of his freedom to respond to the grace which now has unhindered flow.

Pastoral care must be seen against the background of the basic doctrines of the church concerning the work of Christ, the nature of man, the function and responsibility of the church, the cause and effect of sin, God's creative activity and providence, the relationship between the Sanctifier and the communion of saints, and the work of the ministry of reconciliation.

On the other hand, pastoral care, if it is to be carried out with good stewardship of time and energy, must be alert to and utilize all helpful insight into man's social relations and emotional nature, whether that information be gleaned from anthropology or sociology, psychology or psychiatry, the physical, biological, or social sciences.

Toward a Broader Concept of Pastoral Care

"Feed my sheep," said Jesus to Peter. This would suggest that pastoral care is not limited to healing. Yet in the past decade there has been strong emphasis on pastoral care as healing, as is indicated by a plethora of articles on its relationship with psychiatry, counseling, and therapy of various sorts. Since Jesus used the term "feed," we shall not be stretching a point to make an analogy with the modern dietitian, our professional feeder. The dietitian in the hospital can rightly be thought of as a therapist when she provides special diets for diabetic, post-operative, and heart patients. But we say that the dietitian in the public school cafeteria across the street, who plans hot lunches for one thousand pupils, is providing nutrition, not therapy. Yet one is no less a dietitian than the other. The work of the pastor in caring for the sheep of God's flock includes the daily nurture of the ninety-and-nine as well as the care of the one who is broken and bruised.

"The care of all the churches" (II Cor. 11:28) is a phrase that indicates that pastoral care is not limited to the individual case in a one-to-one relationship. Gibson Winter feels that pastoral care is too often thought of as synonymous with counseling with individuals.[14] This exaggerates the isolation and individualism which is already too much a part of our American culture. There has been a growing awareness of this problem, which is being counter-balanced by an emphasis on group work and group dynamics. The author knows of several churches which have added social workers to their staff especially to supplement the pastoral care of the minister by making the fellowship life of the church more fruitful and creative. We know that many people can be helped in groups who have not responded to the one-to-one relationship in counseling.

Pastoral Care is the work of the whole church. It is not limited to the clergy. Only because not everyone can have certain competence or time to devote to the work of pastoral care, we designate a pastor to be especially available; but this ought not remove from other members of Christ's body the admonition to "bear one another's burdens."[15]

In Old Testament times concern for the general welfare of people

14 Gibson Winter, "Pastoral Counseling *or* Pastoral Care," *Pastoral Psychology*, Vol. 8, No. 71, Feb. 1957, pages 16-24.

15 See Suzanne de Dietrich, *The Witnessing Community* (Philadelphia, 1958), Chapter III: "God Sets Apart a People."

was incumbent upon the heads of families, and widely distributed so that actually all persons were to show mercy and hospitality to the widow and the fatherless and the stranger in their midst. In biblical as well as medieval times, much of what we call pastoral care today was done within the home or among nearby relatives. Consider the function of the sponsors or godparents a century ago before family ties became so loosened and social mobility so accelerated. The godparents would quite naturally adopt the orphan in case of the death of the parents, and the whole process of care would take place within the fellowship of the local church. Now it has become a complex social service procedure calling for specialized training and a wide acquaintance with the legal requirements and community resources. There have been some benefits from this development, but it should be noted that it represents depersonalization. The modern Christian can hire specialists to love his neighbor on his behalf, and this can include the pastor as well as the other "helping professions."

A timid, shy spinster was committed to a mental hospital after having attempted suicide. During the eight months of her hospitalization, ten or twelve men and women from her church took turns calling on her. The pastor was quite sure that their concern and love for her had been at least as helpful to her and perhaps more so than his own pastoral calls. They had shared her burden in a spontaneous way and had accepted her in love.

Power in the Church

By Reginald W. Deitz

WHENEVER men have been related to each other in effective institutions, the question of power has arisen. This is obvious in the political realm. Men struggle for political power because it makes a difference in their lives. It has also been true, however, in the church. From the very beginning the fellowship of believers carried on certain activities, made certain decisions, which were significant in the lives of all its members.

How should this power be exercised? In the earliest church three basic patterns emerged—congregational, presbyterial, and episcopal. Most scholars believe that no one of these prevailed everywhere throughout the church; elements of all three can be found in various times and places during the first two centuries. The congregational system located power in the local body of believers. As revived in England and New England it came closest to being a pure democracy. The presbyterian system placed responsibility in the hands of the congregation's chosen leaders, the elders. As developed after the Reformation it was essentially a system of representative government. The episcopal system, which prevailed everywhere until the Reformation, duplicated within the church the authoritarian patterns of anciety society. Bishops were the church's chief pastors and effective leaders. In earliest times there was some popular participation in their selection, though this became only nominal. Among the bishops, however, there was a sturdy tradition of equality. Some of the most important decisions in the life of the church were made by the bishops meeting together in council and expressing their collective opinion.

In succeeding centuries two challenges appeared to the power of the bishop. On the one side, his autonomy was challenged by powerful laymen, princes and kings, who succeeded in exercising a measure of authority in the church. Sometimes bishops were little more than tools of the secular authorities. It was natural that laymen should aspire to control in the church since it was such a powerful and influential institu-

tion in the lives of people. On the other side, the power of the bishop was challenged by the pope. Nominally, the successor of Peter was simply the bishop of Rome. From a very early date, however, he made claims of superior jurisdiction. Through the centuries these assertions were enforced and enlarged. By the Middle Ages the pope was the actual head of the Roman Catholic Church. He exercised power over the bishops in a variety of clearly recognized ways.

The Reformation of the sixteenth century fractured the unity of the western church. The pope retained his position in the Roman Church, but the various Protestant bodies devised their several patterns for exercising power in the church. All represented a considerable dispersal of power. Most conspicuous, however, was interference by the civil authorities. In fact, the loss of strong ecclesiastical leadership tended to give secular lords and magistrates a greater voice in the day-by-day administration of Protestant churches.

Lutherans coming to this country as immigrants had a long background of experience with secular control in the church. As soon as they had a chance to catch the implications of their liberty, they turned their backs decisively on the management of ecclesiastical affairs by constituted authorities. They supported the developing tradition of separation of church and state. In the first flush of freedom they sometimes used the voluntary system in an arbitrary fashion. Henry Muhlenberg complained because Lutheran laymen sometimes treated their pastors like hired hands, calling and dismissing them at pleasure.

But these difficulties soon gave way to organized church life. Synods became the characteristic expression of Lutheran order and an important seat of power in the church. Synods could ordain and discipline. They consisted of congregations and pastors. Lay representatives had an equal voice with pastor in their assemblies. They were led by officers democratically elected by the whole body. Synods proved to have sufficient power for the jobs the Lutheran Church had to do. Eventually they united in larger groupings like the General Synod and delegated certain responsibilities which could be more adequately handled on these higher administrative levels.

We must pause to note what was happening meanwhile in these United States with reference to the exercise of political power. Colonial experience under the British crown led to a widespread republican temper which sought so to disperse and divide power as to keep it from

ever becoming a threat to liberty. To many American patriots this was their chief reason for the War for Independence. The 1776 constitution of Pennsylvania was so republican as to be not only democratic but almost unstable and irresponsible. The first national effort at government was similarly feeble. The federal union under the Articles of Confederation was so bereft of power as to be virtually ineffective at many critical points.

When our Founding Fathers set out to create a framework for stronger national government they realized two things: first, that although power might actually reside with the people, it could not be exercised by them directly in a land so populous and widespread. Therefore it would have to be delegated. Secondly, however, they were determined to devise a structure with adequate power within which individual rights and responsibilities could still be recognized.

Those eighteenth century gentlemen who sat in waistcoats and wigs at Philadelphia's Constitutional Convention were themselves the embodiment of Enlightenment ideals of reason, sobriety, responsibility, moderation. For all their rationalism, however, they entertained instinctively some very profound theological insights, particularly on the nature of man. In spite of their optimistic assurance about the power of reason, they were not sure that men could be depended upon to be reasonable. Their experience with the tyrannous abuses of power made them suspicious of all men. They were sure that government had to have power, but they saw the dangers in power and the corruptions attendant upon its exercise. Utilizing a long theoretical tradition, they devised a system which every school boy learns to describe as one of checks and balances. Government should have power—but power so divided that abuses in one branch might be counteracted by other centers of power before its exercise could become despotic or destructive. Moreover, not only were the branches of the federal government made co-ordinate with one another but also the states were not abolished; rather they were retained in the political power structure being created. The administration of power was divided horizontally between federal and state governments. The Constitution provided a basic frame in which the powers of legislature, executive, and judiciary, and of federal as against the several states were spelled out.

Anyone acquainted with American history knows that the system has actually worked. Very great power is exercised in the federal gov-

ernment today by executive agencies whose day-by-day activities are checked and balanced by the legislature and the judiciary. In the other direction, states or groups of states represent regional interests and blocs of power which effectually limit federal power. Our nation's history suggests that "states rights" can never prevail ultimately against the will of the whole nation, but the division of effective power between states and the federal government means that neither can abuse its power and rights with impunity.

The result of these various checks and balances—and others like the two-party system—has been an extraordinary measure of personal liberty for each of us.

Now, this brief excursion into political history is instructive for the church. In American Lutheranism the problem of power has become significant only in the last generation with the rise of full-time executive staffs. Even the national bodies which preceded the United Lutheran Church did not have full-time presidents. Nor did the synods. Since that time, however, the growth of our church and its work has created an executive staff on a national level of several dozen people. Little attention has been given thus far to their role in the exercise of power. They are in the best sense of the word "professionals." They have great responsibility and they exercise much power over the people, the property, and the affairs of our churches. We are properly grateful for the dedication, skill, and imagination which this executive agency brings to carrying on the work of Christ in our name.

Moreover, in the United Lutheran Church we have developed an effective though unintentional system of checks and balances. In actual fact, as in the national pattern, power has been divided. The countervailing force in our church has not been, as might be supposed, the biennial conventions. In theory the conventions are our church's legislative agency. Actually our conventions no longer provide that check on the executive which in our government Congress exercises over the administration. A convention is too large to be a true deliberative body. It is larger than the House of Representatives. Even more seriously, it meets for a very limited period of time and is composed of constantly changing delegations. It has no way of developing its own leadership. In our national legislature a Representative works at his job full-time, has his own staff for research, and still cannot make himself heard except as he learns to work in the organizational structures of the

body. How much less can the average pastor or layman as a delegate to a national church convention participate effectively in the deliberations of an even larger body.

The result of this is that a ULCA convention tends perforce to be largely in the hands of our executive agencies. The convention has no way of controlling its agenda. Once in a great while on some clear-cut simple issue it can speak resoundingly. Most of the time it can simply express affirmation or dissent on the matters presented to it by the executive. There is nothing surprising about this. It is a condition for which history provides many illustrations and for which the explanations are obvious.

No, the real, though probably unintended, check on our national executive agencies has been the regional synod. Here is the place where every pastor and congregation has a voice and can make himself heard. Our synods have retained a large measure of control in essential areas of the church's life. National agencies can approach our congregations only through the good offices of synods. Undoubtedly these "states rights" survivals have created awkward administrative situations at times, but the result has been a rather wholesome, working, balance-of-power situation. National offices and officers have great influence in our local affairs, but always the synod, immediately heedful of the individual voice, is at hand to promote, modify, temper, delay, and even deny the wishes of the executive in response to its own knowledge of its people's will. In this fashion the democratic implications of the Protestant concept of the priesthood of believers are currently made effective in the power structures of our church.

If we turn now to examine the handling of power in the proposed church mergers (Augustana, AELC, Suomi, and ULCA on the one hand, and ALC, ELC, and UELC on the other), it is evident at once that significant changes have been made. Power has unmistakably been shifted from the synodical to the national level. Control over significant features of the church's life will now reside in national rather than synodical hands. There are good reasons for this change. It removes the specious complaint of critics that we have been only a federation of churches. It makes possible smoother administrative patterns, swifter and more co-ordinated action. The way is opened for the national executive in all its branches to fashion a unified church by setting stand-

ards and controlling discipline. It provides organizational expression for the unity that has actually existed among us.

But the price for these gains should also be recognized. Power has clearly been moved to the national level. Our regional synods, in conventions and through their own staffs, will no longer be effective buffers between congregations and the national executive. Pastors and congregations will still have a voice in their synods, but the real decisions will be made on higher levels where local ideas, concerns, and grievances can be voiced only very indirectly through part-time representatives at a convention. This is a genuine reduction in the working democracy of our church. Power will have moved farther away from the people over whom it is exercised.

There is no point in lamenting the passing of the good old days. The whole trend of our society is in the direction of centralization, toward the creation of vast power structures for the ordering of our lives. Some of this is inevitable in the church as well. No doubt we need in this age the efficiency, the effectiveness, the swift-moving vigor which only centralized power can provide. Most of us are probably glad to have superbly skillful "professionals" manage the church.

Yet the old tradition which sees in American democracy an important but indirect political fruit of Reformation insights about the priesthood of believers has some validity. That "new world" consequence of the Reformation should be especially cherished in the Lutheran Church. We ought not to discard our heritage of local responsibility and dispersed power without careful thought. It is proper to ask, accordingly, whether there might be available in our church any forces which, while preserving the advantages of strong national executive leadership, could also balance and temper the exercise of executive power.

The synods will no longer be able to do this, as we have seen. What about the national conventions? There is no indication that these bodies can be any more effective than they have been in developing independent leadership, staff, or ideas. Conventions will continue to look to the executive for leadership.

What about the boards of the church? In days past they were somewhat autonomous centers of power, but this has not been true in recent years and will not be true in the new church. Within the sphere of a board's work, real power is exercised by the staff. The

membership elected by a convention is important for its negative voice —approving or disapproving proposals—but it can seldom initiate or create. Scattered representatives coming together for a few days a year are inevitably dependent on those who work dedicatedly and professionally in the field. What this means is simply that the boards are also part of the executive structure of the church through which its work gets done. This appears to be in every respect the probable pattern for the new churches as well.

There remains, under whatever name, the Executive Council. Is this a possible balance to executive power? The name is a true indication of its character. It duplicates for the national officers of the church the role of the elected boards for their staffs in the various fields of work. Like the present ULCA Executive Board, the Council will be largely an extension of the executive. It will be a body of men who have other full-time jobs to do. They will meet occasionally to advise the executive and in this capacity will no doubt render valuable service. But there is little prospect that the Council can become an independent, responsible focus of power in the life of the church to balance, strengthen, and, if necessary, check executive power.

There is, however, one possibility which thus far has not been employed in American Lutheranism. Some years ago a ULCA conference of synodical presidents came into being. The role of this group, thus far, has been almost altogether advisory and promotional. The conference provides a convenient channel for explaining executive plans and assessing regional opinion. However, as a body it has many qualifications for becoming an effective balance of power in the life of the church.

Note some of them. Most of its members are full-time professional churchmen. This is not said invidiously. They are respected ministers who work at the business of running the church all the time. They know the problems in the life of the church. They are sensitive to power. Unlike the personnel of a convention, their ranks are relatively stable. Moreover, they represent their regions in a way no body of delegates to a convention ever can. The year-in-year-out business of managing the affairs of a synod gives them an understanding of their churches and pastors unmatched by any other persons. These men are democratically chosen by their colleagues, and every pastor can participate in the election. The tradition of election for limited terms makes

them more responsive to their people than their Episcopal counterparts. They are selected because they are respected and trusted. As a rule they represent an above-average level of intelligence and dedication in the ministry. Having come up, as it were, from the ranks and working constantly with the front-line parish pastors of the church, they know their constituency.

This is not to suggest that individual presidents are not fallible. Some are guilty of abusing their power regularly, and many lapse on occasion. As a group, however, they have the possibility of transcending the faults of their weakest members. They have the possibility of developing creative leadership for the church, of handling the problems of power with discretion, and of providing a solid, constructive check on the centralization of power in the national executive agencies.

Right now the institutional patterns of our churches are being developed. Why would it not be wise to consider giving to the conference of synodical presidents or its equivalent a significant role. Here more than anywhere else, it seems to me, is a body equipped to provide the checks and balances which both ecclesiastical and political experience have shown to be so valuable and realistic in any organization where real power is exercised.

One final word. If this essay has seemed to speak about power in inappropriate political and secular terms, let no one be misled. The children of darkness are sometimes in their own generation wiser than the children of light. There is no point is glossing over realities with pious platitudes. Let us not suppose that there is no power struggle in the church. The management of power is as real a problem here as in politics or business. Moreover, *how* it is managed is an ethical and theological concern of profound dimensions. With it every executive must consciously wrestle if he is at all sensitive. Power involves men as they are and in their relations with others. It is a problem because men are sinners, and even when by the grace of God they are saints they remain sinners. To create a structure of power in the church in which these realities are recognized and in which the wisdom of the Holy Spirit is given the freest possible opportunity to work through all his people is truly the work of Christ.

God Is One

By Martin H. Scharlemann

"HEAR, O Israel: the Lord is our God, the Lord alone."[1] With this resounding formula God's ancient people was introduced to the summary statement of its responsibilities toward the God of the covenant, that is, to the first and greatest commandment, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might." This whole passage is known as the *Shema'*, from the first Hebrew word. And even though the precise formulation of this statement, as we now have it, may date from the time of Josiah's reforms, as modern Old Testament scholars generally agree, the thought and context of this credo go back to the days when the covenant was established at Sinai through Moses.

On that occasion Israel was committed to the exclusive service of Yahweh as the God who had delivered them from the house of bondage. By this act of liberation Yahweh had revealed himself as the Lord of history and of nature. The full consequences of this revelation, however, do not seem to have been drawn at once in terms of a recognition that this one God excluded all other deities. Jephtha, for example, seems to have assumed that Chemosh was quite properly the god of the Ammonites (Judg. 11:23, 24), even as Yahweh was Israel's Lord. Most certainly David believed that other gods ruled outside the confines of Israel (I Sam. 26:19); and what he said to Saul on this occasion leaves no doubt that this was a generally accepted view of his day. King Ahaz, moreover, at a much later date is described as sacrificing to the gods of Damascus, who, as he believed, had defeated him (II Chron. 28:23), and there is no suggestion at all in the text that these gods did not really exist. Even the first of the Ten Commandments (Ex. 20:3) seems to presuppose the existence of other gods, even if, as L. Koehler first proposed,[2] the *'al pānay* of the text means "in opposition to me" rather than "before me."[3]

Israel's worship, therefore, probably ought to be described as monolatrous rather than monotheistic until such time as the existence of other gods was specifically denied and Yahweh was proclaimed as the God of the whole world. The supreme articulation of this kind of monotheism is found in the book of Isaiah (45:22): "Turn to me and be saved, all the ends of the earth! For I am

1 Of the four translations offered by the Revised Standard Version for Deut. 6:4, this one seems to do fullest justice to the Hebrew. The usual translation, "Hear, O Israel: the Lord our God is one Lord," is influenced by the Septuagint translation, which is quoted by Jesus at Mark 12:29.

2 Gerhard von Rad, *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (Munich, 1957), I, 203, Note 28.

3 Von Rad goes so far as to say that the First Commandment has nothing to do with monotheism. *Op. cit.*, p. 202.

God, and there is none other." The distance, however, from Sinai to Isaiah's formulation is considerable. Centuries of history lie between these two statements. These were long years during which God's people came into contact with nations that served other gods, whose existence they did not at first deny, but whose inferiority to Yahweh was made plain at once.

This movement from monolatry to monotheism is an inherent ingredient of the biblical account of Israel's life and worship. The record of this development may serve, therefore, as a primary exhibit of the way in which God manifested himself through mighty historical deeds in such a way as to make it possible for his people to express this aspect of the divine self-disclosure in the formulations that we have in the later books of the Old Testament.

The general thrust of God's revelation and of Israel's faith is unmistakable. The biblical record does not leave us in doubt that, once the implications of accepting Yahweh as God had worked themselves out fully in the faith and life of his people, nothing less than full monotheism could possibly result. For Israel kept in mind that it had been chosen by that one God who, in his holiness and jealousy, could not by virtue of these qualities tolerate the existence of other gods and a belief in idols, whether by Jew or Gentile.

The roots of Israel's belief that God is one certainly reach back as far as the time of the patriarchs. We read in Gen. 14 that, when Melchizedek came out to bless Abram after the defeat of Chedarlaomer and his allies, he said, "Blessed be Abram by God Most High (*'ēl 'elyôn*), maker of heaven and earth; and blessed be the God Most High, who has delivered your enemies into your hand" (vv. 19 and 20).

Now, there was a time when this account was interpreted as being no more than a literary creation. Echoes of this approach are found as late as 1944 in G. Levi Della Vida's suggestion that the name *'ēl 'elyôn* was artificially compounded out of *'ēl,* the lord of earth, and *'elyôn,* the lord of heaven,[4] and that the purpose of the narrative was to emphasize the identity of Melchizedek's God with the God of Abram. The view that the Genesis account proposed to fuse two gods was supported in times past by pointing to the fact that in verse 22 the name Yahweh was used in combination with *'ēl 'elyôn.* There Abram is depicted as swearing "to the Lord [Yahweh] God Most High." However, there is some question as to whether the original text really contained the name Yahweh, especially since the Septuagint does not have it.

Despite the absence of the name Yahweh from verse 22, this story is generally considered to be a Yahwist section. That is to say, those who work with the documentary hypothesis believe that the present form and wording of this narrative date from the time of David even though the original was included by Moses in his account of the patriarchs. In fact, it has been suggested that the editors of David's time took a particular interest in this story because of its stress on the religious significance of Jerusalem, now that it had become the city of David,[5] for

4 "El 'Elyon," in *The Journal of Biblical Literature,* lxiii (1949), p. 9.

5 Gerhard von Rad, *Das erste Buch Mose* (Göttingen, 1952), p. 151.

Melchizedek was the king of Salem, which was later called Jerusalem. Be that as it may—and it is no more than a guess!—the narrative concerning Melchizedek does associate the patriarch Abram with the worship of a god whom extra-biblical sources describe as having ruled over a pantheon of gods, as a divine being superior, therefore, to others. Albrecht Alt has also shown that other passages referring to "the God of the fathers" actually reflect historical situations and developments that relate to the fusion of various tribal traditions into the one worship of Yahweh.[6]

If Alt's contention is correct, there is every reason to assume a connection between Abram and *'ēl 'elyôn*. In that case the patriarch took an oath in the name of a god whom he considered to be "the creator of heaven and earth." In other words the Melchizedek incident indicates that Abram believed in a god superior to others and who was the creator of heaven and earth. This can only mean that the road to monotheism in Israel begins in the patriarchal period.[7]

A great advance, of course, was made at the time of Moses. This is almost universally recognized. In point of fact, Albright goes so far as to say, "If the term 'monotheist' means one who teaches the existence of only one God, the creator of everything, the source of justice, who is equally powerful in Egypt, in the desert, and in Palestine, who has no sexuality and no mythology, who is human in form but cannot be seen by human eye and cannot be represented in any form—then the founder of Yahwism was certainly a monotheist."[8] Yet, in introducing Israel to Yahweh, Moses did not specifically exclude the existence of other gods. This is suggested by a sentence in Miriam's Song of Deliverance, sung at the moment of liberation at the Sea, "Who is like thee, o Lord, among the gods?" (Ex. 15:11). Such a wording of the question seems to assume that there might be other gods. H. H. Rowley, therefore, may be quite right in saying, "Moses was less than a monotheist, but he was more than a henotheist."[9]

In the last analysis, the revelation of God's name as Yahweh was less significant in this respect then attributing to him the qualities of holy (*gōdhesh*) and jealous (*gin'â*). For when once the implications of these two concepts were drawn out nothing less than "cultic intolerance" could follow.

A belief in the holiness of Yahweh was not born of reflection on the nature of God. It was derived from a living association with the God of the covenant in the light of the consuming intensity of Israel's experience at Mt. Sinai. Strictly speaking, the holiness of Yahweh is not one quality among others. It is rather a characteristic that subsumes every quality of God active in his power to have his rule prevail in and among men so that they might live.[10]

6 Albrecht Alt, *Der Gott der Väter* (Stuttgart, 1929), p. 23.

7 "It is now possible to recover with a certain assurance the gods whom the patriarchs worshiped." H. G. May, "The Patriarchal Idea of God," in *The Journal of Biblical Literature*, lx (1941), p. 113.

8 W. F. Albright, *From the Stone Age to Christianity* (Baltimore, 1946), p. 207.

9 "The Antiquity of Irsaelite Monotheism," in *Expository Times*, lxi (1949-50), p. 336.

10 Edmond Jacob, *Theology of the Old Testament* (New York, 1958), p. 87. "The essential aspect of holiness is that of power, but of power in the service of a God who uses all things to make his kingdom triumph."

The view that God is an unapproachable being is not specifically Hebraic in origin. It is found in all Semitic religions and consisted primarily of an awareness that there is a vitiating force in man that prevents full communion with the divine. Hence there is in holiness a notion of separation. The concept actually has independent existence until Yahweh takes possession of it. Then it becomes the power that communicates itself in terms of creative intent.

This particular aspect of God's holiness is brought out by Hosea, when he says (11:9), "I am God and not man, the Holy One in your midst, and I will not come to destroy." This is a significant bit of revelation, for such sheer otherness as is ascribed to Yahweh would normally suggest destruction for all that is not holy. Since Yahweh's holiness is the source of life rather than of death, Isaiah appeals to the people of Jerusalem, menaced as they are by the king of Assyria, that they let God be their fear and dread (8:13). That is to say, they were to let that awe which derives from manifesting Yahweh as holy by their attitudes and actions displace the proximate fear of Rezin and the son of Remaliah. Here holiness is spelled out in terms of depth-psychology as a force that overcomes other fears. Inherent in holiness is its power of displacement.

Yahweh, as the Holy One of Israel, therefore is by his very nature the source of a progressive dethronement of deities in the history of Israel. His holiness is unique and therefore excludes the claims of other gods. This particular emphasis is very strong in the so-called priestly sections. There, however, it is applied primarily on the level of ritual, food, and sex because it was in these areas that God's people incurred the danger of syncretism. Since Yahweh was holy, his people must separate themselves from the religious practices of their Canaanite environment (Lev. 11:44 ff.). This kind of emphasis obviously strengthened the view that God is one.

True, the priestly application of Yahweh's uniqueness led to a point where holiness seemed available to men within a proper system of religious rites—a line that led directly into the post-Maccabean period, where the major features of Jewish religion as practised in the days of our Lord were determined. However, this was not the prophetic view of God's holiness. The prophets kept insisting that man has no power of autonomy, and that God is not within the realm of men's apprehension. It is in this sense that we must understand the Commandment (Ex. 20:4; Deut. 5:8), "Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image." Here we find the implication that God is not equal to any other object. This principle is applied also to the adoration of heavenly constellations. The book of Isaiah is particularly explicit in its polemic against the elaborate cosmogonies and cosmologies of Babylon (Isa. 40:25, 26):

> To whom then will you compare me, that I should be like him? says the Holy One.
> Lift up your eyes on high and see: Who created these? He who brings out their host by number, calling them all by name; by the greatness of his might, and, because he is strong in power, not one is missing.

Yahweh, the Holy One of Israel, is outside and above all things. Hence the

masses in Israel, exposed as they were to lesser gods, had to be reformed again and again. If Yahweh's holy will was to prevail there must be no distinction between the formal cult of the nation and private worship. Here is the source of the ethical element in Israel's monotheism. After all, holiness was a relational power, operative within the context of a covenant, whose terms directed themselves also to the individual in Israel.[11] Holiness, therefore, has its social implications for men in a covenant order of things. No one is more emphatic on this point than Amos, when, for example, the immoral behavior of a father and a son toward a girl is described in terms of profaning the Holy Name (2:7).

Yahweh, then, does not keep his holiness to himself. He is the covenant God, with power to deliver his people. In other words, he is a jealous God, determined to carry out his redemptive plan in history against all possible opposition. At this point the uniqueness of Israel's God becomes particularly clear. The gods of other religions are also described as jealous; but this is mere envy, a self-centered concern for personal honor and official jurisdiction. There is none of this in Yahweh. The very fact that he had established a covenant provided the evidence that he was a God who had broken out of his isolation to communicate with other beings. At the same time, this covenant was an expression of Yahweh's saving will. If men were to live, they would be obliged to obey this single will of One who had created them. Resistance was met with judgment, particularly against such as were "no-gods": the projection of man's wealth, success, and goods (Deut. 32:21). Yahweh, therefore, demands all. Since this is impossible, God is one who forgives. This seems to be the significance of Joshua's words at Shechem, "You cannot serve the Lord; for he is a holy God; he is a jealous God; he will forgive your transgressions and your sins" (Josh. 24:19).[12]

Transgression kindles God's anger, which is the other side of his covenant love. This wrath manifests itself in violent actions against those who oppose Yahweh's single will. At first this applies to Israel itself, even though it was God's own *seghullâ* (Ex. 19:5). Joshua emphasized this point at the time of the Shechem covenant (cf. Josh. 24:20). In time, however, this jealousy is interpreted as God's vindication of Israel against its enemies. It becomes a jealousy *for* Israel, beginning with the time of Ezekiel, where, for instance, we read (38:16), "In the latter days I will bring you against my land, that the nations may know me, when through you, O Gog, I vindicate my holiness before their eyes." From this point forward Yahweh's jealousy appears in eschatological contexts and soon loses itself in the weird fantasies of apocalyptic literature.

For the development of full monotheism in Israel just this shift in the concept of jealousy is of profound significance. It testifies to the determination on the part of God to see his will established against all opposing beings and entities, be they individuals, nations, or other gods. Universal authority is an essential ingredient of monotheism. Yahweh's zeal to fulfill his purposes in history is the driving power behind the creation of this kind of faith.

11 Cf. Walther Eichrodt, *Theologie des Alten Testaments* (Leipzig, 1933), I, 111.

12 The omission of the negative is supported by rather significant texts.

Historically speaking, Elijah's contest with the prophets of Baal on the heights of Carmel ranks as a decisive moment in Israel. Here Yahweh's holiness was pitted against *the* Baal, not a local deity but a god of heaven, worshiped in Tyre and Sidon and introduced into Israel primarily by Jezebel.[13] In this incident are concentrated the seven centuries of conflict between Yahweh and Baal, and Israel must make a choice between the two. They can not both be gods in Israel. Within this context Yahweh made himself known by a mighty miracle, and the people were moved to exclaim, "The Lord [i.e., Yahweh], he is God; the Lord, he is God" (I Kings 18:39). This is practical monotheism, understood as acceptance of that one God whose holiness in action excludes the possibility that other gods exist. But despite Israel's choice on Mt. Carmel, and despite the ascription to Yahweh of functions associated with Baal on the level of popular belief, such as fertility of the soil (Hos. 2:8) and political powers (Hos. 7:11), Yahweh remained a stranger to this world.[14] He continued to be "the wholly Other," but as the living God and not as a philosophical abstraction.

In terms of faith-miles it is not far from Mt. Carmel to the point at which Jeremiah can say of other gods that they are man's handiwork (*ma'asēh yādîm*), where Ezekiel does not hesitate to speak of them as "manure gods" (*gillûlîm*), and when the Psalms refer to them as "no-gods" (*lō' 'elôhîm*). For these gods have no history. They are newcomers (Deut. 32:17). Yahweh, however, has been Israel's God from of old (Ps. 74:2).

We must at this point insist that this movement toward full and unequivocal monotheism can not be interpreted in terms of an evolutionary process. On the contrary, this advance has its source in the absolute uniqueness of Yahweh as he revealed himself to Israel in his holiness and jealousy. We might speak of this as cumulative, rather than progressive, revelation.

It is of great significance to note in this connection that there is no Hebrew word for "goddess." Israel's God is never depicted as having a female counterpart,[15] except at Elephantine in Egypt during the sixth century—at a place far removed from the center of Israel's religious life. There we do have notices of Anat Bethel (*Anat Yahu*) as a consort of Yahweh. Otherwise there is no reference to a Hebrew goddess. This consistent insistence on the oneness of Yahweh makes it possible for Hosea (1-3) and Ezekiel (16:23) to speak of Yahweh as Israel's husband without fear of being misunderstood.

By the time of Ezra any mention of other gods in a context that referred to Yahweh was unthinkable.[16] Heathen gods were turned into angels or even demons, as in the Septuagint, translation of Psalm 95 and in certain apocryphal books. At the same time the transcendence of Yahweh got further emphasis by the use of such circumlocutions as "the heavens," "the power," "the Shekinah," "the place

13 G. v. Rad, *ThdAT*, p. 208.
14 Gerhard von Rad, *op. cit.*, I, 204: "Der grosse Fremdling in der Welt."
15 Eichrodt, *op. cit.*, I, 111.
16 *Ibid.*, p. 113.

of Yahweh's presence," or, most frequently, "the Name." The tetragram was not even to be uttered.

Somewhat parallel and contemporary to these developments runs a tendency to hypostasize the Torah or even Wisdom by ascribing to them a kind of pre-existence. The beginnings of this outlook are possibly found in the use of "the word of Yahweh" as almost distinct from God himself, and in the reference to the Spirit of God "moving over the face of the waters" in the account of creation. At any rate, it seems to be in order to suggest that this trend in Israel was intended to serve as a way of preparing God's people for that self-disclosure of himself whereby, in and through the incarnation, men would be invited to recognize this God as being triune, that is, one God in three persons.

Prediction and Fulfillment

By Wilhelm C. Linss

IN THE Christian faith the terms "prophecy" and "fulfillment" have a very important place. The Old Testament prophets are revered and respected. Their message from the Lord came as both condemnation and consolation to the people of Israel. Jesus, the Saviour, is called a prophet, and by that is meant that in a unique sense he not only speaks the Word of God but is the Word of God. The New Testament speaks of the office of prophets in the early church, and although today perhaps no one in particular is called a prophet, one nevertheless speaks of the prophetic voice of such men as Luther or Wesley or even famous contemporary preachers, certainly of the prophetic voice of the church as such. In all these uses of the term "prophecy," one thinks and speaks of much more than the etymological origin of the word would imply: *pro phemi,* to speak beforehand. A Latin equivalent is found in the word "prediction," and perhaps the best English equivalent would be the word "foretell." It is in this meaning only that the relationship of prediction and fulfillment and its significance for the Christian faith is to be investigated here. The word "prediction" was chosen rather than "promise" because this is primarily an investigation of the formal aspects, not of the contents. It is proposed to look at this relationship from three different angles.

I

In historical sequence the prediction comes naturally before the event predicted. Thus there is a time when only the prediction is existent and those who have heard it are waiting for its fulfillment. In such a time the question must be asked, "Is this prediction trustworthy?" Only the fulfillment can truly prove its trustworthiness. But the belief in its reliability may be influenced by various other factors. For instance, one would probably ask whether other predictions from the same source had been proved true. Going about it in a scientific way, one would most likely establish a quotient which indicates the chances of its being truly fulfilled. Or one might ask on what the predictor bases his statements and correspondingly believe or disbelieve his prediction. Not to be overlooked, furthermore, is the psychological condition in which a person hears a prediction. If it agrees with his innermost desires, he is more inclined to believe it than if it involves trouble for him. Aside from all these considerations, however, is the character, reputation, and authority of the one who makes a prediction. If they are unquestioned, then even an occasional wrong prediction might not affect one's belief in the reliability of what he foretells.

Although the Old Testament does not consist primarily of predictions, this was the situation in which the Jew of the time before Jesus found himself. One might even say that this is the case just because the Old Testament contains much more material other than predictions. Although the canon of the Old Testament was not officially established until after Christ, the Jewish nation or religion at the time of Jesus possessed a body of scriptures, almost completely recognized as authoritative, as the Word of God. Moses had given the Law, and this Law was authority for all Jews. The inspiration of Moses by God was not questioned, even unquestionable. And although the prophets themselves in their own times quite often found opposition and were attacked, persecuted, or even killed, by the time of Jesus the body of the prophetic writings that is collected in the Old Testament also was recognized as fully inspired and authoritative. They preached the will of God for his people Israel, they urged moral and religious sincerity and obedience. Surely, this was from God. And imbedded in this body of literature which is recognized for its own value, the Jew finds a number of predictions. They speak of a glorious future for the people, they speak of an expected Messiah king, of peace, and of well-being.

It is not possible here to analyze the details of this expectation, but it seems that from his sources the Jew could very well draw a picture of what was to happen. This picture may not have been unblurred in all details; it may have varied from one Jewish group to another. But all utterances had in common a certain outline of expected events and a profile of the expected Messiah. The trustworthiness of this expectation was not a question; there definitely was going to be such a Messiah. The expectation was more or less vivid at different times in Jewish history. When the events would take place was not determined, but that they would come was not doubted. All that was needed, then, was to wait for him. And when some one came, claiming to be the Messiah or believed by some people to be this expected king, one had only to compare him with the predictions to know whether he had a right to such claims or not. Thus the predictions became a blueprint, an outline, the real authority. And when Jesus came, the majority of Jews felt that he did not fit this outline and rejected him. And those few who accepted him were persecuted, excommunicated, or killed. After searching for the reasons for this failure—if this term be permitted—it would probably be said that the expectation was too earthly, too external, too political and that Jesus, of course, did not fulfill it in this sense. One could also say that the Jews did not truly understand his claims. Be that as it may, the main point to be noted here is this: there was a set of predictions whose authority and reliability could not be doubted; with these in hand, Jews were waiting for the fulfillment and, as a whole, did not recognize Jesus for what he truly was, the God-sent king and saviour of mankind.

II

There exists a different relationship between prediction and fulfillment, or

rather between prediction and fulfillment on the one hand and the person confronted on the other. While in the first case considered, the Jew stood clearly on the side of the prediction and therefore did not recognize the fulfillment, in this second case man says, "I have to detach myself from the prediction, I have to look at it objectively, I have to check the prediction for what it is worth on its own ground, then I look at the events that are claimed to be fulfillment, and if they fit, then I can say that these predictions were truly fulfilled." In this case the investigator is purely an onlooker, is in his own words "objective," is disinterested, not involved. For instance, if an astronomer predicts an eclipse of the moon and a man sees it, the observer will probably praise the astronomer for the correctness of his prediction but will not be extremely surprised, for he knows that these events are predictable by mathematical computation. He is not personally involved in them and not extremely concerned about them. Or if somebody predicted the economic downfall of, say, Pakistan, and a few months or years later this takes place, one would probably say that the predictor is a good economist and is able to read the signs of the economy of that country, but unless one is an investor or manufacturer of export goods, one is not very much concerned about it. Of course, prediction and fulfillment in the Bible are on an entirely different level, but one might attempt such an objective investigation there also. Such an investigation would most likely proceed in a somewhat mathematical fashion; it would cull from the Old Testament single predictions and try to discover whether they were fulfilled. It would probably be very critical of the New Testament records and suspect their authors of tampering with the facts in order to bring them into agreement with the predictions, and then it would come up with a mathematical ratio. The objective onlooker might be impressed by the remarkable agreements, he might admire the prophetical foresight of the men of the Old Testament, he might even say that it is a great tragedy that the Jews did not accept Jesus and his teachings about God and his ethical commands, but for the rest he would remain detached and disinterested. Even a Christian might perform such an analysis with the best intentions, might attempt to be objective in order to prove to others that Jesus had truly come from God because the predictions that were made about such a person were fulfilled in him. Such examinations have been made for apologetic purposes, but for one reason or another they have been relatively unsuccessful. Those to whom they were supposed to appeal were not very much impressed by them. It seems that the main reason for this phenomenon is exactly the fact that such an investigation was made in a detached state, in an objective atmosphere, so to speak, by a disinterested onlooker. And in this way one misses the main claim of Jesus Christ and of his disciples, namely, the assertion that his coming has significance for me, whoever I may be and in whatever time I may live. The Gospel asserts that I am concerned by it, and if I, unintentionally or intentionally, overlook this claim, then I am also blind to the significance of fulfilled predictions.

III

Christians cannot identify themselves with either one of these two ways of looking at prediction and fulfillment. They do not, like the Jews, first possess a set of predictions with which they look toward the future or, to state it in another way, they do not first believe in the Old Testament and then see how the New Testament fits into its framework. Christians cannot be objective at first and then, on the basis of a detached analysis, perhaps gradually come to the conclusion that Christ must have some meaning for them also. Christians neither stand on the side of the prediction looking for the fulfillment, nor do they stand off-side and look in a detached way at both prediction and fulfillment, but they clearly stand at the side of the fulfillment and from it they may look back to the prediction. From this side the relationship between prediction and fulfillment appears in a quite different light, and it seems that this is the only acceptable way of looking at it. Even the pragmatic test would point to this conclusion, for the majority of the Jews, coming from the prediction, rejected the fulfillment, and objective detachment from the relationship has not been very convincing to many; for almost 2,000 years Christians have been able to use the Old Testament predictions in this manner.

This relationship and the way to discover it has now to be outlined. Most of us have in our childhood heard about Jesus much earlier than about Isaiah or Jeremiah or other prophets. Perhaps the stories about Joseph and Moses also occupied an early place in our religious experience or education, but certainly not the few predictions of a future Messiah that may be found in them. And this is as it should be. Jesus' person and work are convincing in themselves, not based on a supposed agreement with certain predictions. In him God's authority is recognized. He is acknowledged not only as the one who speaks God's Word but as the one who is the Word of God. Christians believe that his death and resurrection have significance for the world, that they have a relevance for each man, quite independent from the question of whether they were predicted or not. Christ is Lord and Saviour regardless of whether he fulfilled the hopes of the Jews or not. This started, quite understandably, as soon as the Gospel was preached to the Gentiles, to those who did not first recognize the authority of the Old Testament. The Jewish confession, "Jesus is the Messiah, the Christ," as Peter would confess, is meaningless to Gentiles; for them Christ becomes a proper name, and they confess that Jesus Christ is Lord. Christians are disciples of Jesus Christ without first becoming disciples of Moses.

Now, this does not mean a Christianity without the Old Testament. This way has also been attempted; it was the error of Marcion and his followers and it had a short and unsuccessful revival among the so-called "German Christians" for quite different reasons. This is not an attempt to demonstrate the superiority of the New Testament over the Old Testament, but to find the place from which to look at the predictions that are imbedded in the Old Testament. The significance of the Old Testament for Christians rests on a different basis and does not have

to be established exclusively by proving that the predictions in it were fulfilled in Jesus Christ. But now, after having put themselves on the side of the fulfillment in Jesus Christ, after having gained a picture of him from the New Testament as he was and not as he was expected to be, Christians can look back at the predictions incorporated in the prophecies and other passages of the Old Testament and attempt to determine their value. These will now no longer be expected to prove that Jesus was the Messiah, since he himself has demonstrated by his life, death, and resurrection that he has significance for everyone. A few of these predictions in the Old Testament may be examined now.

Deut. 18:18, 19 reads: "I will raise up for them a prophet like you from among their brethren; and I will put my words in his mouth, and he shall speak to them all that I command him. And whoever will not give heed to my words which he shall speak in my name, I myself will require it of him." Truly, Jesus was that prophet. He spoke what God commanded him. But verse 20 continues: "But the prophet who presumes to speak a word in my name which I have not commanded him to speak, or who speaks in the name of other gods, that same prophet shall die." And then a test is suggested whereby the Israelites should be able to distinguish the true prophet from the false. Thus it is not a question of one particular prophet, but rather of a succession of prophets. Furthermore, quite a number of prophets could be considered as fulfilling this prediction, certainly Isaiah or Jeremiah or Hosea did. But Christians say that no matter who else fulfilled this prediction, Christ perfectly fulfilled it and is this prophet. It should be clear now that one cannot say this if one starts out from the Old Testament passage, but looking back from the New Testament one can say that Christ truly fulfilled it.

Another example, Isa. 40, says: "A voice cries: 'In the wilderness prepare the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God,'" etc. From the context, under consideration of the historical situation, it is to be concluded that the prophet is speaking about the return of Israel from captivity. However, the authors of the Gospels applied this passage to John the Baptist, who was to prepare the way for Jesus Christ. For an interested reader of the Old Testament the historical expectation in the time of the return of Israel is obvious, but not the interpretation which the New Testament suggests. Only by looking backward from the New Testament to this prediction can one say, and must say, that Jesus or his forerunner, the Baptist, truly fulfilled this prediction in a way which was most likely not even obvious to the writer of the original prophecy.

Hosea 11:1 reads: "When Israel was a child, I loved him, and out of Egypt I called my son." This is clearly a reference to the deliverance of the Israelites from Egypt in the time of Moses. The Hebrew perfect in this instance is always translated by a past tense. The New Testament interprets it as a prediction of the flight of Jesus into Egypt, or rather his return from there. A person who reads only the Old Testament would be unable to recognize this as a prediction, but if he

looks back from the events in the life of Christ he may say that in these Old Testament words the events were foreshadowed.

As a final example Isa. 53, the well-known passage about the servant of the Lord, is suggested. No one knows whom the prophet had in mind. Among the Jews today the interpretation that Israel as a whole is meant seems to hold the field. For Christians, however, Christ again has truly fulfilled this suffering and has made these predictions fully come true: "He was despised and rejected by men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief; . . . he was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities; upon him was the chastisement that made us whole, and with his stripes we are healed. . . . He poured out his soul to death, and was numbered with the transgressors." Only from the New Testament can this fulfillment be recognized.

And then still another fact is realized. These predictions, as worthwhile as they are, do not go far enough. Jesus is to be a prophet, the first passage that was considered suggests. It is true, but he was so much more. Prophets said, "Thus says the Lord." Jesus declared, "But I say unto you." He was not only a prophet but the Son of God. The preparation of the desert so that the Israelites could return safely is the meaning of the second passage. Fine, but with Jesus the meaning is so much more than just a return in an earthly home country. The return of the Israelites from Egypt was referred to in the third passage. Surely, Jesus retraced his steps too, or was brought back like that, but this is of no particular significance for Christians; he has done so much more for them. And even the lofty passage about the suffering servant of the Lord is not sufficient; Christ has fulfilled it, but it doesn't go far enough. Christ rose again from the dead; thus in fulfilling the predictions of Isa. 53, he also has set it aside.

Perhaps these few examples (which could easily be multiplied) can show how little a formal agreement of prediction and fulfillment mean. It could not convince anybody. It could not prove anything to him unless he already believed it. And Christ is so much more than the Old Testament could expect.

But lest it be thought that these and other predictions have no value at all, their worth must now be stated. First, they are significant as Old Testament predicions—that is, in their true historical context—as a part of the Old Testament generally. Second, they come from the God of Jesus Christ, mediated through the prophets, and therefore Christians are interested in them; they are part of his revelation to man. Third, they show that this God is faithful and reliable. Fourth, in their entirety, not necessarily the individual predictions, they gave rise to the expectation of a saviour, of a messiah, and in this manner prepared the way for the coming of the Lord. The groundwork was laid. Jesus was able to connect his message with ideas familiar to his audience; the writers of the New Testament could explain his mission to their readers in concepts with which they were acquainted. Fifth, precisely because there were such predictions and resulting expectations, the superiority of Jesus Christ to everything that preceded him stood out in much bolder relief, as is set forth so beautifully in the opening words

of the Epistle to the Hebrews. And thus all waiting is concluded, all expectation is fulfilled, all hope is realized in this "Son whom God appointed the heir of all things, through whom also he created the world."

In conclusion, it may be necessary to anticipate an objection. A person who has the prediction and waits for the fulfillment or a person who believes that he looks at both prediction and fulfillment in an objective way may say: "You misinterpret the prediction, you make it say what you wish it to say." This is not the case. The predictions are taken honestly, in their historical sense. But history has to be interpreted in the total context of experience, and fulfillment in Jesus Christ, whether it follows closely the literal predictions or not, is part of this total context of experience and must therefore be used in explaining and interpreting such a thing as a prediction. To interpret a prediction alone, isolated from its fulfillment or from what is perhaps only claimed to be its fulfillment, would be a partial procedure only. The true meaning of predictions can be determined only from the fulfillment. A secular example is presented by the oracle that was given to Croesus: If he would go to war he would destroy a great kingdom. Only after the events did the real meaning become clear, namely, that it was his own kingdom that he destroyed. The predictions of the Old Testament can be truly and rightly understood only in the light of their perfect fulfillment in Jesus Christ, the Son of God, our Lord and Saviour.

The Force of *apo* in I Corinthians 11:23

By George O. Evenson

IT APPEARS that it is rather much taken for granted in theological circles today that Paul was dependent on the *paradosis* of the early Christian community for his message. This position is held despite the strong affirmation by Paul: "For I would have you know, brethren, that the gospel which was preached by me is not man's gospel. For I did not receive it from man, nor was I taught it, but it came through a revelation of Jesus Christ" (Gal. 1:11, 12, RSV). The undersigned asked a European theologian who was present at the Lutheran World Federation Assembly in Minneapolis in 1957 how he could hold the above-mentioned position in view of this solemn declaration by Paul. His answer was, "The prepositions are different." He specifically referred to the *apo* in I Cor. 11:23, where the apostle states that his information concerning the institution of the Lord's Supper was received *apo tou kuriou.*

It is argued that *apo* means indirectly, mediately, from; it is *para* that means directly, immediately, from. Thus Christ states in John 10:18, "This commandment received I *para* my Father."

Now, it is obvious that if Paul were dependent on the *paradosis* for his gospel, then *apo tou kuriou* has to be understood to mean something different from its simple meaning. That different meaning is provided for if *apo* contains in itself the idea of transmission through someone else and not directly. In other words, the meaning of the preposition has to be different to support the theory.

But does this necessity prove that the meaning is different? Is it not strange to turn around and use the meaning necessitated by the theory to establish the correctness of the theory?

It is the contention of this study that the preposition *apo* in I Cor. 11:23 in no sense proves that Paul was dependent on the *paradosis* for his gospel. Following are the reasons for this conclusion:

1. Paul emphatically denies any such dependence in his epistle to the Galatians. His affirmation in chapter one has already been quoted. Equally pertinent is his further claim that the pillars of the church at Jerusalem "added nothing to me" (Gal. 2:6, RSV). It takes a bit of mental gymnastics to explain these statements away.

2. Paul sets that which he received *apo tou kuriou* in contrast with the *paradosis* of which he speaks earlier in the chapter (I Cor. 11:2). The conduct of women in church is a matter of the *paradosis.* The information concerning the institution of the Lord's Supper is not *paradosis* but *apo tou kuriou.*

3. The prepositions *apo* and *para* are not inherently and necessarily different in meaning. They may be different in meaning, but this difference is established

by the context. It is not proper to reverse the procedure to establish a rather dogmatic theory.

a) Competent authorities affirm a similarity in meaning. C. M. Cobern states that "*apo, para, hupo,* and *ek* are used in the papyri without exactness of distinction."[1] J. H. Moulton calls attention to the same fact.[2] A. T. Robertson declares: "In the older Greek *para* was the common preposition for the conscious personal departure. But in N. T. *apo* occurs also with persons."[3] He concludes his discussion of this comparison by denying that it is proved that there is a radical distinction between *para tou patros* (John 10:18) and *apo tou kuriou* (I Cor. 11:23). The latest Greek-English lexicon in its discussion of *apo* refers to Luke 22:71, "*hear from someone's mouth,* i.e., from him personally." After listing a number of other references it continues: "Probably *paralambanein apo tou kuriou,* I Cor. 11:23, is to be understood in the same way; Paul is convinced that he is taught by the Lord himself."[4]

b) In the New Testament *para* and *apo* are at times used interchangeably. Some examples follow:

Christ says in John 16:27 that the Father loves the disciples because they believe that he came forth *para* the Father. The disciples answer that they believe that he came forth *apo* God (John 16:30).

Luke relates that a messenger came *para* the house of Jairus informing him that his daughter was dead (Luke 8:49). Mark in relating the same detail says that the messengers came *apo* the house (Mark 5:35).

Paul in Gal. 1:1 states that he is not an apostle *apo* men (just how could this be indirectly or mediately?); in Gal. 1:12 he states that he did not receive his gospel *para* man.

c) Without question *apo* is at times used in the New Testament in the sense of directly, of immediately from. Some examples follow:

When Joseph asked Pilate for the body of Jesus, the latter summoned the centurion to him to find out if Christ were already dead. "And when he learned *apo* the centurion that he was dead, he granted the body to Joseph" (Mark 15:44, 45).

The writer of the first epistle of John had heard, seen, beheld, handled the Word of Life. It was the message which he had heard *apo* him that he was now declaring (I John 1:1-5).

Paul instructs a wife not to separate *apo* her husband (I Cor. 7:10). Concerning his thorn in the flesh, he besought the Lord thrice that it might depart *apo* him (II Cor. 12:8). He rejoiced because Timothy came to him *apo* the Thessalonians (I Thess. 3:6).

1 C. M. Cobern, *The New Archaeological Discoveries.* Second edition. (New York, 1917), p. 110.

2 J. H. Moulton, *A Grammar of New Testament Greek.* Second edition. (Edinburgh, 1906), I, 237.

3 A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research.* Second edition. (New York, 1915), p. 579.

4 W. F. Arndt and F. W. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature* (Chicago, 1957), p. 87.

d) Sometimes *para* is used in the New Testament in the sense of indirectly, mediately from. God's message to Mary was brought to her by an angel. That message is spoken of as coming *para* God (Luke 1:37) and *para* the Lord (Luke 1:45).

The conclusion is clear. Even though Paul had made no such claims as he does in Gal. 1 and 2, it would be lexically untenable to hold that the preposition *apo* in I Cor. 11:23 indicates Paul's dependence on the *paradosis* for the content of his gospel. The proof for such dependence must be found elsewhere. And the simple meaning of his statements in Galatians requires that it must be a weighty proof.

The Lutheran Church and the Unchurched Negro

By John C. Cooper

IT SEEMS to this writer (who professes to be socially neither radical nor liberal) that the injunction to "go into all the world and preach the Gospel to every creature" (Matt. 28:19-20) bears no footnotes that say "to all the world, as long as it is far away from home" nor any exclusive provision on the basis of race or social status. It is all too easy to play the part of a missionary-minded Christian when all the "dirty work" is being done some 5,000 miles away and is being done by the "other fellow." I believe that Jesus Christ died to save all men, even the most troublesome minority groups close at home. Any denial in our practice of this universality of his grace is a living witness to our hypocrisy and unfaith.

The older churches of the larger (and older) eastern cities and the entire church of the South may experience various trials in the years ahead due to the changing complex of social life, the breakdown of legal segregation, gradual integration, etc., but to *new* churches, conceived and brought into being in this sixth decade of the twentieth century, this need be no problem. New missions will reflect the character of the communities with which most of them were born, and thus they will be largely homogeneous. They will not face the changing patterns of a decaying neighborhood or country-side as older churches do today.

They may, if they desire to follow the logical outgrowth of Christ in faith, decide to make the church "a house of prayer for all peoples." Thus they may begin with full integration of every racial group in the (larger) community, or they may encourage limited integration, gradually extending the hand of fellowship to all as the feelings stirred by recent unfortunate actions on both sides subside.

Or again, if the community is not interracial, the new congregation may become all white, or all Negro. In a multitude of ways, all sensible and all Christian, the new church can begin its life as a part of the body of Christ merely by showing Christian love to all who come to worship the desire of all nations.

But what of the opportunity? How great is the field we have left unexplored for so long? The statistics are (as usual!) very impressive, yet they prove very little. In the last analysis, the main thing is the truth that many of the over 13,000,000 Negroes of this country are either un- or ill-churched. How can they help but be? Anyone who has ever seen Harlem in New York City or Jenkinsville in Philadelphia would never hesitate to answer that!

In the Philadelphia area alone, 3,000 Negroes flooded in from the South *every week* during the summer of 1956. Needless to say, no adequate provision for their spiritual life has ever been provided. It has been almost impossible to provide

adequate police service, much less spiritual guidance. Of course, these people present too vast a potential for them to be left strictly alone; a host of pernicious sects have sprung up to plague them and to fleece the unsuspecting.

While in Philadelphia, this author witnessed a Spiritualist Temple that preyed on the Negroes and recent immigrants who lived in the area. This "temple" failed, and in its place a "Holiness" group sprang up. I am not sure that the last situation was not worse than the first. This situation is reflected in every "marginal" neighborhood and "black bottom" in the country.

Of the 13,000,000 Negroes in America today, 8,300,000 are professed Christians. Of this number, only 300,000 are Roman Catholic, although the Roman Church has, by and large, done a better job for its colored folk than the Protestants. Yet Rome has only one twenty-eighth of the Christian Negroes of America in its care. The remaining 8,000,000 Negro Christians are concentrated mainly (and quite loosely) in the Baptist and Methodist communions. These two names cover a multitude of organizations (many non-official). A lesser number of Protestant Negroes are Presbyterians (of the northern branch, even in the South) and members of smaller sects. These smaller sects seem to dominate the Negro landscape, at least in the more squalid quarters. Among them are Bishop S. C. Johnson's followers, the disciples of "Daddy Grace" and Father Divine, and members of such organizations as The Capadocian Pentecostal Free Will Fire Baptizing Church of God.

These groups exploit the poorer, uneducated Negroes, as well as leading them into much sin. Of these 8,000,000 "Protestant" Negroes, 7,500,000 are completely separated from any fellowship with white Christians, being members of all-Negro bodies. Among the larger of these are the National Baptist Convention, Inc., the African Methodist Episcopal Zion Church, and the Colored Methodist Episcopal Church. The remaining 500,000 Negro Protestants are included in the predominantly white denominations, but well over 90 per cent of these Negroes are segregated in all-Negro churches. Less than one-half of one per cent even irregularly attend white churches. Meanwhile, over *four-and-a-half million Negroes are unchurched,* while a goodly number are ill-churched in these Negro and white-sponsored organizations.

The Church of the Reformation should see itself, the third largest Protestant group in America, as a shameless traitor to its principles if it does not take the Bread of Life to these poor for whom, too, Christ died. We Lutherans, with our multitude of institutions of higher education and with the prayers and treasures of 7,500,000 American believers, should begin to train an adequate Negro pastorate to cope with the sin we see raging among the darker peoples of our cities.

There are about 21,000 Negro Lutherans in this country, but over half of these are in the Negro missions operated by the Synodical Conference (Missouri Synod). The United Lutheran Church has about 3,000 Negroes in its membership, most of them in the large cities of the North and in the Caribbean Synod. Once the United Synod of the South's old North Carolina Synod had about 180 Negro Lutherans and five Negro pastors. But after the Civil War, during the "era of

separation," these colored people formed their own Synod. This was the Alpha Synod of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of Freedmen in America. In a few years (1870), the Synodical Conference (Missouri Synod) began a Negro Mission and these North Carolina colored Lutherans became members of this organization. The Synodical Conference still maintains this work, and now has the only Negro Lutherans in North Carolina and, with the exception of the American Lutheran Church in the deep South, the only Negro Lutherans in the South.

A Lutheran pastor knew a colored Lutheran woman who *lived next door* to his church in North Carolina. He visited this woman and brought her church literature, but his church council would not permit her to take part in the congregation's activities. Again, a young couple in West Columbia, S. C., allowed their baby-sitter (a young Negro woman) to read and study Luther's Catechism and other Lutheran works and were pleasantly surprised when she said she believed all she had read and would like to join a Lutheran church. They were so concerned about this that they came to the writer for advice. I could only tell them to consult their pastor (they belong to a new and growing mission) about the possibility of her being admitted as a member. I do not know what the outcome of this consultation was, but I do know that the baby-sitter is not yet a member of a Lutheran church.

Of course, the simplest (and usual) response to the challenge of Negro needs would be to ignore them. After all, they have no Lutheran "background." None of them has German ancestors who subscribed the Book of Concord. Senseless as such a sentiment appears on paper, it is an unconscious response for many Lutherans, especially in the South. It is too easy to limit our ministrations to "our own people," who are usually white, Germanic, or at least Anglo-Saxon. The "others" have to wait for the crumbs while the children are fed. This is one possible response we must resolve never to give again.

Another possible response is to "pass the buck" in the old army way—usually to the National Lutheran Council. Next to completely ignoring the problem, this has been the commonest response. Most of the literature this writer has read was about the work of the National Lutheran Council and was in favor of letting the N.L.C. continue this operation. Such a response has many favorable features. First, it salves the conscience, for by contributing money (never very much) to "the cause" and occasionally sending a worker to the Council, we effectively deal with the problems (from our viewpoint) and also keep the Negro at a good, safe distance. Secondly, we remain free of any adverse criticism from segregationists, *both South and North.* Needless to say, this writer feels that such a response not only leaves much to be desired but is the apex of hypocrisy.

Probably the most terrible in its effects on men's consciences is the response of those devout Lutherans who know that our neglect of the Negro is sin and who genuinely wish to do something about it, yet fail to "push" the church for action lest we lose white members by doing so. This is the type of response that says: "Why integrate Lenoir Rhyne College and lose 500 white students when we would gain only five or six Negro students? Is not the best policy the main-

tainance of the *status quo* so that we can continue to do *the most good to the most people*. Why cause trouble where there is none?" If this is overdone, the writer begs pardon. He does not think it is, for he has heard these sentiments expressed (if not believed) by one of the staunchest Lutherans he knows. Such a response, as sensible as it may seem to be on the surface, is in reality the paralysis of Christian morality. It is sinful, for it is hypocrisy, an attempt to act as if the situation did not exist. Such conduct is no different from Peter's action when he acted as if he did not know the Lord who might get him into trouble (not with the officials!) *with the people*.

We must resist any attempt of our weaker impulses to make us act "sensible" when we should be acting "Christian." Martin Luther King, Jr. (who is *no* prophet in my judgment) has a good point in his recent article, "Out of the Night of Segregation," when he says that we should be "maladjusted" today, for to become "adjusted" to racial injustice would be capitulation to the forces of evil. We must remain thus "maladjusted and unsensible" as long as our church fails to respond to the needs of dying sinners around us.

Perhaps the most attractive response to the challenge would be to place our hopes in the few well-trained Negro Lutheran leaders we now have and thus to "pass the buck" and depend on them. This idea, along with its admirable companion, an attempt to secure theological candidates from among Negroes, has appealed to many synods heretofore. I am told that several years ago the North Carolina Synod attempted to secure some Negro youth who would be acceptable as theological candidates and failed when it was proved that such persons as they found could not make the grade in college.

Of course, such an outcome was to be expected when one considers the terrific handicap of the average southern (and northern slum-dwelling) Negro's background. No man is inherently inferior, no race is intellectually poorer than any other, yet poor environment and poor schools can stunt anyone's mental development. It is too much to ask the average man, white or colored, to make the transition from Class C high schools to college life. The occasional genius can do it, and probably could do it without high school, yet genius is perennially hard to find. For every George Washington Carver and Booker T. Washington who makes the grade, there are thousands who do not and can not, for the cards of life are too well stacked against them from their heredity to their acquired traits.

No, this plan, basically fine as it is, cannot be considered a correct response to the unchurched Negro's problem as it *now* stands. There are many reasons for desiring the preparation of an indigenous ministry among minority groups, among them the undeniable fact that people will work better with members of their own race, yet this plan is too slow to meet the challenge *now*. We Lutherans should by all means seek out qualified Negro (and Mexican-American, Japanese-American, and American Indian) youth for admission to our colleges and seminaries, but we must not let the millions of Negroes who now have no shepherds wait until these students (who have not even been "found") are ordained. We must begin such a search for *indigenous* leaders, but like the foreign mission board, we must send

white missionaries to begin the work now before such leaders can be obtained. Right now, when we should answer the call, we have (for the most part) only *white* home missionaries to send.

It may be argued that such "mixing" of a white missionary and Negro people would be "offensive" to many Lutherans, especially in the South. Again, it may be said that although segregation is illegal from the point of view of federal law, on the state level (in the deep South) it is legal. It can be reasonably believed that it could also be physically dangerous. To go into the slums where so many of the unchurched Negroes live is not healthy for a white man in the daytime, much less at night. The home missionary would have to be out among his people at all hours —in fact, he would have to live among them. No effective mission work could be done if the pastor retreated each evening to the nicer precincts in the "better part of town."

No doubt it would be an uncomfortable feeling, a feeling that I experienced when I worked in the slum area of Philadelphia. It is hard to be an "outsider," a "have," in the midst of "gangs" of "have-nots." Nevertheless, the challenge is no greater than the challenge in the Liberian jungles, or the dark streets of crowded Hong Kong. Men have been found who would risk their lives to carry the Gospel to the ends of the earth. Surely our Lutheran church can find some who will risk their reputations (and perhaps their lives, too) in the "jungles" of Negro-town, U. S. A. It might help our people to think less emotionally, and more objectively, if they would mentally put themselves in the Negro's place and think of life (and death) without the blessings of the Christian Gospel.

So far, we have been negative in our approach. Certainly there must be a positive side somewhere, for there must be a correct response to every proper challenge. Logic may so teach, but life seems to have few "logical" answers to the terribly involved "existential" problems of life. There seem to be no "pat answers" anywhere to the problems raised by our unchurched (and ill-churched) colored population. I personally have the conviction that only one response will even begin to meet the need: a full and complete Christian acceptance of the Negro as a child of God for whom Christ died. This acceptance must go beyond the make-believe Christian "fellowship" that expresses itself solely in high-sounding resolutions. It must be a genuine face-to-face acceptance of the one man out of every ten we meet who has a colored skin.

Book Reviews and Notices[1]

Consummatum est: Eschatology and Church in the Gospel of St. John. By Alf Corell. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958. x + 240 pages. $5.00.

Doctoral theses of a technical nature, published in translation a decade after their original composition, without substantial revision from later findings, and stripped of documentation are not always too satisfactory. Alf Corell's *Consummatum est* has survived most of these hazards, however, to emerge as a contribution in current debate on Johannine theology.

Originally published in 1950 in Swedish, with the subtitle *Eskatologi och Kyrka i Johannesevangelict,* this work has been translated communally by the Order of the Holy Paraclete, Whitby, with no major changes in views for the English edition, the author affirms (p. ix), in spite of the Scrolls and much literature on John since then. Footnotes are used only to give scriptural citations. Though a long bibliography lists a formidable literature in German, French, English, and Swedish down to 1949, and reference is made to many of these writers, documentation and page numbers are almost never supplied. The result is exasperating when one wants to check a point but is, perhaps more important, readable, uncluttered by the usual jungle of citations in dissertations. This is one way of making theses presentable, but need the process be so spartan that even quotations are not identified as to source (p. 134), so strict that one is left to guess, from a twenty-four page bibliography, the identity of "one Scandinavian scholar" who has analyzed the use of *krisis* in John in an intricate way (p. 162)?

So then the book is a readable thesis on eschatology and church in John, Gospel and First Epistle. What does the writer try to do? Corell argues that both church and eschatology are important concepts in John and need to be seen in connection with each other.

Eschatology in John is viewed as past, present, and future, the adjectives "realized" and "proleptic" also being used to describe it. Bultmann's excision of the few futurist passages as the handiwork of *der kirchliche Redaktor* is rejected, and so is C. H. Dodd's emphasis on an exclusively "realized eschatology." *Tetelastai* (19:30), as the title suggests, is seen as the key verse, though more might be done, one feels, with I John 3:2 as a pregnant summary of John's eschatological thought, if Corell is going to argue for both realized and future eschatology.

Eschatology is further related to a "collective," the church, in John. Corell is strong on the community and light on the individual. "The ecclesiastical basis of the Johannine eschatology," he holds, "has preserved St. John from . . . the mystic's individualistic experience . . . and the apocalyptic's attempt to date and map out the last things" (p. 203), while "the eschatological foundation of the idea of the Church . . . prevents us from regarding it as merely an institution of this world" (p. 202). Instead, her cult and ministry, confession, and mission are seen as given by the Lord, these three functions corresponding to the facts of the unity, exclusiveness, and universality of the church (p. 99).

The presentation thus stresses the eschatological and ecclesiastical sides of John, though a long section is added on election as well. It is not surprising that the thrust is "theology, not chronology" (p. 196), with a heavy sacramental interest. Such concerns are reflected in the handling of individual verses. Thus, the "beloved disciple" becomes a shadowy collective—never an individual, of course—who represents the Church herself. Chapter 19, verse 34, the reference to water and blood flowing from Jesus' side, is taken, with Cullmann, as a reference to baptism and eucharist, though cognizance is also given to some of the other reasons for the verse,

1 Books reviewed or noticed in these pages may be purchased through your church's publication house.

which, in the context, seem more likely to the reviewer: this detail about water and blood is meant to strengthen the eyewitness idea (cf. v. 35), fulfills Old Testament prophecy (v. 37), and refutes the docetists (v. 34). At other times, however, Corell criticizes Cullmann for "being too zealous in seeking out a sacramental interpretation of the text" (p. 62).

What are the especial merits of Corell's book? A survey of opinions on various points, first of all, such as the twenty page summary of how election in John has been construed through the years (pp. 166-186). Even without documentation this is valuable and done with extreme conciseness. Second, brief examination of some twelve key terms in John (works, signs, words, faith) with succinct statistics on the presence of each and neat classifications of the use. And besides the general contribution on eschatology and church, some striking observations on the thought of John, like the comment that the Prologue is really an "overture," linking Johannine eschatology with "protology" (p. 115).

Chief among the book's demerits is the fact that many statements are dangerous when taken out of context and questionable even in context. Here are some examples. "The Christian ministry . . . is a sign that the church is created 'from above' and not by men. It is a function belonging to her very existence, instituted by Christ so that the members of his Body may receive the right administration of the Word and the Sacraments" (p. 4). "The Ecclesiastical Ministry is an expression of the unity of the Church. It is . . . a function of the church, instituted by Christ to administer his words [*sic*] and sacraments" (p. 100). The phrase at 6:40, "everyone that beholdeth the Son and believeth on him should have eternal life," is taken to refer to "the liturgical seeing of Christ . . . the seeing of Christ in the Eucharist" (p. 136). Or the interpretation of the footwashing in Ch. 13, that it "refers to the Sacrament of Penance" (p. 72). All warrant debate or clarification.

Readers will evaluate Corell's views partly in accordance with their sympathy towards his presuppositions and analysis of individual verses. Presuppositions usually clash with those of Bultmann, for example, whose views are cited only to be rejected. But at times one feels this is done too easily, as when it is stated (p. 115) that Bultmann has "an exaggerated idea of a polemic against the Baptist . . . in . . . the Fourth Gospel, but of which there is no trace in the Synoptic Gospels." Polemic against the Baptist does appear in the Synoptics, and more than once Corell seems to end up very close to Bultmann's views anyway (e.g., pp. 60 f., 206). Similar exaggerations or inconsistencies emerge in exegesis of passages. "The dead" of 5:25 are explained as "spiritually dead" on p. 149, but earlier this verse has been listed as evidence for a futurist eschatology (p. 108). Can it be both ways?

The parting of the ways for many readers may come over the role which Corell gives to the History of Religions approach towards John. The Scandinavian myth-ritual emphasis is in the forefront constantly, though with all too little documentation for readers unfamiliar with the work of the Upsala School. A striking case is the discussion on Jesus as King, where Corell outlines the age-old ritual pattern of "King" ideology in the ancient Near East. He then goes on, "The Evangelist has arranged his material in a way which suggests the liturgical pattern of the King ideology. For example, the ritual fight fought by the King has its counterpart in Jesus' cleansing of the temple. . . . Again the cult ceremony of the King's enthronement has its counterpart in Jesus' Triumphal Entry into Jerusalem," and so forth (pp. 18 f.). John, he concludes, "has consciously arranged his material in this way, so as to stress the conception of Jesus as the longed-for King" (p. 20). One wonders if John knew the results of myth-ritual investigation quite so well!

Students of John, however, should be grateful for this exposition of church and eschatology (which many writers have denied in the Johannine literature), along theological, *religionsgeschichtliche*, sacramental lines, whether they accept the orientation or not, for the translation reveals trends some Swedish research has taken on the perpetual enigma of John's thought.

John Reumann

The Book of Nahum. By Walter A. Maier. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959. 386 pages. $5.75.

The late Dr. Walter A. Maier is remembered by many for the evangelistic fervor which he brought to the Lutheran Hour on radio. It is not as generally known that he was also an Old Testament scholar and exegete of the first rank. The present posthumous publication gives evidence of the scholarly thoroughness with which he carried through the exegetical task. It also gives evidence of the evangelical firmness with which he championed his own basic convictions as to the prophet's message.

About one-third of the volume is devoted to the problems of Introduction. On internal grounds the book of Nahum is commonly dated between 663 and 612 B. C. Dr. Maier argues persuasively for a date early in this period, when Nineveh was still at the height of its prestige and power. He contends for the interpretation of the book as predictive prophecy and not as a temple liturgy. He is both incisive and insistent in his devaluation of attempts to reconstruct the form of the book on the basis of a metrical pattern allegedly used by Nahum. He is often caustic in his criticism and rejection of the "higher criticism" which rewrites the text to support a theory and refuses to let the text speak for itself. He does not conceal his own basic premise of respect for the Massoretic text, but he is willing to argue it out with those who believe otherwise; he quotes from a wide range of sources and weighs carefully each individual viewpoint. The reader does get the impression at times that he singles out J. M. P. Smith to serve as something of a "whipping-boy," or shall we say "as a special antagonist." The breadth and the depth of his research is too evident, however, to charge him with a dogmatic judgment. He is quite at home in the field of linguistics, and also in the field of archaeology as related to ancient Nineveh.

The commentary portion of the book is a verse by verse exegesis based on the Hebrew text. The translation is strikingly different at times from any of the English versions. The pattern of interpretation is that of exposition of the verse as a whole followed by detailed linguistic notes. Through it all runs a unified interpretation of the message of Nahum that makes it relevant both for the prophet's own historical situation and for the modern world. The author seldom loses sight of the historical perspective even while holding firmly to the divine inspiration of the prophet's message. Only occasionally does he oversimplify the problem of "higher criticism" by dismissing all who disagree with him on a given point as "critics." It may be said that Dr. Maier's own approach to his task is in a good sense critical. That does not detract from but adds to the value of his commentary. What impressed this reviewer is that he reaches a conclusion which is fair to the integrity of an ancient biblical manuscript and lets Nahum speak his message in his own way. This is a good book for the Lutheran pastor's library.

J. P. Milton

More New Testament Words. By William Barclay. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1958. 160 pages. $3.00.

The study of Greek can be interesting! Indeed it is, not only for the preacher (and his number is increasing) who uses it in preparing to preach, but also for the man who must depend upon the pulpit to bring the Good News to bear upon his life in imaginative and meaningful fashion. This is demonstrated by the fact that a newspaper (British Weekly) publishes articles on New Testament words and by the fact that when some of these studies appeared in a book (1955) the reception was such that a second volume of such studies is now available.

If preaching is to acquire more power in our day at least two things are needed: 1) a profounder penetration into the doctrines of our faith, and 2) a deeper awareness of the content of the words used to express them. A book like this, while no substitute for a Kittel or Arndt-Gingrich, does have values worthy of mention: 1) It demonstrates not only the meanings of words but also technique of word-study. 2) It illustrates how the study of words can transcend the words themselves and stand in reverence before the Word. 3) It shows how Greek words, which had a noble heritage from classical and philosophical usage, were still further

enriched as they became the bearers of Christian concepts.

It hardly needs repeating that behind the Koine of the New Testament lies not only the language of ancient Greece but also the great faith of Israel, expressed in speech characterized by poetic parallelism, concrete imagery and great realism, and transmitted through the Septuagint. Since this is so it is well to remember (e.g., for the word *agape*) that the meaning of a concept rests not only upon the New Testament usages, which Barclay has so generously documented, but also has roots, as Kittel and Cranfield (in A. Richardson's *Theological Word Book of the Bible*) show, in the Old Testament and the Septuagint. In the case of the word *logos*, on the other hand, Barclay has pointed to this Semitic source and this adds value to his fine study.

One may properly hope that the fruit of this book will find its way into many a sermon and that this will not be the last such study to come from Barclay's pen.

HARRY J. MUMM

The Twelve Christ Chose. By Asbury Smith. New York: Harper & Bros., 1958. $3.00.

The author draws pen portraits of each of the twelve apostles, using for his sources the New Testament, legendary material, and his own imagination. The characters and events which he describes serve him as paradigms of general spiritual truths, and these in turn are illustrated by modern examples and religious poetry.

The result is a book fluently written, easily readable, instructive, and indeed quite entertaining. This reviewer feels, however, that the author tends to mingle Scripture and tradition, fact and fiction, objective events and their subjective interpretation too freely. Perhaps it is true that John had "spiritual capacity," Levi a nagging wife, and Thomas a melancholy strain. But the New Testament gives only very slight support for these character studies. Could it be that its writers refrained intentionally from psychological analysis of the apostles because to them faith was a miracle of sheer grace?

U. S. LEUPOLD

Bibelns Eget Budskap. By Hugo Odeberg. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag. 203 pages.

This volume is a series of Bible studies by Hugo Odeberg, published in connection with his sixtieth birthday celebration. For all who can read Swedish there is a wealth of edification and inspiration in these studies. Public worship and private prayer and meditation are both emphasized. A major section in the volume is an interpretation of the Book of Revelation, primarily from a devotional point of view. Some of the presuppositions of the author with respect to problems of Introduction may be questioned, but there can be no question about the devotional values of the series.

A. D. MATTSON

Möten Med Den Uppstandne. By John Cullberg. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag. 83 pages.

This little volume is a series of Bible studies on the Resurrection appearances of our Lord. They involve a rather unique method of Bible study. The author recognizes the place that Bible exposition has held among Christians, he discusses the merits and the difficulties of the Vesteras method and then he goes on to describe the method which he uses. In the first place, he presents the situation as it is revealed in the text; in the second place, he emphasizes what the text means for a personal religious experience; and finally, he sums up each meditation with the actual message of the Word. The author has succeeded in giving us a most edifying series of Bible studies.

A. D. MATTSON

Sjukdom och Lidande i Nya Testamentet. By Bertil Gärtner. Stockholm: Svenska Kyrkans Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag. 85 pages.

This is a very fascinating little volume on the problem of evil—particularly on the problem of sickness and suffering. The author sees the problem in cosmic dimensions. He rejects the dualism of Zoroastrianism but he takes seriously the cosmic proportions of the struggle between God and Satan. He sees the problem of suffering in this con-

text. God has entered into this struggle and enters into it in the present and it is only in the religious context that there is any answer to the problem of evil. The author has made a real contribution to the discussion of this difficult problem.

A. D. MATTSON

Christ and the Christian. By Nels F. S. Ferré. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958. $3.75.

This is both an intriguing and a disturbing book. It is intriguing because of the forthrightness and the daring of its author. It is disturbing because it is often difficult to "pin him down," inasmuch as in so many instances new content is put into terms whose content has been established by long tradition.

The main line of Dr. Ferré's exposition runs as follows: Jesus of Nazareth was born in Bethlehem, a "Son of man." To say that he was born true man is to say that he was born as all other men with the drives of original sin. These hindered him, as they do all others, from reaching his true fulfillment. This is the first or subagapaic stage of his existence. At some point in his life (Ferré does not say when), Jesus was confronted by the "Son of God," the outgoing of God's Agape, offering him the activity by means of which he might arrive at his authentic Self. Jesus responded to this confrontation, as a result of which he was born again, that is, the divine nature became incarnate in him. He thus became "Son of God" as well as "Son of Man." He now had two natures, for which reason he is designated "God-Man." This was the second stage of Jesus' career. The divine nature, having become incarnate in Jesus, constituted the co-subject in Jesus' life, directing his self to its true fulfillment. This happened as the self, which hitherto had been identified with the lower nature, gradually submitted to the higher nature to the point where it became identified with it. In this way the true self emerged. The process concluded in the full response of one integrated personality conclusively enacting the Agape life of God. This was the third and final stage in the life of Jesus. The hyphen of the second stage was now dropped, for he was no longer "God-Man" but "Godman," he was no longer two sons, "Son of God" and "Son of Man," nor was he any longer of God or of man. As such Jesus was the first appearance of the New Being, the metaphysical union between God and man, the conclusive union of God and man—"Godman," organically related through God's nature as Love and man's nature as created in and by love. This consummate relation between God and man was first realized in Jesus.

It was not God's intention, however, that the New Being should stop with Jesus, but that all mankind should share in the fully integrated personality that became his by his conclusively incarnating in himself the Agape life of God.

As "Godman" Jesus reveals to us what we were meant to be, how far short we have fallen of true personality, and consequently that we are in need of redemption. He is our Redeemer in the sense that he shows us that the way to our fulfillment is by surrendering ourselves to the love of God in order that we might become "God-man," and ultimately like Him—"Godman."

There are many things for which Dr. Ferré is to be commended. Among these are the following: his uncompromising determination to make Christ relevant by placing him squarely within the human race and by disavowing any or all docetism, his working out of what he claims to be the two keys to the understanding of man's total relation to God, encounter and co-inherence (the first of these being the work of God as personal spirit—the second being the work of God as personal Spirit), his presentation of Jesus Christ as both the fulfillment of manhood and of all mankind, his setting forth of Jesus Christ as the principle by which human existence may be understood, judged and saved, and his analysis of existence into the levels of the inanimate, the organic, the personal and the spiritual. All of these reveal Dr. Ferré to be the possessor of a keen and analytic mind and of a spirit that is not interested in doing lip service to the past but in wrestling with the contemporaneous situation in order to make the Christian faith a communicating reality.

In spite of these and many other helpful insights, however, the book raises some very serious questions. Among them the following may be mentioned:

1. Every theologian knows how difficult it is to walk the tight rope of the articulation of the doctrine of God without falling down either on the side of tritheism or modalism. The question by which this reviewer was again and again confronted as he read the book was: How trinitarian is Ferré's doctrine of God? He can write, "After all, there is only one God as Son, one second person in the Trinity" (p. 211), and "The fact is that in Jesus Christ the eternal Son of God has come into human form and into human history. The eternal ontological son, the pre-existent personal word, is Agape. The personal Spirit who is wholly Love, and holy Love" (p. 201), and, "The only begotten Son is with God, begotten in eternity, and is God from the beginning" (p. 146). Yet, when pressed, there is serious question as to the hypostatic distinction between the Son and the Father. Ferré can also write, "God came as Son—not as another personality beside Himself but as the personal spirit of Love Who God is (p. 133) and, "The eternal Father comes Himself as the Son, the eternal outgoing love of God, to participate in man's desperate plight and to make a way out of it," and, "The pre-existent Son is God Himself in His outgoing capacity as Spirit operating in the singular" (p. 192). Sentences like these raise the question whether "the Son" is not another name for the Father—a designation of his nature but not a real distinction within the Godhead. This seems to be borne out in the sentence, "To call Jesus the eternal Son after the incarnation would be either to separate the two natures or to deny the permanent nature of Jesus' humanity" (p. 190). This is only necessary if "The Eternal Son" is a designation of nature and not of person—if there is no possibility of a continuity of identity between the Eternal Son and Jesus.

2. Does Ferré do justice to the incarnation? In his article on the *Christology of Donald Bailie* in the March, 1958, issue of *The Scottish Journal of Theology,* Prof. J. H. Hick uses a distinction which may be of some assistance in our discussion. He maintains that two aspects must be dealt with if full justice is to be done to the doctrine of the incarnation. He designates them as *incarnatum* and *incarnatio.* By the former is meant the historical phenomenom of the life of the incarnate Son. The latter refers "to the trans-historical noumenon of God's act of incarnating."

From the standpoint of the former (not, however, without some objections which will be raised later), Ferré shows great analytical skill and descriptive power in his attempt at expounding "the divine human psychology" of the life of Jesus. His spelling out of the insight that as a result of the fellowship between Jesus and God, human nature was brought to fulfillment, is that in the face of Jesus Christ we see the glory of God, is adeptly done. Dr. Ferré makes a strong case for the position that man was created in and for fellowship with God. Outside this fellowship man cannot arrive at the end for which he was created, but within it his fulfillment can be realized, as made manifest in Jesus Christ.

From the standpoint of *incarnatio,* however, the author does not fare as well. For Ferré the incarnation is not a "trans-historical noumenon of God's act of incarnating," but happened when Jesus of Nazareth, confronted by the Son of God, responded to his offer to rescue him from his subagapaic stage of existence and to his promise to become the fulfilling agent in his life. It was at this point that the incarnation took place, that the divine nature became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. He now had two natures —the *human,* which was necessary for him to be man, and the *divine,* which was necessary for him to become true personality. By this enmanning of the divine nature, Jesus became "God-man." By the indwelling of the divine nature God became the controlling co-subject in the life of Jesus, directing him to his true fulfillment. As Jesus submitted himself to the divine co-self, his true self emerged until the point was reached when there was a full response of one integrated personality conclusively enacting the Agape life of God. Jesus was now "Godman"—the New Being.

There is no New Testament evidence for the thought that Jesus was confronted by the Son of God. There is plenty of evidence that Jesus was in communion with Another. The consistent testimony of the New Testament, however, is that he designated this Other not

as the Son of God but as his Heavenly Father. There is likewise evidence that he knew the indwelling and leading of the Holy Spirit, and that he preferred to think (if the witness of the Fourth Gospel is acceptable at this point) of this relationship in personal terms. There is, however, no New Testament evidence that Jesus thought of the confrontation within which he stood as a confrontation by the Son of God, for the simple reason that he *was* the Son of God.

For him the term "Son of God" was the designation not of another person or nature but of himself. When used in the New Testament "of him" or "by him" it refers not to another beside himself or enmanned within him but to himself. When the Other is referred to it is designated as "the Father."

What we have in Ferré's exposition is not an incarnation as this has been traditionally understood, but an indwelling, an incorporation, an enmanning—a God-possessed man. That this is so is borne out in many places throughout the book. It is clearly expressed in the discussion of Jesus' uniqueness, which is not *sui generis* but lies in the fact that he was the first human in whom the conclusive union of "God-man" occurred. What happened in his life can happen in the life of every man. This means, from Dr. Ferré's point of view, that we are all, to the extent we have responded to the love of God, incarnate "God-men," destined to become "Godmen."

The criticism levelled against Prof. Bailie by Prof. Hick in the article referred to above may with equal justice be levelled at Dr. Ferré. "But to think of the incarnation in such wise that any man who, divinely graced, lived a perfect human life would thereby be God incarnate is to define incarnation in terms not of deity but of divinity adjectivally construed, and is to fail in the task of restating the faith of the creeds for the modern world."

3. Probably the most daring thrust in Ferré's book is the setting forth of the thought of the "unsinlessness" of Jesus—not only in the sense that he had original sin, understanding by this a lower nature which had drives that hindered him from reaching his true fulfillment until enmanned by the Son of God, but also in the sense that the descriptions of his emotional states on a number of occasions clearly reveal what we know as anxiety. This Ferré calls sin since it indicates a lack of trust in God. "Sin is the acceptance of anxiety; fear is therefore the external sign of sin" (cf. pages 110-113).

There are three possible objections to this thrust. In the first place, the presence of these emotional states need not be identified with sin but with finitude, which Ferré himself appears to adopt as a more acceptable explanation later in the book (see footnote, page 166). In the second place, Ferré's brushing aside of the testimony of the Epistle to the Hebrews, "yet without sin," as having weight only "for the literalist" is arbitrary. The sinlessness of Jesus is not only claimed by the author of the Hebrews (if this passage stood alone in claiming the sinlessness of Jesus, then there might be some cause for question) but it is also acclaimed by John (I John 3-15), Peter (I Peter 3:22) and Paul (II Cor. 5:21). In the third place, if Jesus is to be identified with the race, not only as creature but also as sinner, then he is not in a position to make atonement, but is himself in need of forgiveness. This the New Testament will "not buy."

4. The worship of Jesus. "Jesus is now rightfully related to God, in one sense within the Trinity, in that God constitutes regulatively his nature as a human being "of the right hand of God." For this reason we no longer know Jesus "according to the flesh" but as the Spirit. In Jesus Christ God acted climactically to save the world. The same Lord or Spirit acts now both in heaven and on earth. We must therefore not worship Jesus as a human being who as to humanity forever remain like us. Yet we worship through the human being the Incarnate Lord who is saving Love. The constitutive reality of the Christ-deed was and is Agape. Those who have made an idol of the human Jesus and believe in him simply as God walking on earth may feel in this analysis that they have lost their Saviour" (p. 221). If this means that we can worship the Son of God apart from Jesus, then we have divided the natures and denied the incarnation. The New Testament does not share Ferré's point of view here. Thomas exclaimed of the resurrected Jesus: "My Lord and my God."

Stephen prays, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Peter proclaims, "This same Jesus, whom you men crucified, God hath made both Lord and Christ." The Risen Lord says to Saul: "I am Jesus whom you are persecuting." Paul writes: "That at the name of Jesus every knee should bow." The Book of Revelation sings: "Worthy is the Lamb who was slain, to receive power and wealth and wisdom and might and honor and glory and blessing."

The paradox of the Incarnation lies in the duality of natures and the unity of person. No articulation of the Incarnation which falls down on either side is adequate. In the opinion of this reviewer Dr. Ferré has ably presented the former—at the expense, however, of the latter.

GEORGE AUS

Maker of Heaven and Earth: A Study on the Christian Doctrine of Creation. By Langdon Gilkey. New York: Doubleday, 1959. 311 pages. $4.50.

The central thesis of this work (the latest in the Niebuhr "Christian Faith Series") is that the doctrine of creation can best be rescued from its present caricature as "an irrelevant dogma inherited from a prescientific and prephilosophic past" by combining the results of theological neo-orthodoxy and ontological metaphysics.

As an avowed disciple of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich, Gilkey attempts to mediate the distinctive orientations of both his teachers. Chances are that consistent representatives of either school of thought will be dissatisfied with this somewhat eclectic result. Few, however, could fail to gain many significant insights along the way as the author develops this basic Christian doctrine in a fresh and vivid way in constant dialogue with the latest findings in process philosophy, linguistic analysis and the physical sciences.

An illuminating opening section spells out the basic differences between the religious, philosophical, and scientific approaches when it comes to the question of "origins." Repudiating pseudo-science as well as pseudo-religion, the author contends that the opening chapters of Genesis, for instance, are not essentially concerned with a dated scientific "when" or "how," but rather the basic theological "Who." The doctrine of creation is primarily "an affirmation of faith . . . which asserts above all that our present existence is in the hands of the one almighty Lord whom we know as love. The theological idea of creation is first of all an answer to the religious question of the meaning and destiny of man's historical life" (p. 30).

Since he believes "it is unwise to dispense with either the ontological tradition or the more personal tradition when we speak of the Christian God," Gilkey then develops his doctrine of the Creator around the three concepts of transcendence, immanence, and freedom, as they depict, "analogically and mythically," the activity of God "beyond," "within," and "over" his creation. In keeping with this, the church's affirmation of the *creatio ex nihilo* may be said to express three main ideas. They are: 1) God alone is the source of all that is (guarding against idolatry); 2) creatures are dependent yet real and good (guarding against both monism and dualism); and 3) God creates in freedom and with purpose (guarding against speculation and despair).

The heart of the book (five consecutive chapters) is devoted to a critical analysis of the meaning of the "goodness of creation." Rejecting both the "orthodox" teaching on a perfect beginning and the "liberal" teaching on a perfect ending, Gilkey treats "Behold, it was very good" in terms of ever-present potentiality.

Five interrelated ideas constitute a modern "existential interpretation" of this doctrine. First, that creation is orderly and intelligible and a fit object of human activity. Second, that despite the contingency and precariousness of life, the essential structure of historical existence is meaningful. Third, that evil is an historical "intruder" in a world that is essentially good. Fourth, that the saving power of God which is proclaimed by the gospel can conquer this evil and realize the potential goodness of creation. (Ch. 8 on the interdependence of creation and redemption is, in many ways, one of the most valuable in the book.) Finally, that there is a divine purpose running throughout temporal existence to which the man of faith may relate himself as a prelude to eternity.

The dominant point(s) of view of this distinguished faculty member of the Divinity School at Vanderbilt University may best be gleaned from the following two quotations. On the one hand, "The Reformation was surely right in making justification by the grace of Christ, through faith alone, the absolute norm and center of the Christian message" (p. 220). On the other hand, however, Gilkey also maintains, "The religious question concerning an Almighty Creator, a Preserver and a Savior, is ultimately about the same "Being" as the metaphysical question concerning the Real from which all existence comes" (p. 35).

To this reader, at least, the author's persistent contention that "ontology and biblical theology are complimentary sides of the same religious affirmation" (p. 88) is basically incompatible with his concluding thesis that "the attempt of natural theology to reach God the Creator . . . can only uncover an idol, never the true God" (p. 267). In the age-old struggle between Jerusalem and Athens, Gilkey would appear to qualify for dual citizenship.

William H. Lazareth

Temporal and Eternal. By Charles Peguy. Translated by Alexander Dru. Harper and Brothers: New York, 1958. $3.50.

Charles Peguy, poet, editor, and ardent Christian, left a vast legacy both in French literature and life. He wrote a surprising array of prose works, about the Dreyfus case, anti-Semitism, the Catholic Church, French politics and, in addition, a number of polemical pieces, indicative at this date more of the tempo of French literary and esthetic life than they are illuminative of issues and personalities. A number of lengthy poems, some of them already translated into English, also add substance to the memory of Peguy.

Peguy was thirty-three when he returned to the Catholic faith of his childhood. The year was 1907, and seven years later he was killed at the battle of Marne. Daniel Halevy, the eminent historian, Jacques and Raissa Maritain (the latter in *Adventures of Grace*) have told parts of the story of those stormy intervening years. Peguy was editor of the *Cahiers* and thus seemed to his subscribers and French intellectuals the champion of liberty and the Left. His conversion was a shock to his readers; and it does not seem to have been easy for most Catholics to absorb either. Peguy tried to combine tradition and freedom, authority and moral decision, justice and obedience, an unflagging individualism with national patriotism and loyalty to the Christian faith.

There may be something to Raissa Maritain's thesis that Peguy's reluctance to attend mass, to baptize his children, to regularize his civil marriage, were not only a reflection of his respect for his non-believing wife but were also consequences of spiritual defection, a reluctance to do the deeds of faith. Whatever the judgments about those tempestuous seven years, the world is still richer for Peguy's literature in which he bears witness to the temporal vocation of the Christian. The two pieces included in *Temporal and Eternal* are from this period. The first, *Notre Jeunesse* (1910), called here *Memories of Youth,* discusses the Dreyfus case and what the clerical and republican "politique" has made of the Christian and republican "mystiques." The second piece, happily rescued from Peguy's mass of papers, is a series of musings of Clio. Their penultimate point comes when Clio, the goddess of history, says: ". . . they think God is working for them, forgetting that it is their office to work for Him. . . . The present unchristianity, our de-Christianity, if one may so describe it, is infinitely more serious, more culpable, more 'criminal,' as Corneille would say, than the unchristianity of former times, than the innocent anti-Christianity so to speak."

Peguy's charge against the political order of France is that the mystique, once genuinely an encompassing enthusiasm and passion for good, has become only policy; likewise he finds that Christianity is now also a politique and is administered by clerks. The responsibility of the Christians is like that of earlier days: "Originally, primitively, the mystical life, the Christian operation amounted to and consisted, not in avoiding the world, but in saving the world, not in fleeing the world or in separating and cutting oneself off from the world, in hiding from it, but, 'on the contrary,' consisted in nourishing the world mystically."

This book of 158 pages undercuts conventional Protestant-Catholic polemics and forces the reader's attention to those theses of Holy Writ concerning the opposition between the world and faith. Peguy spent all of his energies searching out the just, the true, the worthy and the Christian mystique. His writings are, despite their flamboyance, a testimony to the lay apostolate that Lutheranism is the poorer without. One could wish for something else in Protestant circles than the layman's committee assignments, and Peguy is a clue to a role that is decisive, even though it is unconventional.

PAUL L. HOLMER

Theological Essays. By F. D. Maurice. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1957. 331 pages. $5.00.

The church in England in the nineteenth century resembles in many ways the church in Alexandria in the third and fourth. Traditional theological problems were given fresh urgency by the development of science. All the questions concerned with the being and nature of God and with his relation to the world and the questions related to the historical origins of Christianity were discussed with courage, candor, and deep scholarship. The aim of theological activity was not to conquer adversaries, but to reach the truth out of devotion to Christ. The most representative exponent of the liberal temper which took shape in response to the great intellectual and social problems facing the church was F. D. Maurice, who was born in 1805 and lived to 1872.

Maurice brought un unusually sensitive and comprehensive mind to bear upon the great issues of his day. He combined a stress upon the objectivity of divine revelation, on the church as the divine society, and upon the activity of God in the sacraments, with an insistence upon the authority of Scripture, an appeal to personal experience, and an emphasis upon the indispensable vocation of reason within the structure of Christian thought. From the theology of Maurice flowed the mid-nineteenth century recovery in England of the objectivity of religion and the supernatural character of the church. His work laid the foundations of the position which was in time to domesticate higher criticism, and he must be regarded as one of the important founders of the social ethic which sought to overcome the cleavage between organized religion and the movements of social reform. It is not surprising that the influence of Maurice has grown steadily since his death. During the past few years Anglicans have re-examined his theology, and here in America H. Richard Niebuhr has given Maurice a place of honor in his *Christ and Culture.*

The *Theological Essays* were first published in 1853. Maurice intended this book to be a formal and mature statement of his theological beliefs, from which all his other activities, educational and social, necessarily flowed. The volume includes sixteen essays on the major doctrines, arranged in such a way as to constitute a systematic exposition of the intrinsic structure of Christian theology. At each point the author takes issue with Unitarian and Romanist objections to the classical Protestant heritage. Maurice is remarkable for the honesty and skill with which he states the objections to his own views and one is led to the conclusion that the essential questions to be faced by the apologetics and proclamation of the church have not changed since his time. These essays cover the main points of systematic theology and express Maurice's characteristic ideas, yet they are more like sermons than like chapters in a dogmatics textbook. They remind one of Kierkegaard's *Edifying Discourses* or of Tillich's sermons. The style is in parts rambling and obscure and the method is deliberately logical, yet the power of an authentic and living experience of God in Christ is everywhere present. To read Maurice is to encounter a rich and devoted Christian mind. Conservatives found him too liberal, and liberals found him too conservative. He has much to say to theologians of all schools.

HAROLD H. DITMANSON

The Things That Remain. By W. R. Inge. New York: Harper and Brothers. $3.00.

If it ever should happen that the making of books comes to a gradual end, it seems safe to assume that books of sermons will be among the last to disappear. The supply appears to be inexhaustible. Might we ask:

"Breathes there a preacher with soul so dead, who never has felt the yen to be read?" This paraphrased plagiarism would seem to be a fairly accurate appraisal of the situation. And if one could be sure of mining a consistently high grade of ore from the homiletic mines, this fact might well prove to be "a good thing." But is such the case? Judging from the samples I have seen, the jewels are few and far between. Many of these books are both trite and trivial, and sometimes even worse. One cannot help but wonder: who pays the printing costs for many of these literary lead balloons? What percentage of them pay their own freight?

It is granted, of course, that the book of sermons possesses, from the very outset, an implicit disadvantage. Sermons are prepared, normally, to be presented in person, to a seen congregation. Reduced to writing, the sermon which was probably very well received by the congregation initially loses much of its verve and cogency. The psychology of setting and person-to-person contact has much to do with sermonic success. Deprived of these invaluable aids, the preacher who would also write to the satisfaction of an unseen audience must be both a good preacher and a good writer, and the two do not always coexist.

The book herewith reviewed is a rather pleasant exception. The late Dean of St. Paul's cathedral in London, W. I. Inge, who died in 1954, is said to have been a great preacher. As this book clearly illustrates, he was also an effective writer. The depth of his insights, the wide range of his scholarship, and the cogency of his style are all present in these twenty selected sermons (the first of Inge's sermons to be published in the United States). They are a far cry from the typical scissors-and-paste job of the contemporary American pulpit, with an illustration here and an anecdote there; they are rather, for the most part, sound literary productions. The present Dean of St. Paul's, W. R. Matthews, pays tribute in a brief Introduction to Inge's "powerful and acute intelligence, his intellectual honesty, his gift of terse epigram, his way of blurting out uncomfortable truths"—and all of this and more is reflected in "The Things That Remain." This title, by the way, was originally appended to what appears to have been Inge's next-to-the-last sermon preached before retiring as Dean.

It must also be acknowledged, however, that the man who reads Inge's sermons in the light of *confessio Augustana invariata* will find a number of theological bones to pick. The devil, to Inge (for example), is "our evil over-self." He also quotes, with evident approbation, the definition of faith (attributed to Clement of Alexandria) which stresses that faith is "compendious knowledge," and something that begins "as an act of choice." The sermon on "Dr. (Samuel) Johnson's Faith" is a rather strange panegyric, based on I Peter 2:17. In general, it might be said that the evangelical note is present in these sermons, though in a somewhat muted form. For some of us it may not come through with sufficient regularity and clarity.

But in spite of that, this is a book of sermons which I believe deserves a wide acceptance. Almost anyone who preaches regularly can learn something of value from Dean Inge's efforts.

GENE LUND

Faith and Ethics. Edited by Paul Ramsey. New York: Harper and Brothers. 306 pages. $5.00.

This volume is a study of the theology of H. Richard Niebuhr by nine commentators, all eminently fitted to perform the task. Liston Pope has supplied a personal account of Niebuhr as a teacher and as a man and has well described his impact on generations of students at Yale University.

The book constitutes a study of contemporary trends in theological circles as it analyzes Niebuhr's reactions to these trends. The creativity of Niebuhr appears in his eclectic attitude as he confronts contemporary theological movements. Niebuhr's position has been defined as a "Radical Monotheism" and this volume points out the implications of this position for the church, for social policy, for race relations, for ethics and for the concept of the Kingdom of God. The influence of Barth, Troeltsch, Schleiermacher, Royce and many others is well defined as Niebuhr's position is described.

This is a volume of more than ordinary interest and it deserves careful study.

A. D. Mattson

Catholiques, Protestants: Freres pourtant. By Le Chanione Cristiani and Pasteur Rilliet. Paris: Fayard, 1954.

Catholiques, Protestants: Les Pierres d'Achoppement. By Le Chanione Cristiani and Pasteur Rilliet. Paris: Fayard, 1955.

These two books, which must naturally be considered together, are the result of patient collaboration on the part of two disinguished clerics troubled by the intransigence and potential greatness in the still bitter controversy started by the Reformers. L. Cristiani, a former professor in the Catholic Institute of Lyons, and Jean Rilliet, head of the French Calvinists in Zurich, go about their task in an interesting way. The books are made up of a series of short letters (4-14 pages) wherein each correspondent writes his reply to the deep issues that present themselves in the course of the discussion.

The first work was written before the two clerics had even met each other. In form it follows the Credo, a fortunate beginning, for while they themselves are getting to know each other better by elaborating their beliefs, the reader also gains by the personal exchange. The arguments (for such they are, even without personal bitterness) are carried through logically and earnestly. A conversational tone prevails, and the discussion, in Pastor Rilliet's words, is not cold. The main result of the correspondence in this book is that each man has frankly stated his principal beliefs while trying to find, among real differences, some points on which to establish an understanding. This is successful only up to a point, for the faith of both Cristiani and Rilliet is firmly ingrained in their respective traditions. The dominant impression is just this, that each one has succeeded in writing his own interpretation of the Creed, but that of a Catholic and that of a Protestant leave wide areas of divergence.

The second book delves more deeply into certain specific problems and is appropriately entitled "stumbling-blocks." The saints, the mother of Jesus, the Mass and Holy Communion, and church authority are a few of the subjects to which whole chapters have been devoted in this work. It is true, of course, that entire volumes would hardly exhaust each of these subjects, but the work here is not superficial and is often foot-noted with references to more complete works.

Apart from a useful and interesting exchange of views, the problem of unity or, at any rate, of rapprochement, seems at the end of the two books as remote as ever. The canon's final appeal is for prayer as the only hope, and when he asks himself how God is going to bring about this miracle, he answers, "It is his own secret." The results of this endeavor are not revolutionary.

N. Arne Bendtz

Steps to Christian Understanding. Edited by R. J. W. Bevan. New York: Oxford University Press, 1958. 212 pages. $3.50.

Perhaps the most important front in the war between the church and the world today is on the campus and in the classrooms of our colleges and universities, including church colleges. If men and women, students and professors, who think about their faith and its implications for life in all its aspects are to be kept and strengthened in their faith, they must be given some guidance in their thinking by the church. There is an abundance of literature, books and pamphlets that deal with problems of Christian faith. But many of them are aimed at theologians, not laymen, while yet others are aimed at laymen, but not thinking laymen. Any effort to help the thinking layman must be welcomed with deep gratitude.

This book represents such an effort, and there will be many who will be deeply grateful for it. It seeks to guide those who believe and think, and it starts out by recognizing that the power to think is dependent on God's will and that faith is the working of God's grace. The book is divided into three parts: God and the Word, God and Man, and Doctrines of the Christian Faith. The Introduction is actually a chapter on "Thinking about Religion," while the Conclusion discusses "The Place of Understanding." The book closes with the observation that, although it is primarily concerned with the problems of the mind, "religion is the response of our whole being."

In Part I: God and the World, we have

three essays, Science and Religion, The Biblical Story of Creation and Modern Science, and God the Creator, written by Henry Balmforth, Principal of Ely Theological College and Canon Residentiary of Exeter, S. H. Hooke, Emeritus Professor of Old Testament Studies, University of London, and C. A. Coulson, Professor of Applied Mathematics in the University of Oxford, respectively. The essays of Part II: God and Man, come from the pens of well known men. Norman Snaith, Principal of Headlingly College, Leeds, writes on "The Idea of Revelation in Religion," David Cairns, Professor of Practical Theology, Christ's College, Aberdeen, discusses "The Christian View of Man." Herbert Butterfield, Professor of Modern History in the University of Cambridge, is the author of "God in History." The four doctrines treated in Part III are: the person of Jesus Christ, the Holy Spirit, the Holy Trinity, and Christian hope. The essayists are S. P. T. Prideaux, sometime Canon of Salisbury, F. W. Dillistone, Dean of Liverpool, Percy Hartill, Archdeacon Emeritus of Stoke-on-Trent, and J. E. Fison, Sub-Dean of Truro, respectively. The introduction is written by W. R. Matthews, Dean of St. Paul's, and the conclusion by Nathaniel Micklem, sometime Principal of Mansfield College, Oxford.

Campus pastors and counselors could do much worse than to use this book as a study guide or to urge students and professors alike to read and ponder over it. And pastors who have thinking laymen among their flock, that is, laymen who because of their education face problems unknown to the average layman, would strengthen their ministry to them by studying this book themselves. We cannot expect to answer twentieth century questions with sixteenth century answers. Here is an attempt to supply some twentieth century answers. If you do not ask the questions, you will not be interested in the answers, but if you do ask them, this book will help you.

WALTER J. KUKKONEN

Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, Vol. I, *The Nineteenth Century in Europe.* By Kenneth Scott Latourette. New York: Harper Bros., 1958. 498 pp. $6.00.

Kenneth Scott Latourette received international attention among historians when he published his seven volume work, *A History of the Expansion of Christianity.* Before and since that time books have been coming from his pen. Now another massive project is "in the works," and, *Deo volente,* in due course five volumes covering the history of Christianity in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries under the general title, *Christianity in a Revolutionary Age,* will appear. The first, the volume under review, discusses the background of the nineteenth century and the Roman Catholic Church. The second volume (we understand it will be published in the autumn of 1959) will bear the title, *Non-Roman Catholic Christianity in Europe from 1815 to 1914.*

The volume begins with a quick review of Christianity from its beginnings to the seventeenth century. Then a more detailed survey of the transitional era (1789-1815) which lies just behind our modern society is presented in thorough-going Latourettian fashion. Over against this period of revolution (political, economic, intellectual), the author sets the Roman Catholic Church and develops his well-known theme of challenge and response.

Latourette, a Baptist, clearly treats the Roman Catholic Church from his Protestant orientation. This is the way it should be. But as a non-Catholic he examines his subject with scrupulous fairness, and in the process gives us an informative and illuminating chronicle of the papal church as it rose to meet the challenge of "revolution."

Those who know Professor Latourette's previous books will recognize, in this volume, his distinct style, his ability to treat movements in a panoramic, though not superficial, manner, and his helpful chapter or sectional summaries. One will also note the extensive bibliography and detailed index.

For the few who may not know, Dr. Latourette is professor-emeritus of missions and Oriental history in Yale University.

E. CLIFFORD NELSON

Early Christian Doctrine. By J. N. D. Kelly. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958. 500 pages. $5.75.

This important study in the doctrinal history of the ancient church covers the period

from the close of the Apostolic age to the middle of the fifth century, A.D.

The author is an Anglican scholar, Principal of St. Edmund Hall and Canon of the Chichester cathedral. This Anglican background of Dr. Kelly explains, in part, the rather extensive discussion of the hierarchal and sacramental teachings in the first centuries of the Christian church.

The book divides into four major parts.

In Part I, the Prolegomena, the author discusses, first, the contemporary environment of the Christian message, the religions, trends in the Graeco-Roman world. Chapters two and three deal with Tradition and Scripture.

Part II, the Pre-Nicene Theology, includes a discussion of the beginnings of the doctrines of the Trinity, of Christ, of man and redemption.

Part III covers the period from Nicaea to Chalcedon, the conflicts which necessitated the trinitarian and christological statements of the great councils. A comprehensive treatment of the teachings of sin and grace, of the atonement, and of the church and sacraments, in both the East and the West, concludes this part.

Part IV is an Epilogue. It deals with the nature of the Christian hope, the teachings of the soul, the resurrection, the parousia, the millenium, and life everlasting.

Here is presented to the student of ancient church history a readable and scholarly account of the main doctrinal tenets in the writings of the Greek and Latin fathers during the formative years of the Christian church. Because of the emphasis on the church and sacraments in Anglican theology, this volume is a supplement to the earlier standard works in the field of Christian doctrine. To be sure, Seeburg, for example, did not overlook these features in his monumental *Dogmengeschichte*. However, Dr. Kelly spreads before the reader a more comprehensive outline of the teachings of the Fathers with respect to tradition, church, and sacraments. On the other hand, some phenomena, Gnosticism for example, is given only a very cursory treatment.

The content of the chapters is nicely proportioned. The reader gets a good general view. The mode of presentation is comprehensive and has precision and detail. In addition, the volume is profusely documented from the original sources.

The book will be indispensable for the study of doctrines and dogmas in the first five centuries of the "undivided church."

OTTO W. HEICK

Lutherforschung heute. Edited by Vilmos Vajta. Berlin: Lutherisches Verlagshaus, 1958. 188 pages. DM16.80.

During the summer of 1956 the first International Congress for Luther Research was held in Aarhus, Denmark. It attracted about eighty scholars from Germany, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland, Holland, Austria, Hungary, Italy, France, Switzerland, Japan, England, Canada, and the United States. Initiated and planned by Vilmos Vajta, director of the Department of Theology of the Lutheran World Federation, the congress was attended not only by Lutherans but also by some non-Lutherans. Thus the interconfessional as well as international interest in the Reformer and in the Reformation, which is a notable characteristic today, came to expression. A second congress is planned for the summer of 1960 in Münster, Germany, and the relations between Luther and Melanchthon will be given special attention.

The present volume contains the papers which were read at the first congress without any attempt to report the discussions which followed each of them. Heinrich Bornkamm (Germany) and Roland Bainton (America) discussed problems in the biography of Luther and suggested, among other things, special areas which still require investigation. Gerhard Ebeling (Germany), James Atkinson (England), and Ruben Josefson (Sweden) discussed Luther's understanding of the Scriptures, the first showing how, in his treatment of Psalm 45, Luther departed from traditional exegesis, the second calling attention to the Reformer's high evaluation of John, and the third suggesting that for Luther Christ was in, above, against, and under the Scriptures. Sanctification was discussed by Regin Prenter (Denmark) and Philip Watson (England), the former asserting that progress in sanctification cannot be empirically substantiated but is not unreal, while the latter contended that

according to Luther justification and sanctification are two different aspects of one and the same work of God, one emphasizing forgiveness and the other renewal of life. Wilhelm Maurer (Germany) and Jaroslav Pelikan (America) discussed Luther's doctrine of the church, the former, on the basis of Luther's comments on the Psalms, as this doctrine was shaped by tradition, and the latter, on the basis of Luther's lectures on Genesis, as this doctrine was developed in opposition to the Jews, to Rome, and to the left wing of the Reformation.

The volume also contains a report by Hanns Rückert (Germany) on the progress which is being made to complete the Weimar edition, and also reports on recent Luther research in Scandinavia by Thestrup Pedersen, in Italy by Valdo Vinay, in America by George Forell, in England by Gordon Rupp, in Germany by Walther von Loewenich, in France by Theobald Süss, and in Hungary by Deszö Wiczian.

In addition to serving as a report of the Aarhus congress, this volume offers a helpful survey of recent Luther studies throughout the world.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

Reformation and Reaction in Tudor Cambridge. By H. C. Porter. Cambridge: The University Press, 1958. 462 pages. $10.00.

This book, written by a former research fellow of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge who is now lecturer in history at the University of Toronto, deals with aspects of religious life and thought in the University of Cambridge between 1500 and 1650. In its original form it was a 1952 winner of the Archbishop Cranmer Prize. This award, given periodically for writings "which shall relate the intention and result of the changes in doctrine, organization and ritual within the Church of England between 1500 and 1700," was earlier given to two treatises which make good companion volumes for a study of this period. They are E. G. Rupp, *Studies in the Making of the English Protestant Tradition: mainly in the reign of Henry VIII* (1947); and G. R. Cragg, *From Puritanism to the Age of Reason, a Study of Changes in Religious Thought within the Church of England, 1660-1700* (1950).

While a study of Lutheran beginnings always includes consideration of Wittenberg University, its professors, its patron and its influence in the rising reform movement, the usual treatment of the English Reformation so focuses attention on Henry VIII, Edward VI, Mary and Elizabeth that the role of the universities, "traditionally the nurseries of the church," receives but scant notice. For more than a decade prior to Henry's break with Rome Cambridge was a center of Reformation thought where many leaders of future reform were brought to new religious views. Even earlier the way was being prepared. The University lacked a Luther but it did for a few years enjoy the presence of Erasmus, who from 1511 to 1514 lectured in Greek at Queens College. The Reformation interest at Cambridge began as a love of letters on the part of men devoted to the New Learning but was soon to move beyond a mere academic concern.

By the mid 1520's Robert Barnes, close in sympathy and views to Luther, was preaching against the abuses of ecclesiastical courts and against the pomp and pride of prelates. Thomas Bilney, who in 1531 was to be burned as the first Cambridge martyr of the Reformation, was speaking out against images, prayers to saints, pilgrimages, vows, purported miracles and papal authority. Latimer was calling into question what he considered to be superstitious devotion, the gilding of images, setting up of candles and "other idle inventions of men whereby the glory of God was obscured." In 1531 Cambridge was debating the question of communion in both kinds, fasting, clerical celibacy, and the authority of the church.

Not only Bilney, but many other Cambridge men sealed their Reformation conviction with their very lives. Twenty-five of them died as martyrs between 1531 and 1558. Of the 472 Marian exiles who sought refuge on the continent, seventy-six were or had been members of Cambridge colleges. Through these men Calvinist ideas and practices were promulgated following their return from exile.

The influential continental reformer, Martin Bucer, who left Strassburg rather than accept the compromising Augsburg Interim,

taught at Cambridge from 1549 until his death two years later. Some of his suggestions, made in a detailed evaluation and criticism of the 1549 Anglican liturgy were incorporated in the 1552 revision of the Prayer Book. In 1557 the bodies of Bucer and Paul Fagius, his colleague both at Strassburg and Cambridge, were exhumed and publicly burned as heretics. When the fortunes of Protestantism had improved under Elizabeth the two men were in 1560 restored to a place of honor.

It was at Cambridge that English Puritanism had its rise. Thomas Cartwright in 1570 delivered his lectures on proposed reforms in church government which were to result in his removal from his professorship. Dr. Porter traces not only the beginning and spread of Puritan ideas and practices but notes also the reaction to Puritanism and the struggle, especially at Cambridge, between the opposing groups. Not all proponents of Puritan reform were involved in the conflict which was generated. Many "godly pastors" nurtured by the University of Cambridge were characterized by their pastoral devotion. Continuing their scholarly interests they spent from twelve to sixteen hours a day in study, private prayer and the writing of their diaries, "the Puritan substitute for the confessional" as part of their pastoral work.

A final section of the book reviews the theological debates on Grace, Predestination and Christian Assurance carried on at Cambridge during the closing decade of the 16th century. In these discussions the high Calvinism of William Whitaker and William Perkins was challenged and the more moderate position espoused by John Whitgift came to the fore, followed in turn by Whichcote and the Platonist School.

This volume, fascinatingly written, is helpful for a better understanding of the English Reformation and of the life of the Anglican Church during the century following its breach with Rome. The many parenthetical references included in the body of the text may be distracting to the general reader, but provide interesting sidelights which illuminate the subject matter under discussion.

DORRIS A. FLESNER

The Formation of the American Lutheran Church. A Case Study in Lutheran Unity. By Fred W. Meuser. Columbus: Wartburg Press, 1958. 327 pages. Paper, $3.50.

Literature on the history of the Lutheran Church in America has been enriched by the publication of this study, the original form of which was prepared as a doctoral dissertation. When supplemented by an equally scholarly history of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, which is reported to be in process of publication, we shall have access to a more reliable picture of what contributed to the emergence of that "middle group" of Lutherans who have stood between Missouri on the one hand and the United Lutheran Church on the other.

The present study traces the relations of the Ohio, Iowa, and Buffalo synods to other Lutheran synods and to one another up to the formation of the American Lutheran Church in 1930. The study proper is preceded by a sketch of the earlier history of Lutheranism in America and is followed by a summation of the characteristic positions of the body which is shortly to go out of existence in a new merger. Major emphasis is placed on doctrinal discussions and agreements. Non-theological factors, whether psychological, sociological, or cultural, are mentioned only incidentally. The men who were involved in the doctrinal discussions emerge less as personalities than as symbols of theological stances. The only exceptions are the theologian Reu and the administrator Hein, and this not by design, for it was apparently not the author's intention to do any more than trace the external steps toward unity in faith which prepared the way for organizational union. To wish that the author had done more is to wish for a book of double the size of this one, but what he has done is so well done that one would like to have more.

The study is based on a diligent and careful use of published and unpublished materials. Only the brief and limited influence of *The American Lutheran Survey* seems to have remained untouched. Such issues as predestination and conversion, chiliasm and Antichrist, open questions, confessional subscription, church and ministry, the lodge question, and altar and pulpit fellowship are

treated with fullness in their context. Especially helpful is the extended description and analysis of the controversy over inspiration, which almost caused the merger of 1930 to founder. Here one might suggest that the difference between Iowa and Ohio was not so much that the former was biblical and the latter was theological in its orientation (pp. 93, 94), for both were theological, but that the former was less scholastic. The author reconstructs the theological debates and the solutions arrived at not in order "to write an *apologia* for the American Lutheran Church nor to vindicate the actions of any of the participants." Rather, it was his purpose to understand the church to which he belongs and "help that church to understand itself in the light of its history." This he has accomplished admirably.

The reader will make his own observations as he reflects on the findings. The extent to which the thinking of Lutherans in the former Ohio, Iowa, and Buffalo synods was oriented, consciously as well as unconsciously, around positions and attitudes of the Missouri colossus to the right and the emerging United Lutheran Church colossus to the left is astonishing when spelled out in detail. Hardly less interesting is the price which the whole Lutheran Church in America has paid for its loss of theological contact with Lutherans in Europe before World War I, or even before World War II. A retrospective glance, with the aid of this detailed study before us, illuminates the tragic extent to which Lutherans in America have in the past wrestled with the wrong questions or with the right questions put in the wrong way. In part, at least, this was because they had insulated themselves against stimulation from fellow-Lutherans abroad and isolated themselves from the issues confronting fellow-Christians at home. But perhaps all this was necessary to prevent the Lutheran Church from losing its identity in the religious pluralism of the New World and to prepare it for a more important future.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

Kyrkoliv och väckelse. By Sigvard Plith. Stockholm: Svenska Diakonistyrelses Bokförlag, 1959. 301 pages. Kr. 20.00.

Another product of Professor Hilding Pleijel's emphasis at Lund on the relation of ecclesiastical and social history, this study by one of his students treats the effects of the neo-evangelical awakening of the nineteenth century on church life in the diocese of Skara. The awakening gained an early foothold among poor peasants who had been cut loose from community life by economic and social changes and also by the church's policy of dissolving country churches to merge them into larger, centralized parish churches. Such people rediscovered the lost intimacy of religious and social life in conventicles, mission chapels, and missionary societies. Meanwhile attendance at established churches and reception of Communion in them declined. The tables on frequency of Communion (pp. 257-275) between 1800 and 1910 are illuminating beyond the context of this study. The results of the investigation are summarized in German at the close of the volume.

THEODORE G. TAPPERT

The Victor Speaks. By Edmund Schlink. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House. 126 pages. $2.50.

The author is Professor Schlink of Heidelberg University, who is well known among American theologians as a most distinguished representative of Lutheran conservatism. In his own country he has been a leader in opposition to liberal attacks on the authority of the Bible as the Word of God. He is the author of a number of books and articles in defense of the faith.

This book is not controversial but sermonic. The translation was begun by Professor Paul F. Koehneke and on his death was completed by his son, Dr. M. L. Koehneke. It is an excellent translation and "reads well."

The sermons are based on the seven last words from the cross and eight words of the Risen Christ. It is the second series that offers the more unique contribution to sermonic literature.

There is nothing coldly intellectual about these sermons. The translators have achieved a remarkable impression of passionate eagerness on the part of the author to inspire understanding and commitment to Christ as God and Saviour. Sentences rush along at

a rapid pace eloquently witnessing to a victorious Saviour. Professor Schlink writes as a conquered man using every skill of expression to extol the Victor.

There are many quotable passages for present day preaching. "There is no faith except the faith of Jesus Christ. No faith leads to God unless it is the faith of this crucified One" (p. 40). "As one in a hurry, the Risen Lord gives command (to Mary Magdalene in the garden by the empty tomb) to hurry: 'Go to my brethren and say to them.' He hurries away from them not only at his ascension into heaven but in all his appearances, beginning with Easter. As soon as he has established faith and has given his commission he disappears, and so by his very disappearance he counsels: you have here no continuing city. Hurry, hurry!" (p. 57 ff.)

In treating the great commission Professor Schlink says, "The command of Jesus says nothing about the sequence of Baptism and instruction, but he says: No Baptism without instruction—and no instruction without Baptism! By means of both, the nations are to be delivered to the one Lord of all lords" (p. 111). His attitude toward the Old Testament is expressed in these terms; "The Old Testament is not solved for anybody except by faith in the crucified and risen Lord, and the crucified and risen Lord is not revealed to anybody without the Old Testament. Whoever believes in the victory of the crucified Lord in his resurrection can more easily do without the Scripture of the New Testament than without the Scripture of the Old Testament. For 'the New Testament is nothing else but an opening and revelation of the Old Testament. If I had the Holy Spirit, I too, could make a New Testament out of the passages of the Old Testament if it had not already been done' (Luther)."

This would be a very suggestive book for any preacher as he plans his sermons from Ash Wednesday to Pentecost. It might have been expanded and made more useful by illustrations. Naturally, the large majority of quotations are from Luther.

Amos John Traver

Preaching for the Church. By Richard R. Caemmerer. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959. 345 pages. $4.50.

Any book on homiletics is apt to be repetitious and less than exciting. Any book by the distinguished Professor of Homiletics of Concordia Theological Seminary, Dr. Richard R. Caemmerer, is, however, apt to be interesting and penetrating. What happens when these two conflicting situations meet is recorded in this book. Anyone who reads this excellent volume will undoubtedly agree that the author has overcome some of the difficulties in writing a book on homiletics, for in interesting language and style, and with deep theological insight, he discusses the major considerations in a fundamental course in homiletics. The book might well serve as a text in the seminary classroom, but will also be of great value to any preacher of the Gospel.

The topics are discussed briefly and crisply without undue prolonging of any particular phase of the discussion. It has a happy balance of the practical and the doctrinal and can be read with profit by all those engaged in preaching.

Arthur O. Arnold

Preaching, the Art of Communication. By Leslie J. Tizard. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 106 pages. $2.25.

This book is, by its own admission, an incomplete book. The author, a minister of the Congregationalist Church in Great Britain, died before the manuscript was finished. But in what we have there is much of value. His concept of preaching is that it is proclamation. "All true preaching is proclamation, although, of course, not all proclamation is preaching. You may proclaim anything, but you are not preaching in the Christian sense unless you are proclaiming what God is and what he has done" (p. 10). The content of the proclamation is listed as (1) the historical facts through which God revealed himself and acted for man's salvation, (2) what God has done through Christ in human experience, and (3) what God has done for us and others he can and will do for anyone. The purpose of preaching is "to bring about a personal encounter between God and the

souls of his hearers. . . . When a man with ears to hear has listened to the faithful preaching of the Gospel, he stands naked and defenceless before the God who judges him, but who in his great mercy also forgives and empowers him" (p. 18).

Chapter II and III deal with the personality of the preacher. The distinction between the chapters is that one is a positive approach and the other negative. The positive emphasis is on the awareness of a sense of call to preach characterized by a feeling for the needs of men and having the constraining love of Christ. This sense of a call to preach is not only to be felt upon entering the ministry, but is in constant need of renewal. The essential qualities of the preacher are listed as sincerity, love, authority, and self-acceptance. The temptations (negative approach) which confront a preacher are craving for power, the love of praise, the dangers of self-display, the need to satisfy a personal emotional need. In the course of this chapter the aim of the sermon is again emphasized in a quotation from Dr. John Watson, "As it now appears to me, the chief effect of every sermon should be to unveil Christ and the chief art of the preacher to conceal himself" (p. 41).

"The Art of Communication" is the title of Chapter IV. A recital of the parts of this chapter would make it sound rather commonplace. Indeed, what is dealt with is just that. Yet, every preacher needs to be reminded of what is here. This is in no sense a technical chapter about the science of communication. It is a refreshingly written reminder of that which all of us need. It is the heart of the book.

The last chapter, which was apparently to have been one of many on different types of preaching, is entitled "Pastoral Preaching." It deals with the relationship between counseling and preaching.

This is a helpful book, written in the style of which only the British seem to be capable. Incomplete though it is, it has more to offer than many another book in this field which makes no confession of incompleteness.

STANLEY D. SCHNEIDER

The Sermon and the Propers. By Fred H. Lindemann. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1958. Two volumes: 200 and 246 pages. $4.00 and $4.50.

Any pastor using the established text of the church year will find a great deal of help in this two-volume work by the well-known Pastor Lindemann. It is a careful attempt to give background and insight into the proper relationship between the sermon and the appointed Propers for the day. The book follows a rather constant pattern, with each chapter containing some remarks about the particular day, a few observations on the Propers, and an outline, or a brief sermon, on both the Epistle and the Gospel for the day.

The author's viewpoint is that the sermon is a part of the thought worship and that it should be related to the rest of the liturgy. This book is exceedingly valuable as reference material for a pastor preaching in the liturgical tradition.

ARTHUR O. ARNOLD

The Sign of the Cross. By O. P. Kretzmann. St. Louis: Concordia Press, 1959. 86 pages. $1.25.

Again from the pen of a poet, theologian, and churchman comes a book rich in devotional literature. It is one of the Lord's achievements in personality that a man whose days are filled with administrative pressures can lead men into the soul's searching for the inner springs of life. Few books will be more searching reading during Lent, or for that matter at any time during the church year, than this.

A. N. ROGNESS

Invitation to Commune. By Charles R. Goff. Nashville: Abingdon Press. 94 pages. $1.75.

This splendid little book speaks to the children of our age and it speaks in evangelical language. From the opening chapter on *Repentance,* it addresses itself to the Christian duty and privilege in the Lord's Supper. While it does not deal in theological profundities, the mystery of Holy Communion is not left vague and undefined, but is firmly linked with the Lord's suffering and death

for the sins of the world. The reader is recalled to the atonement once made on Calvary, and the feast is cast in the memorial motif rather than in the context of a living presence in bread and wine. But the book is a practical, devotional and effective call for the Christian to prepare himself to share in the high Sacrament of the Church.

A. N. Rogness

Men Who Faced God. By William J. Siegel. Rock Island: Augustana Press, 1959. 89 pages. $2.00.

This book recaptures the events and personalities of the crucifixion with a vivid detail rarely found in a series of Lenten sermons. The author betrays that he has himself been intrigued by the geography and history of the Holy Land to such an extent that he perhaps belabors the descriptive to the exclusion of the exhortative. On the other hand, the graphic reconstruction of these events and places enables the reader himself to make application to his own situation. These are sermons, too, that probe into the reader's heart with power. This book will be helpful to the preacher and an engaging book for the lay reader.

A. N. Rogness

I Believe in Immortality. By John Sutherland Bonnell. New York and Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959. 96 pages. $1.25.

This is one of the volumes in a new series of inspirational booklets which seek to answer the average man's questions about the Christian faith in simple, non-technical language. The author, in order to bolster our faith in life after death, appeals to the universal longing of the human heart, to rational proofs, to his own sincerely felt conviction and that of many other believers and noble minds, and to the Bible. His collection of quotations and illustrations for immortality is quite impressive. But he fails to come to grips with the problem in its biblical dimension. In spite of his own admission that immortality is not a Bible key word, the whole discussion centers around this concept. Lacking any reference to the stark terror of death and the still more terrifying possibility of eternal death, the presentation lacks the realism of the biblical hope and passes only now and then beyond the friendly and harmless vistas of humanistic idealism.

Ulrich S. Leupold

Risen Indeed. Studies in the Lord's Resurrection. By G. D. Yarnold. New York: Oxford University Press, 1959. 134 pages. $2.25.

This collection of ten devotions on the Easter narrative seeks to fill in a gap. While there is no lack of devotional and theological books on the passion of Christ, there are relatively few on the resurrection. The author of this book offers a discussion of each story with practical applications. His approach to the Easter events is basically conservative, tempered by psychological explanations; e.g., he accepts the appearances of the risen Lord as "objective and physical, plus something more which is indescribable," but takes the angels in the empty tomb for a personification of the truth that had come alive in the disciples' heart ever since the crucifixion. On the whole, this book is not supposed to be a critical examination of the Easter stories. Its aims are devotional, rather than theological. But at times one cannot escape the impression that the author belabors the obvious, and that if critical questions are raised at all, they deserve a more radical answer than the reader is given.

Ulrich S. Leupold

Ecclesiastical Embroidery. By Beryl Dean. Boston: Charles T. Branford Company, 1958. 258 pages.

The title of this book suggests that it is of rather limited interest. It is. Although the jacket says "It should be emphasized that Miss Dean's treatment is non-sectarian and that the instructions that she gives are as applicable to Roman usage as to that of the Church of England," it will take a discriminating Lutheran, well read liturgically, to make use of certain parts of the volume.

Apart from this observation it must be said that the book is well written and more than adequately illustrated. This reviewer, knowing nothing of the mechanics of embroidery, can in no way evaluate the effectiveness of the instructions given for this

art. He can agree wholeheartedly with the observation on pages 27 and 28: "Much religious art has become almost synonymous with the sham Gothic products: to some it seems impious to import new forms into the church, forgetting that each style was modern in its time and as it emerged met with opposition and criticism."

There are fourteen chapters in this book. Ten of these are concerned with the mechanics and materials of embroidery. The first four deal with the history of the art, with design and color, the liturgy, and symbolism. Miss Dean is British and the bulk of her illustrations and references are to things British and continental.

For the specialist with a particular interest in art and architecture this book has value.

STANLEY D. SCHNEIDER

Discovering Love. By Lance Webb. New York: Abingdon Press, 1959. 176 pages (with index). $3..00.

An experienced Methodist preacher has gathered numerous illustrations, quotations, etc., about love and its practical significance in daily life. He has also quoted abundantly and appropriately from Scripture giving brief and sound interpretations. His style is quite readable for the average layman. It is generally sound from a mental health as well as from a theological point of view. In short, there is nothing objectionable to this reviewer with the exception that almost everything said in this book has been said so often before that it practically amounts to repeating the obvious. Yet it could be good general reading matter on a parish library shelf for the parishioner who says, "I'd like to read something. Do you have any suggestions?" It is full of sermon illustrations, but I'm afraid they've been used frequently.

DAVID BELGUM

How to Tell Your Children About Sex. By Clyde M. Narramore. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing House, 1958. 97 pages. $2.00.

The author of this excellent and wholesome guide for parents is Consultant in Research and Guidance for the Office of the Los Angeles County Superintendent of Schools. The approach is psychologically sound and has an unforced spiritual tone that helps parents take sex in their stride as a natural part of God's creation. This book is highly recommended for the parish library, for parents' groups or couples' clubs and Sunday School teachers, who frequently are asked frank questions about sex by pupils anywhere from age three or four on right through adolescence.

A fine feature of this small and readable book is that there is no deep morbid threatening of parents who might happen to make a few mistakes along the way. Many current "helps" for parents are actually quite frightening because the already fearful young parents are promised that if they don't do just right, their children will very likely become hopelessly psychotic. This book deals with most common questions in the sex area with a wholesome attitude of objectively, illustrative samples, and quiet reassurance. A few topics are: "The Right Vocabulary," "How Much Should a Child Be Told?" "Explaining the Father's Role in Reproduction," and "When Children Ask About Menstruation," etc.

DAVID BELGUM